Can Asians Think?
Mini Teaser: Realistically, can the rest of the world continue to ride on the shoulders of the West? If Asians double in population in the next fifty years, will they be able to carry their fair share of this burden?
This is obviously a sensitive question. In this age of political
correctness that we live in, just imagine the uproar that could be
caused if I went to Europe or Africa and asked, "Can Europeans
think?" or "Can Africans think?" You have to be Asian to ask the
question "Can Asians think?"
Given its sensitivity, let me explain both the reasons why and the
context in which I raise the issue. First, I believe that if one had
to ask one single, key question that could determine the future of
the globe, it could well be "Can Asians think?" In 1996 Asians
already made up 3.5 billion out of a global population of over 5
billion (or about 70 percent of the world population). By
conservative projections, the Asian portion of the world population
will increase to 5.7 billion in 2050 out of a global population of
9.87 billion, while the populations of North America and Europe will
remain relatively constant at 374 million and 721 million,
respectively. Clearly in the past few centuries, Europe, and more
recently North America, have carried the larger share of the global
burden in advancing human civilization. By 2050, when Europeans and
North Americans make up one-tenth instead of one-sixth of the world's
population, would it be fair for the remaining 90 percent of mankind
to expect this 10 percent to continue to bear this burden?
Realistically, can the rest of the world continue to ride on the
shoulders of the West? If Asians double in population in the next
fifty years, will they be able to carry their fair share of this
burden?
Second, I am not asking this question about individual Asians in
terms of limited thinking abilities. Clearly, Asians can master
alphabets, add two plus two to make four, and play chess. However,
throughout history there have been examples of societies that
produced brilliant individuals but yet experienced a lot of grief
collectively. The classic example of this is Jewish society. Per
capita, Jews have contributed more brilliant minds, from Einstein to
Wittgenstein and from Disraeli to Kissinger, than any other society.
Yet, as a society, they have suffered so much, especially in the past
century or so. (Let me stress that I am not speaking about the
travails of Israel in modern times. I am speaking of the period from
135 A.D. when the Jews were forced to leave Palestine to 1948 when
Israel was born.) Will the same happen to Asian societies, or will
they be able to think well and ensure a better future for themselves?
Third, the time scale in which I am posing this question is not one
of days, weeks, months, years, or even decades. I am looking at the
question from the time scale of centuries, especially since we stand
two years away from the new millennium. Arguably, the future course
of world history in the next few centuries, as I will explain later,
will depend on how Asian societies think and perform.
Back then to the question: "Can Asians think?" In a multiple-choice
examination format, there would be three possible answers: "Yes",
"No", or "Maybe." Before we decide which choice to tick off, let me
make a case for each answer.
No, They Cannot Think
I will start with the reasons for the "No" answer, if only to refute
any critics who may suggest that the question itself is manifestly
absurd. If one looks at the record of the past thousand years, one
can make a very persuasive case that Asians, Asian societies that is,
cannot think.
Let us look at where Asian societies were a thousand years ago, say
in the year 998. Then, the Chinese and the Arabs (i.e., Confucian and
Islamic civilizations) led the way in science and technology,
medicine and astronomy. The Arabs adopted both the decimal and the
numbers 0 to 9 from India, and they learned how to make paper from
the Chinese. The world's first university was founded just over a
thousand years ago, in the year 971, in Cairo. By contrast, Europe
was then still in what are familiarly known as the "Dark Ages", which
had begun when the Roman Empire collapsed in the fifth century. As
Will Durant summed it up in The Age of Faith (1994):
"Western Europe in the sixth century was a chaos of conquest,
disintegration, and rebarbarization. Much of the classic culture
survived, for the most part silent and hidden in a few monasteries
and families. But the physical and psychological foundations of
social order had been so disturbed that centuries would be needed to
restore them. Love of letters, devotion to art, the unity and
continuity of culture, the cross-fertilization of communicating
minds, fell before the convulsions of war, the perils of transport,
the economies of poverty, the rise of vernaculars, the disappearance
of Latin from the East and of Greek from the West."
Against this backdrop, it would have been sheer folly to predict at
the time that in the second millennium Chinese, Indian, and Islamic
civilizations would slip into the backwaters of history while Europe
would rise to be the first civilization ever to dominate the entire
globe. But that, of course, is precisely what happened.
