Détente Part Deux
Break out the bell bottoms and ABBA EPs—the seventies are back, at least in diplomacy. America needs to look beyond the Georgian conflict and reassess its approach towards Moscow.
Once again summer has brought war to Europe. Russia's incursion into Georgia prompted immediate comparisons to Hitler's dismantling of Czechoslovakia in 1938 and Brezhnev's suppression of the 1968 Prague Spring. But July 1914 might be a better historical analogy. However odious Russian conduct and however noble our intentions of supporting democracy in Georgia, we-the United States-played a role in a drama that leaves the world once again a far more dangerous place. We offered uncritical support to an appealing but reckless leader who hitched a local nationalist agenda to our worldwide promotion of democracy.
After Russia's calculated, brutal, and overwhelming reaction to President Saakashvili's attempt to assert Georgian control over South Ossetia, it seemed almost inevitable that U.S.-Russian relations would experience a chill not felt since the early 1980s. U.S.-Russian cooperation in important areas such as peaceful nuclear energy, anti-terrorism, drug interdiction, space exploration, and many other areas is already in jeopardy. Events seem to be rushing along a predetermined track toward confrontation.
What led to this mess? Even more important, what is our way out? One interpretation is Russia is reverting to expansionist Soviet-Russian imperial behavior. This explanation is particularly attractive for policymakers struggling to make sense of the post-cold war world, especially reverses in democratic governance and cooperation with Russia. It is comforting to see the crisis in Georgia and the larger failure of the post-cold war order as the result of a thousand years of Russian autocracy. That way we need not ask to what extent we contributed to this state of affairs.
The sad truth is we did not fully understand what we were getting into with Georgia and failed to define clearly the fundamental U.S. interests in the region. While Mikheil Saakashvili's professions of support for democratization and market reform charmed American interlocutors, he brought considerable nationalist baggage to his quest for European integration and NATO membership. Resurgent Georgian nationalism as the Soviet Union collapsed made it easy for Moscow to cast itself as the protector of the Abkhaz and Ossetians. Busy in the early 1990s with other crises, the United States actually encouraged Yeltsin to undertake mediation of these conflicts. Appeals by Tbilisi for greater U.S. and EU involvement were-until recently-overshadowed by higher priorities.
It is no surprise that Russia has its own agenda in Georgia, but Russia's ambitions go far beyond protection of the Abkhaz and Ossetian minorities. Commenting on the conflict on August 11, President Dmitri Medvedev noted "Russia has been a guarantor of security in the Caucasus region for centuries." The question now is what Russia's actions show about its aims, not just in Georgia and the Caucasus, but also the former Soviet republics, and Europe as a whole. What we know about events in Georgia, especially those crucial days in August 2008, does not give us clear answers. Whatever the provocations from Russia, there is no obscuring Georgia's strategic mistake in deciding to respond with military force. The hope of seizing South Ossetia in a quick stroke of force was a chimera; it was a tragic blunder to pursue it.
Contrary to Georgian charges, Russian forces did not drive to Tbilisi to replace the government. That may be Moscow's desire, but it seems Russian leaders may be clever enough to wait for Georgian politics to take care of that. Meanwhile there is now a long-term Russian military presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Moscow's actions contain a message for her neighbors, in particular Ukraine, Moldova, and Azerbaijan: Russian power is back and Russia is not afraid to use it; the "near abroad" is an area of special Russian security interests; and NATO or EU expansion into Russia's backyard will be met by Moscow as a threat.
What does this all mean for the United States? Sadly, what the American government understood as support for democracy and reform, Saakashvili perceived as backing against Russia. Georgia was not in NATO, but was a U.S. ally. Saakashvili sent troops to Iraq to help the Americans. Surely America would help him if he needed it? The Bucharest NATO Summit only added to the impression that the United States would stick by Georgia no matter what. The August events leave Georgia shattered and disappointed, and U.S. credibility shaken.
So what are the possible courses of action for the United States? There are few good ones. Many Washington reactions focus on blaming Moscow for the crisis (all too easy to do), and finding ways to punish and isolate Russia. In these responses, patterns of behavior learned during the cold war seem dominant. But if this is not a new cold war (as experts are quick to assert, while they call for Russia to pay a price for its actions), then why should we be using the old cold war playbook?
