SHOULD SYRIAN president Bashar al-Assad fall, Syria’s problems will have only just begun. With the dictator gone, crime, score settling and a violent contest for power likely will ensue, keeping the streets unsafe and the people afraid. Iran, foreign jihadists and Syria’s neighbors may meddle to protect their interests or stir up trouble. Assad kept Syria’s rival communities in check through force, but his reign created underlying schisms. Now, the civil war has generated new ones. It also has turned the country’s economy, always struggling, into a disaster area. So far the splintered Syrian opposition has shown no skill in reassuring Syria’s minorities, and any new government’s initial legitimacy is likely to be weak.

Unlike other Arab Spring conflicts that have resulted in regime capitulation (Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen) or regime decapitation (Libya), the long and bloody Syrian conflict is likely to generate a failed state requiring the kind of large-scale reconstruction efforts seen in Iraq and Afghanistan. Inevitably, some will call for America to step in to establish order. The United States has a long and rather ugly record in trying to help countries in Syria’s position. True, in Iraq and Afghanistan the United States has gained hard experience in the dos and (mostly) don’ts of state building. But the lessons from these and other state-building efforts suggest success requires considerable resources, excellent coordination within the government, long-term follow-through and serious planning for the postconflict period even as the war is being waged. None of these is likely to be present for any U.S. effort in a post-Assad Syria, given the current political and operational environment.

We argue here that the United States and its allies are unlikely to overcome Syria’s myriad problems and establish a peaceful, stable and democratic Syria. The likely lack of resources, poor governmental coordination and the sheer scale of Syria’s problems probably would spell failure for any ambitious efforts. Moreover, regime-change initiatives could backfire and complicate postregime plans.

Thus, going in small may be the best we can manage. The results also would be small, but being present in some capacity would offer the United States more credibility in supporting regional democracy, greater legitimacy to weigh in on key regional issues and a better strategic position to counter potential threats to U.S. interests. Still, Washington should prepare not only for a limited state-building mission but also for the possible failure of state building in Syria.

This article has four sections. First, we detail the problems Syria is likely to face should Assad fall. Next, we review the potentialrole of outsiders such as the United States in ameliorating these difficulties. Third, we discuss actual U.S. and allied capabilities and their likely problems and limits. Finally, we offer recommendations for a limited engagement in Syria and assess the probable impact of such an engagement.

ASSAD HAS ruled Syria by brute force: he hollowed out the country’s institutions, making a mockery of political parties, the judiciary, the media and other core parts of a functioning state. Now the civil war has destroyed cities and turned Syrian against Syrian. It follows that bringing peace to Syria involves more than toppling Assad; any new regime must also rebuild the state and mend the nation.

The current antiregime violence could morph into chaos or a new power struggle among the anti-Assad victors. The Syrian opposition is famously disunited. Despite having its back against the wall in the anti-Assad struggle, and foreign encouragement to unify, the opposition remains divided by region, ethnicity and political ambitions. No Nelson Mandela of South Africa or Daw Aung San Suu Kyi of Myanmar unites the rebels. Once Assad goes, these groups may come together through a democratic process, but it is far more likely that any near-term elections would be dubious affairs and that at least some of those fighting Assad would turn their guns on each other.

Assad’s divide-and-rule methods and favoritism toward key groups will make continued strife even more likely. Favored minorities, particularly the Alawites but also the Christians and Druze, will want to keep what they have. Poorer, disempowered Sunni Muslims, who are doing the bulk of the fighting (and dying) and comprise the largest community in Syria, will want more power and wealth. Score settling against regime servants is likely to commence almost immediately. Just as the Assad regime has mobilized the Alawites in militias to murder other communities, opposition forces will want payback. If a new government reflects the will of the majority of Syrians, it may openly discriminate against Alawites and other minorities and exclude those Sunnis, small in number but powerful, who cooperated with Assad.

In Iraq after Saddam Hussein fell, crime—even more than political violence—led to national collapse. Similarly, in Syria armed gangs masquerading as freedom fighters capture wealthy and middle-class citizens, demanding ransom or bribes before freeing them. One Aleppo resident told the New York Times, “Chaos, lawlessness, fear, it is just so chaotic, and with all the thugs in the streets, you never know who might kidnap you and ask for a ransom.” Such problems may grow exponentially as Syria’s police, tainted by their association with Assad, will likely prove incapable of enforcing order and preventing massive looting or other crime.