It did not come about suddenly. Until about the sixteenth century,
the more advanced societies of Asia, while they had lost their
primacy, were still on a par with those of Europe and there was no
definite indication that Europe would leap far ahead. At that time,
Europe's relative weakness was more apparent than its strength. It
was not the most fertile area of the world, nor was it particularly
populous--important criteria by the measure of the day, when the soil
was the source of most wealth, and human and animal muscle of most
power. Europe exhibited no pronounced advantages in the fields of
culture, mathematics, engineering, navigation, or other technologies.
It was also a deeply fragmented continent, consisting of a hodgepodge
of petty kingdoms, principalities, and city-states. Further, at the
end of the fifteenth century Europe was in the throes of a bloody
conflict with the mighty Ottoman Empire, which was pushing its way,
inexorably it seemed, toward the gates of Vienna.
Asian cultures, on the other hand, appeared to be thriving as late as
the fifteenth century. China, for example, had a highly developed and
vibrant culture. Its unified, hierarchic administration was run by
well-educated Confucian bureaucrats who had given an unparalleled
coherence and sophistication to Chinese society. China's
technological prowess was also formidable. Printing by movable type
had already appeared in the eleventh century. Paper money had
expedited the flow of commerce and growth of markets. China's
gargantuan iron industry, coupled with the invention of gunpowder,
gave it immense military strength.
However, and amazingly, it was Europe that leapt ahead. Something
almost magical happened to European minds, and this was followed by
wave after wave of progress, from the Renaissance to the
Enlightenment, from the Scientific Revolution to the Industrial
Revolution. While Asian societies degenerated into backwardness and
ossification, European societies, propelled forward by new forms of
economic organization, military-technical dynamism, political
pluralism within the continent as a whole (if not within all
individual countries), and the uneven beginnings of intellectual
liberty (notably in Italy, Britain, and Holland), produced what would
surely have been called at the time the "European miracle"--had there
been an observing, superior civilization to mark the event. Because
that mix of critical ingredients did not exist in any of the Asian
societies, they appeared to stand still while Europe advanced to the
center of the world stage. Colonization, which began in the late
fifteenth century, and the Industrial Revolution in the nineteenth
century, augmented and entrenched Europe's dominant position.
Coming from a small state like Singapore, with a population of three
million, it is a source of great wonder to me that a modest country
like Portugal, also with a population of only a few million, could
carve out territories like Goa, Macau, and Malacca from larger and
more ancient civilizations. It was an amazing feat. But what is even
more amazing is that it was done in the 1500s. The Portuguese
colonizers were followed by the Dutch, then the French, then the
British. Throughout all this period, for almost three centuries or
more, Asian societies lay prostrate and allowed themselves to be
surpassed and colonized by far smaller societies.
But the most painful thing that happened to Asia was not the physical
but the mental colonization. Many Asians (including, I fear, many of
my ancestors from South Asia) began to believe that Asians were
inferior beings to the Europeans. Only this could explain how a few
thousand British could control a few hundred million people in South
Asia. If I am allowed to make a controversial point here, I would add
that this mental colonization has not been completely eradicated in
Asia, and many Asian societies are still struggling to break free
from it.
It is truly astonishing that even today, as we stand on the eve of
the twenty-first century and five hundred years on from the arrival
of the first Portuguese colonizers in Asia, only one--I repeat, only
one--Asian society has reached, in a comprehensive sense, the level
of development that prevails generally in Europe and North America
today. The Japanese mind was the first to be awakened in Asia,
beginning with the Meiji Restoration in the 1860s. Japan was first
considered developed and more or less accepted as an equal by 1902,
when it signed the Anglo-Japanese alliance.
If Asian minds can think, why is there today only one Asian society
that has been able to catch up with the West? I rest my case for the
negative answer to our question. Those of you who want to tick "No"
to the question "Can Asians think?" can proceed to do so.
The "Yes" Answer
Let me now try to draw out the arguments for answering "Yes" to the
question "Can Asians think?"
The first, and the most obvious one, is the incredible economic
performance of East Asian societies in the past few decades. Japan's
success, while it has not been fully replicated in the rest of Asia,
has set off ripples that now, current problems notwithstanding, have
the potential to become tidal waves. Japan's economic success was
first followed by the "four tigers" (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong,
and Singapore). Their success convinced the other Southeast Asian
countries, especially Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, that they
could do the same. Lately they have been followed by China, which now
has the potential to overtake the United States and become the
world's largest economy by 2020 or earlier. What is amazing is the
pace of economic development. It took the British 58 years (up to
1780), America 47 years (1839), and Japan 33 years (1880s) to double
their economic output. On the other hand, it took Indonesia 17 years,
South Korea 11 years, and China 10 years to do the same. As a whole,
from 1960 to 1990 the East Asian miracle economies grew more rapidly
and more consistently than any other group of economies in the world.