There are some things the United States and its allies can do that might help:
Condemn specific Russian actions in Georgia, but restrain official U.S. rhetoric. The Russians already know we don't like what they did. The United States should focus on obtaining things we want, and should avoid complaints and threats we are not prepared to back up.
Democracy promotion in Georgia can and should continue, but should not be confused with reconquest of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. If the latter is attempted, both will fail. The foremost task is to do everything possible to get Russian troops out of as much of Georgia as possible. Independence and sovereignty in some territory is better than no independence in any territory.
Restoration of confidence among the warring parties is another primary task. The neutral monitoring effort envisioned by the EU and OSCE will not have any real teeth-it will not be able to force either the Russians or the separatists to do anything they don't want to do. However, the lack of coercive power won't prevent an observer mission from fostering transparency and restoring trust.
Real U.S. involvement in the process of seeking political settlements of separatist conflicts in the region needs to be a priority. This means more than just rhetoric about the territorial integrity of states. Consistent ministerial and presidential attention is a must. In Georgia, our best hope for now may be a Cyprus-like situation, in which few states recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and settlement negotiations resume sometime in the future. However, Nagorno-Karabakh and Transnistria are still sources of instability and we must not neglect them. We must also seek to avoid making our mediation a proxy fight with Moscow.
Go slow on NATO expansion in areas that NATO clearly lacks the capability or desire to defend. NATO credibility has been damaged by the mismatch between rhetoric and action in Georgia. Just because Russia opposes further NATO expansion somewhere does not mean that expansion there is automatically a good idea. After the dust settles, the Alliance may wish to add Georgia and Ukraine as new members. In making these decisions, we should take another look at the criteria in the 1995 NATO Study on Enlargement, rather than simply act out of pique. Finally, the Allies might also wish to revisit the question of where NATO and Russia fit into the overarching European security architecture. The failure to integrate Russia into post-cold war security structures remains Europe's fundamental security failing.
Reestablish a structured U.S.-Russia dialogue on the full range of European and global security issues. This bilateral dialogue needs to be institutionalized, and headed by a very senior official, as it was during the Reagan and Clinton administrations. Emotional approaches, like Putin's Munich outburst or our own self-indulgent moral indignation, are poor substitutes for real policy.
Remember that integration of Russia into Euro-Atlantic and global institutions was a primary post-cold war goal. Russia's actions in Georgia make this much more difficult, but the goal should not be abandoned. Resurrecting a lost enemy will neither resolve U.S.-Russian differences nor restore stability and provide security.
Prospects for dealing with Moscow dispassionately right now are pretty dim. The current Russian leadership is both overconfident and oversensitive. Russia's oil-soaked economic success has fostered the illusion in the Kremlin that good relations with the West are not particularly necessary. At the same time, Putin and his associates have a tin ear. Not recognizing the effects of their heavy-handed actions, they perceive criticism as a challenge to their rule. This has produced a vicious cycle, in which Russian actions and foreign criticism each grow harsher, making prospects for maintaining relations with Moscow-let alone improving them-increasingly slim.
To break out of this cycle, we need to identify more clearly the most important American interests in our relationship with Russia. There are a number of significant items in any list: effective control and reduction of nuclear weapons; prevention of further proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; cooperation in fighting international terrorism; collaboration in battling international crime such as the drug trade, trafficking in human beings, cybercrime, and more. These do not exhaust the array of important interests that we could pursue in cooperation with Russia.
Most important, we should ask: why are so many of us spoiling for a fight with Moscow? Will the world really be better if Washington and Moscow return to an adversarial relationship, even outright enmity, like the second half of the twentieth century? There is every reason to remonstrate with the Russians over their behavior in Georgia, while we continue to support peace, stability, and democracy in the Caucasus. In the end, pursuit of our goals in the Caucasus will have a better chance if we also work to salvage our relationship with Russia, as distasteful as that may seem in the heat of the moment.
William H. Hill, currently Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College, served two terms between 1999 and 2006 as Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova. The opinions expressed here are his own.