Recent figures from the Quilliam Foundation estimate that the Syrian war also has attracted several hundred foreign jihadists, whose ideology is akin to that of Al Qaeda. Some (no one knows how many) owe their loyalty to Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri or to Al Qaeda of Iraq. These fighters want an Islamic state in the parts of Syria they control, and they will try to sway or coerce Syrians into joining their group. As former CIA official and terrorism analyst Bruce Riedel points out, “Look at Iraq, where we decimated them time and again. They’re still there.” Syria may go from importing terrorists to exporting them, with Al Qaeda and other groups using territory they control to launch attacks on neighboring states and perhaps even Western targets outside the region. Already, Assad partisans and their enemies conduct attacks in Lebanon against one another, and this violence may grow as parties jockey for power in Syria. Compounding these fears, the Washington Post reports that Syria has at least several hundred tons of chemical weapons dispersed across roughly fifty towns and cities. Israel fears they might fall into the hands of Hezbollah, and the world fears Al Qaeda and other jihadist groups might acquire them.

Foreign states likely will continue to meddle in Syria. Saudi Arabia and Turkey not only want Assad out but also want their favored Syrian groups to replace him. Meanwhile, Iran will want to retain at least a toehold of influence even if Assad falls and will support Alawite rejectionists and others willing to do Tehran’s bidding. Some states will fear instability while others will see it as an opportunity. Large refugee populations may fear returning home or not have homes to return to, adding to the concerns of neighboring states bearing the brunt of the ongoing refugee flow.

The war’s devastation, the surge in crime, the risk of political violence and the overall civic uncertainty will make Syria’s economy a basket case. All this will worsen the country’s political problems. Even before the violence, Syria ranked 151st in GDP per capita. It clearly has fallen even further. Foreign investment, always scarce, will be scarcer.

Many of these post-Assad problems have become more likely because of present regime-change efforts. Numerous sanctions have helped speed Syria’s economic implosion. They have devastated Syria’s middle class and rendered the black market as vital as the legitimate economy. It took nearly a decade following the Iraq invasion to rebuild that economy, and it required tremendous U.S. investments, even with Iraq’s massive oil resources. Layers of sanctions are also difficult to roll back quickly. In Libya, it took months after Muammar el-Qaddafi’s fall for the UN, EU and United States to unfreeze assets from Libyan banks and Qaddafi’s former inner circle.

Arms flooding into Syria also will confound stabilization efforts. In 2011, before the fighting began, Syria had a strong military, effective police, and a cowed and unarmed population. After Assad falls, the security forces will be weak and devastated, while popular groups will be well armed and emboldened. It is uncertain if weapons will stay in the hands that received them or even remain in Syria. A poorly secured cache of weaponry in Libya, including man-portable surface-to-air missiles, made its way out of the country to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, according to news reports.

IN THEORY, outsiders could help Syria maintain the security of its borders, assist with internal security, provide economic aid, encourage democratization, and otherwise assist Syria in its efforts to go from war, chaos and tyranny to peace, stability and democracy.

Syria’s borders are porous, and they may grow more so if the Syrian army deteriorates further. Refugees flow out while fighters, arms and terrorists flow in. Even before the latest conflict, smuggling was common between Syria and Lebanon and between Syria and Iraq. In Iraq after Saddam Hussein, jihadists entered from Syria, Saudi Arabia and beyond, while Iran sent in hundreds of paramilitary and intelligence personnel. All made a bad situation worse. By policing borders, foreign forces could reduce the scale of neighboring states’ meddling, making it harder for them to send arms and paramilitary forces to Syria. Jihadists could be stopped at the border and arrested or perhaps deterred from entering Syria at all.

But securing borders can require large numbers of troops. Borders have physical and political components. Neighboring states’ interests and their own capacity for security will determine the difficulty. So will terrain and internal Syrian security considerations. Troops would also need excellent intelligence and training. But Syria’s army is in disarray, and much of its officer corps will (or should) be purged if Assad goes, though Iraq has taught us to avoid a wholesale dissolution of the military, as Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta recently noted in an interview with CNN. This also holds true for Syria’s police force. Purges of Syria’s uniformed services—viewed by many within Syria as little more than an Alawite militia—would leave an immediate vacuum. Given the societal schisms caused and exacerbated by the conflict, an “impartial” outside role may help reassure communities and ward off dangerous cycles of violence.

Syria’s armed forces still do one valuable thing: secure Syria’s chemical-weapons stockpiles. Even though chemical weapons are less dangerous than conventional weapons in most cases, their psychological impact is massive. Should Assad’s regime fall and the army collapse with it, securing these weapons would be a vital task for outside forces.