They averaged 5.5 percent annual per capita real income growth,
outperforming every economy in Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, and
even the OECD countries, which only averaged 2.5 percent growth in
that period.
You cannot get good grades in an exam by luck. It requires
intelligence and hard work. Similarly, you cannot get good economic
performance, especially of the scale seen in Asia, simply by luck. It
reflects both intelligence and hard work. And it is vital to stress
here that the pace and scale of the economic explosion seen in Asia
is unprecedented in the history of man. The chief economist of the
World Bank, Joseph Stiglitz, captured this reality well in a recent
Asian Wall Street Journal article (February 2, 1998):
"The East Asian 'miracle' was real. Its economic transformation of
East Asia has been one of the most remarkable accomplishments in
history. The dramatic surge in gross domestic product which it
brought about is reflected in higher standards of living for hundreds
of millions of Asians, including longer life expectancy, better
health and education, and millions of others have rescued themselves
from poverty, and now lead more hopeful lives. These achievements are
real, and will be far more permanent than the present turmoil."
The confidence of East Asians has been further boosted by the
numerous studies that now demonstrate their impressive academic
performance, both in leading Western universities and at home. Today,
many of the top students produced by American universities are of
Asian origin. Educational excellence is an essential prerequisite for
cultural confidence. To put it baldly, many Asians are pleased to
wake up to the realization that their minds are not inferior. Most
Westerners cannot appreciate the change because they could never
directly feel the sense of inferiority many Asians experienced until
recently.
The second reason why we might answer "Yes" to the question "Can
Asians think?" is that a very vital mental switch is taking place in
many Asian minds. For centuries, Asians have believed that the only
way to progress was through emulation of the West. Yukichi Fukuzawa,
a leading Meiji reformer, epitomized this attitude when he said in
the late nineteenth century that for Japan to progress, it had to
learn from the West. The other leading modernizers in Asia, from Sun
Yat-sen to Jawaharlal Nehru, shared this fundamental attitude. The
mental switch that is taking place in Asian minds today is that they
no longer believe that the only way to progress is by copying; they
now believe they can work out their own solutions.
This switch in Asian minds has taken place slowly and imperceptibly.
Until a few decades ago, Western societies beckoned as beacons on the
hill, living models of the most successful form of human societies:
economically prosperous, politically stable, socially just and
harmonious, ethically clean, and, all in all, providing the best
possible conditions for their citizens to grow and thrive as
individuals. These societies were not perfect but they were clearly
superior, in all senses of the word, to any society outside the West.
Until recently it would have been folly, and indeed inconceivable,
for any Asian intellectual to suggest, "This may not be the path we
want to take." Today this is what many Asians are thinking, privately
if not publicly.
Overall, though, there is no question that Western societies still
remain more successful than their East Asian counterparts. They
retain fields of excellence in areas that no other society comes
close to, in their universities, think tanks, and certainly in
cultural realms. No Asian orchestra comes close in performance to the
leading Western orchestras, even though the musical world in the West
has been enriched by many brilliant Asian musicians.
Many Asians, however, are shocked by the scale and depth of social
and economic problems that have afflicted many Western societies. In
the case of North America, they are troubled by the relative
breakdown of the family as an institution, the plague of drug
addiction and its attendant problems, including crime, the
persistence of ghettos and the perception that there has been a
decline in ethical standards. This is exemplified by statistics
provided by the U.S. government that reflect social trends for the
period 1960-90. During that period, the rate of violent crime
quadrupled, single parent families almost tripled, as did the number
of U.S. state and federal prisoners. Asians are also troubled by the
addiction of Europeans to their social security nets, despite clear
evidence that these nets now hold down their societies and have
created a sense of gloom about long-term economic prospects. In
previous decades, when East Asians visited North America and Western
Europe they envied the high standard of living and better quality of
life in those societies. Today, though, the high standards of living
remain in the West but Asians no longer consider them as role models.
They are beginning to believe that they can attempt something
different.
A simple metaphor may explain what Western minds would see if they
could peer into Asian minds. Until recently, most of those minds
shared the general assumption that the developmental path of all
societies culminated in the plateau on which most Western societies
now rest. Hence, all societies, with minor variations, would end up
creating liberal, democratic societies, giving emphasis to individual
freedoms, as they moved up the socio-economic ladder. Today Asians
can still see the plateau of contentment that most Western societies
rest on; but they can also see, beyond the plateau, alternative peaks
to which they can take their own societies. Instead of seeing the
plateau as the natural end destination, there is a desire now to
bypass it (for they do not wish to be afflicted by some of the social
and cultural ills that afflict Western societies) and to search for
alternative peaks beyond. This kind of mental horizon never existed
in Asian minds until recently. It reveals their new confidence in
themselves.
The third reason why we might answer "Yes" is that today is not the
only period when Asian minds have begun to stir. As more and more
Asians lift their lives up from levels of survival, they have the
economic freedom to think, reflect, and rediscover their cultural
heritage. There is a growing consciousness that their societies, like
those in the West, have a rich social, cultural, and philosophical
legacy that they can resuscitate and use to evolve their own modern
and advanced societies. The richness and depth of Indian and Chinese
civilizations, to name just two, have been acknowledged by Western
scholars. Indeed, for the past few centuries, it was Western
scholarship and endeavor that preserved the fruits of Asian
civilization, just as the Arabs preserved and passed on Greek and
Roman civilization in the darkest days of Europe. While Asian
cultures deteriorated, the museums and universities in the West
preserved and even cherished the best that Asian art and culture had
produced. As Asians delve deeper into their own cultural heritage,
they find their minds nourished. For the first time in centuries, an
Asian renaissance is underway. Visitors to Asian cities--from Tehran
to Calcutta, from Bombay to Shanghai, from Singapore to Hong
Kong--will find now both a new-found confidence as well as an
interest in traditional language and culture. As their economies grow
and as they have more disposable income, Asians spend it increasingly
on reviving traditional arts. What we are witnessing today is only
the bare beginnings of a major cultural rediscovery. But the pride
that Asians feel about their culture is clear and palpable.
In short, Asians who would like to rush and answer "Yes" to the
question posed have more than ample justification to do so. But
before they arrive at a final judgment, I would advise them to pause
once more and reflect on the reasons for believing that, after all,
"Maybe" is the right answer.
The "Maybe" Response
Despite the travails sparked by the financial crisis in late 1997,
most Asians continue to be optimistic about their future. Such
optimism is healthy. Yet it may be useful for Asians to learn a small
lesson in history from the experience of Europeans exactly a century
ago, when Europe was full of optimism. In his 1993 book Out of
Control, Zbigniew Brzezinski described how the world looked then:
"The twentieth century was born in hope. It dawned in a relatively
benign setting. The principal powers of the world had enjoyed,
broadly speaking, a relatively prolonged spell of peace. . . . The
dominant mood in the major capitals as of January 1, 1900 was
generally one of optimism. The structure of global power seemed
stable. Existing empires appeared to be increasingly enlightened as
well as secure."
But despite this great hope, the twentieth century became, in
Brzezinski's words,
". . . mankind's most bloody and hateful century, a century of
hallucinating politics and of monstrous killings. Cruelty was
institutionalized to an unprecedented degree, lethality was organized
on a mass production basis. The contrast between the scientific
potential for good and the political evil that was actually unleashed
is shocking. Never before in history was killing so globally pervasive,
never before did it consume so many lives, never before was human
annihilation pursued with such concentration of sustained effort on
behalf of such arrogantly irrational goals."
One of the most important questions that an Asian has to ask himself
today is a simple one: Can any Asian society, with the exception of
Japan (which is an accepted member of the Western club), be
absolutely confident that it can succeed and do as well in a
comprehensive sense as contemporary advanced societies in North
America and Western Europe have done? If the answer is that there is
none, or even that there are only a few of whom that can be said,
then the case for the "Maybe" response becomes stronger.
There are still many great challenges that Asian societies have to
overcome before they can reach the comprehensive level of achievement
enjoyed by Western societies. The first challenge in the development
of any society is economic. Until the middle of 1997 most East Asian
societies believed that they had mastered the basic rules of modern
economics. They liberalized their economies, encouraged foreign
investment flows, and practiced thrifty fiscal policies. The high
level of domestic savings gave them a comfortable economic buffer.
After enjoying continuous economic growth rates of 7 percent or more
per annum for decades, it was natural for societies like South Korea,
Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia to assume that they had discovered
the magical elixir of economic development.
The events following the devaluation of the Thai baht on July 2, 1997
demonstrated that they hadn't. The remarkable thing about this
financial crisis was that no economist anticipated its depth or
scale. Economists and analysts remain divided on its fundamental
causes. As the crisis is still unfolding at the time of writing, it
is too early to provide definitive judgments on those causes. But a
few suggestions are worth making.