Protecting borders, securing chemical-weapons caches and fighting criminality could require sizable external forces. RAND studies on stabilization operations find average force-to-population ratios ranging from 2:1000 to 13:1000, depending on the levels of violence, ambition of objectives and number of contested areas. For Syria’s population of more than twenty-two million, this could mean a range of 44,000–286,000 troops and will probably be on the larger end given the myriad problems there. Of course, force-sizing considerations depend largely on the percentage of population significantly affected and the amount of the country left vulnerable to violence when the regime falls.

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) will be difficult, yet failure to do these things could prove dangerous. Tribal and sectarian interest in settling scores and redistributing power will make fighters reluctant to lay down arms, as will fear of retribution. Unemployment also could prove dangerous. With nothing to do once fighting subsides and before the economy restarts, battle-hardened fighters must be effectively and productively engaged.

DDR efforts must be coordinated with transitional-justice efforts. A properly constituted court system to try those responsible for atrocities could forestall temptations for former victims to settle matters on their own. However, rushing to put large numbers of individuals on trial or conducting a mass purging of government officials such as in Iraq can be similarly destabilizing. The two objectives—stability and accountability—are mutually supportive, but without coordination one effort can undermine the other.

The international community can provide near-term support through forums such as truth and reconciliation commissions. It also can assist with arbitration if it becomes unclear who is the victim or the perpetrator. Though the United States is clearly rooting for the opposition, and Assad’s forces and paramilitary shabiha are committing the bulk of the killing of civilians, the atrocities are not one-sided, and rebel reprisals may increase as the war drags on.

An international presence in Syria can help discourage secessionism—a danger that can spread across borders and, for that reason, invite meddling from neighboring states. Syria’s Kurds could seek to secede not because the demand for their own state is overwhelming but simply because the Syrian state is dysfunctional and denies them just rights. They may also believe that Iraqi and Turkish Kurds, or even sympathetic governments, can help their quest. Outside powers, by providing security and preventing foreign meddling, can dampen this enthusiasm.

The most pressing initial need for aid will be humanitarian assistance. This also is likely to overwhelm any remaining or nascent governmental capacity. The need for shelter, food and health care will be most acute with internally displaced populations and refugees. Current UN figures estimate over 2.5 million people need assistance within Syria’s borders, while over two hundred thousand have fled the country. Many will return to destroyed homes and livelihoods, throwing them at the mercy of external support.

Outsiders can also help economically—and will be expected to do so. A provincial-reconstruction-team member in Iraq commented in conversation on the challenges she observed on the job, saying, “Democracy does not mean free electricity”—yet this was the expectation she routinely encountered. As the most immediate security and humanitarian needs subside, expectations will grow apace. Restoring—or, more accurately, establishing for the first time—a real economy will be an important part of reconstruction as well as longer-term development efforts. A corollary is the need to manage expectations. In Iraq, when expectations were not met the result was anger and frustration.

Finally, outside powers also can offer expertise for the myriad problems any new regime would face. Syria’s government always functioned poorly, and many of the more apolitical and competent civil servants will have fled. Whether it is designing a constitution, rebuilding the electric grid or training military forces to defend borders, the United States and its allies can help the Syrians.

THE UNITED States is far from ready, politically and institutionally, to bear the burden of helping Syria. But the United States has several key strengths when it comes to state building. Perhaps most significant is its long history of involvement in such missions, in particular using the U.S. military. From the Mexican-American and Spanish-American wars through both world wars, the military conducted postconflict reconstruction and military government, albeit, as historian Earl Ziemke noted, as “a kind of reluctant afterthought.” Since the end of the Cold War, the tempo has increased. A 2007 RAND study found the United States launching a new stability operation roughly every other year, while UN peacekeeping missions increased from once every four years to once every six months. Afghanistan and Iraq also have offered painful experiences that generated tremendous study. Coordination of diplomatic, development and defense assets is better, particularly at operational and tactical levels. For U.S. civilian agencies (with the exception of USAID and its operationally focused culture), these skills present a new kind of “operational diplomacy.”

Another significant improvement in U.S. capabilities is the creation of stabilization and reconstruction committees. In 2004, the State Department created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, followed last year by the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations. Together with the Defense Department’s recent embrace of stability operations, the U.S. executive branch has undertaken notable, if limited, efforts to develop and maintain state-building capabilities.

Still, the U.S. government remains plagued with structural shortcomings in state building. There remain indications of failure to institutionalize lessons learned from Afghanistan and Iraq. The government seems unsure of what its role in state building can or should be.

Civilian capabilities remain particularly weak. One reason discussion of alternative courses often swings between doing nothing and military intervention is the persistent absence of a robust nonmilitary capability. The underlying premise in Iraq was that the military would stabilize the country and then hand the mission over to civilians for reconstruction, but the handoff never occurred. Civilian organizations dedicated to stabilization and reconstruction materialized too late. Beltway turf battles do not help either; the State Department’s powerful regional bureaus refused to give the predecessor organization to the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations control of any missions, thus contributing to its demise.