On the economic front, many mistakes were made. In Thailand, for
example, the decision to sustain fixed exchange rates between the
baht and the dollar, despite the disparity in interest rates, allowed
Thai businessmen to borrow cheap in U.S. dollars and earn high
interest rates in Thai baht. This also led to overinvestments in
Thailand's property and share markets. All this was clearly
unsustainable. The IMF provided some discreet warnings. However, the
relatively weak coalition governments then prevailing in Thailand
were unable to administer the bitter medicine required to remedy the
situation, because some of it had to be administered to their
financial backers. Domestically, it was a combination of economic and
political factors that precipitated and prolonged the financial
crisis.
There was also a huge new factor that complicated the story: the
force of globalization. The key lesson that all East Asian economic
managers have learned in the 1997-98 crisis is that they are
accountable not only to domestic actors but to the international
financial markets and their key players. The East Asians should not
have been surprised. It was a logical consequence of liberalization
and integration with the global economy. Integration has brought both
benefits (in terms of significant increases in standards of living)
and costs (such as loss of autonomy in economic management). But
there was a clear reluctance to acknowledge and accept the loss of
autonomy. This was demonstrated by the state of denial that
characterized the initial East Asian response to this crisis, a
denial that clearly showed the psychological time lag in East Asian
minds in facing up to new realities.
Significantly, the two East Asian economies that have (after the
initial bouts of denial) swallowed most fully the bitter medicine
administered by the IMF are the two societies that have progressed
faster in developing middle classes that have integrated themselves
into the worldview of the new interconnected global universe of
modern economics. South Korea and Thailand, although they continue to
face serious economic challenges, have clearly demonstrated that
their elitesare now well plugged in to the new financial networks.
The new finance minister of Thailand, Tarrin Nimmanhaeminda, walks
and talks with ease in any key financial capital. His performance is
one indicator of the new globalized Asian mind that is emerging.
The 1997-98 financial crisis also demonstrated the wisdom of the
Chinese in translating the English word "crisis" as a combination of
two Chinese characters, "danger" and "opportunity." Clearly, the East
Asian societies have experienced many dangerous moments. But if they
emerge from the 1997-98 financial crisis with restructured and
reinvigorated economic and administrative systems of management, they
may yet be among the first societies in the world to develop strong
immune systems to handle present and future challenges springing from
globalization. It's too early to tell whether this is true. And this
in turn reinforces the point that on the economic front, one should
perhaps give the "Maybe" answer.
Second, on the political front most Asian societies, including East
Asian societies, have a long way to go before they can reach Western
levels of political stability and harmony. There is little danger of
a coup d'etat or real civil war in most contemporary Western
societies (with the possible exception, still, of Northern Ireland).
Western societies have adopted political variations of the liberal
democratic model, even though the presidential systems of the United
States and France differ significantly from the Westminster models of
the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. These political forms are
not perfect. They contain many features that inhibit social progress,
from vested interest lobby groups to pork barrel politics. Indeed, it
would be fair to say that political development in most Western
societies has atrophied. But it has nevertheless atrophied at
comfortable levels. Most of their citizens live in domestic security,
fear no oppression, and are content with their political frameworks.
How many Asian societies can claim to share this benign state of
affairs? The answer, clearly, is very few. And if it is equally clear
that they are not going to enjoy this in the very near future, then
this again militates in favor of the "Maybe" answer.
Third, in the security realm, the one great advantage Western
societies have over the rest of the world is that war among them has
become a thing of the past. The reasons for this are complex. It
includes an awareness of ethnic affinity among Western tribes who
feel outnumbered by the rest of the world's population and also a
sense of belonging to a common civilization. It may also reflect the
exhaustion of having fought too many wars in the past. Nevertheless
it is truly remarkable, when we count the number of wars--and truly
big wars--that the British, French, and Germans have fought with each
other (including two in this century), that there is today almost a
zero chance of war between their countries. This is a remarkably
civilized thing to have achieved, reflecting a considerable step
forward in the history of human affairs. When will India and
Pakistan, or North and South Korea, achieve this same zero prospect
of war? And if the answer is not in the near future, is it reasonable
to suggest that perhaps Asian minds (or the minds of Asian societies)
have not reached the same level as the West?