Although planning and coordination have improved, weaknesses remain. How early and how effectively executive agencies engage each other in the planning process is still largely personality-driven, and plans are closely held. The biggest lesson from Iraq is the imperative to plan early and inclusively. Many of the missteps and breathtaking oversights following the Iraq invasion are attributed to flawed plans that failed to take into account critical outside perspectives.

Another potential pitfall is in dispensing aid. In Iraq, aid dollars flowed through a single source—the U.S. government—with substantial delays reaching target recipients or achieving desired economic conditions. Afghanistan saw a web of donor countries and nongovernmental organizations achieve similarly poor results, sometimes undermining the Afghan governmental controls. The danger in Syria is that dollars could be used in ways that could put its economic viability further out of reach or create unsustainable expectations. A Senate report last year found that 97 percent of Afghan GDP derived from military spending and international support. Without that support, it concluded Afghanistan could suffer “a severe economic depression.”

Even when presidents generate political and public support for intervention, the United States historically has lacked the will to stay committed. Without strong support for war, domestic tolerance for casualties is near zero, and interest in spending large sums on foreign development has never been strong. The idea that nation building can be done on the cheap largely has been debunked, and the crippling bills racked up in Afghanistan and Iraq make for a nasty reality. Fatigue and overextension resulting from those conflicts make the likelihood of domestic support for a long, costly engagement nearly nil. Pew Research Center polls found only 25 percent of Americans believed the United States should intervene in Syria (with only 14 percent calling for deploying troops), and support would surely be less for a messy and expensive state-building effort.

The U.S. military also believes it is overstretched, and with the risks of significant cuts and even “sequestration” on the horizon, it will not be eager for a costly, troop-intensive mission that has little support at home and no clear end date. The new Defense Strategic Guidance puts it bluntly: “U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.”

The idea of allies taking over in lieu of U.S. leadership is similarly implausible. European capabilities for such missions have been steadily deteriorating for some time as the Continent’s economic crisis has lingered on. Even if willing, NATO seems unlikely to have the capacity to shoulder the burden, given its capability shortfalls and least-common-denominator approach to action. Robert Gates’s stinging remarks in his last policy speech as secretary of defense laid the blame on lack of will and lack of resources, resulting in European defense budgets “chronically starved for adequate funding for a long time.”

Turkey is the country likely to do the most. It has large numbers of competent forces, its economy is robust and its citizens care about the fate of Syria. Most important, Turkey fears massive refugee flows, the spread of secessionist sentiment to its own Kurdish population, terrorist activity and other evils that could emanate from a chaotic Syria. A Turkish role should be encouraged, while remembering that Turkey is not an impartial power and it will favor Syrian groups that may be anti-American, or at least not eager to embrace Washington.

The United States will also push democracy—but here Syrians likely will take a different course than Washington wants. The big issue is whether the civic structure will be liberal, guaranteeing individual and minority rights, or majoritarian, reflecting only the interests of the Sunni Arab community. Religious minorities—particularly the Alawites but also Christians, Druze and others who enjoyed some favor during the Assad years—likely will lose their special privileges and may also suffer open discrimination or even persecution. Elections can make the problems worse. Groups may rally against one another, make chauvinistic electoral promises and sow fear within their own communities. Warlords will attempt to control and manipulate the process, with power coming out of the barrel of guns. If the new government is Islamist in orientation, the discrimination may be even more intense. While Islamists in Egypt so far have shown respect for minority rights, in Syria there likely will be more pressure to discriminate because minority communities will be painted as sympathizers of the old regime. Assad’s regime has stoked sectarian tension, and those to whom evil is done often do evil in return.

While opposition forces are indeed vocal in requests for lethal aid to break the regime’s back, it is not at all clear to what degree U.S. assistance will be solicited to fashion a post-Assad state. Lack of government legitimacy is one of the main problems facing a new Syrian nation. A conspicuous foreign presence propping up a new government, possibly at the perceived expense of certain minorities, may further undermine legitimacy.

These considerations suggest that any state-building effort should be approached with restraint, but a limited U.S. role may actually encourage neighbors to meddle. Proxy battles between regional actors such as Saudi Arabia and Iran may confound efforts to stabilize Syria without a strong intervening presence. An absent America plays into a broader narrative of a weak and faltering superpower, strength sapped by foreign battlefields in Afghanistan and Iraq. Conversely, an expansive U.S. role may likewise provoke external interference, particularly from Iran and foreign jihadists.