Fourth, Asians face serious challenges in the social realm. While it
is true that it took the social dislocations caused by the Industrial
Revolution to eradicate the feudal traces of European cultures
(social freedom followed economic freedom), it is still unclear
whether similar economic revolutions in East Asia will have the same
liberating social effects on Asian societies. Unfortunately, many
feudal traces, especially those of clannishness and nepotism,
continue to prevent Asian societies from becoming truly meritocratic,
where individual citizens are able to grow and thrive on the basis of
their abilities and not on the basis of their birth or connections or
ethnic background.
Fifth and finally, and perhaps most fundamentally, the key question
remains whether Asian minds will be able to develop the right blend
of values that will both preserve some of the traditional strengths
of Asian values (e.g., attachment to the family as an institution,
deference to societal interests, thrift, conservatism in social
mores, respect for authority) and absorb the strength of Western
values (the emphasis on individual achievement, political and
economic freedom, respect for the rule of law as well as for key
national institutions). This will be a complex challenge.
One of the early (and perhaps inevitable) reactions by some Western
commentators to the 1997-98 financial crisis was to suggest that it
fundamentally reflected the failure of Asian values. If nothing else,
this quick reaction suggested that the "Asian values" debate of the
early 1990s had touched on some sensitive nerves in the Western mind
and soul. The desire to bury Asian values revealed the real pain that
had been inflicted during that debate.
The true test of the viability and validity of values is not shown in
theory but in practice. Those who try to draw a direct causal link
between adherence to Asian values and financial disaster have a tough
empirical case to make, given the varied reactions of East Asian
societies to the financial crisis. South Korea and Thailand, two of
the three countries that were most deeply affected by the crisis
(i.e., those who had to turn to the IMF for assistance), had been
given the highest marks by the West for their moves toward
democratization. The three open economies least affected by the
financial crisis, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, have very
different political systems. In short, there was no clear correlation
between political systems and financial vulnerability.
The only correlation that is clear so far is that between good governance and resilience in the financial crisis. Good governance is not associated with any single political system or ideology. It is associated with the willingness and ability of the government to develop economic, social, and administrative systems that are resilient enough to handle the challenges brought about in the new economic era into which we are moving. China provides a good living example of this. Its leaders are not looking for the perfect political system in theory. They are searching daily for pragmatic solutions to keep their society moving forward. The population supports this pragmatism, for they too feel that it is time for China to catch up. Traditionally, the Chinese have looked for good government, not minimal government. They can recognize good governance when they experience it. The fact that Japan which is in Western eyes the most liberal and democratic East Asian society - has had great difficulties adapting to the new economic environment demonstrates that political openness is not the key variable to look at.
It is vital for Western minds to understand that the efforts by Asians to rediscover Asian values are not only or even primarily a search for political values. Instead, they represent a complex set of motives and aspirations in Asian minds: a desire to reconnect with their historical past after this connection had been ruptured both by colonial rule and the subsequent domination of the globe by a Western Weltanschauung; an effort to find the right balance in bringing up their young so that they are open to the new technologically interconnected global universe and yet rooted in and conscious of the cultures of their ancestors; an effort to define their own personal, social, and national identities in a way that enhances their sense of self-esteem in a world in which their immediate ancestors had subconsciously accepted the fact that they were lesser beings in a Western universe. In short, the reassertion of Asian values in the 1990s represents a complex process of regeneration and rediscovery that is an inevitable aspect of the rebirth of societies.
Here again, it is far too early to tell whether Asian societies can successfully both integrate themselves into the modern world and reconnect with their past. Both are mammoth challenges. Western minds have a clear advantage over Asian minds, as they are convinced that their successful leap into modernity was to a large extent a result of the compatibility of their value systems with the modern universe. Indeed, many Western minds believe (consciously or subconsciously) that without Western value systems no society can truly enter the modern universe.
Only time will tell whether Asian societies can enter that universe as Asian societies rather than Western replicas. Since it is far too early to pass judgment on whether they will succeed in this effort, it is perhaps fair to suggest that this too is another argument in favor of the "Maybe" answer to the question "Can Asians think?"
Clearly, the twenty-first century and the next millennium will prove to be very challenging for Asian societies. For most of the past five hundred years, they have fallen behind European societies in many different ways. There is a strong desire to catch up. The real answer to our question will be provided if and when they do so. Until then, Asians should constantly remind themselves why this question remains a valid one for them to ponder. Only they can answer it. No one else can.
Kishore Mahbubani is permanent secretary (policy) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Singapore. These are his personal views.
Essay Types: Essay