HOW THE United States supports regime change—and whether it should support Assad’s fall at all—should depend in part on U.S. plans for the aftermath. The long-term political objective should be a stable and democratic (or at least representative) government that both Syrians and their neighbors can live with. Helping neighbors manage refugees, police their borders, go after terrorist groups and solve other problems should be central considerations in any U.S. strategy for Syria.

Effective planning for the day after Assad’s fall, despite all the uncertainties and contingencies, is essential now. Planning involves more, however, than small cells in large bureaucracies such as the Pentagon or State Department. It involves a comprehensive effort across agencies that includes the highest decision makers. The big decisions, and the big fights, must be done in advance.

Getting significant resources for such a mission is unlikely given current fiscal constraints and the political environment. To invoke the admonition attributed to Winston Churchill, “Gentlemen, we have run out of money. Now we have to think.” Recognizing limitations up front allows for strategic and prioritized use of finite resources. Too often the United States has failed to fully grasp this imperative. It has underestimated the challenge, overestimated its own capabilities, and overpromised in extending political pledges and impassioned, intermittent pleas for intervention. All this can result in overextension. Or the United States could find itself in a middle ground on resources and commitment, with its exposure maximized and its ability to achieve its objectives limited. This would be the worst of both worlds. Instead, the best the United States is likely to manage will be a limited engagement with modest aims and a modest commitment of resources, working with the larger international community. It is better to go small and achieve less than to launch large, ambitious projects that are ultimately unsustainable.

But this does not suggest an entirely hands-off approach. Inaction has its own costs. One emerges in the battle for public opinion as Arab publics look for evidence that the United States is credible in its claims to promote democracy and human rights. Criticism already has been levied over NATO and U.S. willingness to engage in Libya, ostensibly to prevent mass atrocities, but not in Syria, where atrocities already committed long since overtook the mere threats that were present in Libya. Standing by as chaos enveloped Syria would further diminish opinion of the United States. Providing some help lends Washington greater legitimacy (and access) to weigh in on issues that it cares about, such as securing Syria’s chemical weapons and reducing Iran’s influence in a post-Assad Syria. With people on the ground, the United States also gains an intelligence advantage and is less likely to be blindsided should things go awry.

The United States also has interests in Syria that go beyond what most Syrians care about. The threat of Syria’s chemical arsenal falling into terrorist hands, for example, is a greater concern for Syria’s neighbors and the West than for Syrians, who understandably would put more focus on immediate issues of security and economic rebuilding. Washington also will be concerned about the security of Israel, which most Syrians see as an enemy. The United States should prepare for the possibility that a post-Assad crisis involving the compromise of chemical-weapons arsenals could trigger an intervention.

Any effort would require both soldiers and civilians—though preferably as few soldiers on the ground as possible. Given U.S. weaknesses on the civilian side, reaching out to the international community is essential, though it too is weak on this score. Moreover, an American-led stabilizing force would probably not be welcome in Syria, and there would be little support for a sustained presence among the American people. The United States should consider being part of a multinational body and playing a supporting role to demonstrate it is contributing to Syria’s security. Recognizing U.S. intent in pursuing a limited course of action now would help focus attention on unity of effort with partners who will augment and/or lead external state-building efforts.

But what should these people do? A multinational body of uniformed and civilian personnel could help reconstitute Syrian uniformed forces, lend expertise in setting up impartial and functional political institutions, and help restore basic services. Washington should also work with any new Syrian government to fight terrorists. Here Yemen is a model, with the United States providing a broad range of assistance and conducting unilateral actions with the fig leaf of a government claiming them as its own. Perhaps most important, the United States can help set conditions for economic recovery: rolling back sanctions, helping to repair banking infrastructure, encouraging foreign investment, and coordinating assistance from Syria’s neighbors and other parties to ensure that aid is used efficiently.

The United States also could coordinate efforts of U.S. allies. Each will come to Syria with its own interests, and a modest U.S. role means the United States cannot impose its agenda. Washington can, however, try to prevent inevitable differences from getting out of hand and push for a sensible division of labor.

Among U.S. allies, Turkey is best positioned to intervene rapidly. The so-called golden hour after Assad falls will be critical, and Turkey already will be present. Also, Turkish forces are prepared to operate in an integrated way with civilians and NATO partners, as they have done in leading two provincial reconstruction teams in Afghanistan. Gaining a NATO mandate and UN support for Turkish activities would embolden Ankara and give its moves more legitimacy. Turkey, of course, will pursue its own interests in Syria, but for the most part these coincide with America’s: Ankara wants a stable and secure Syria that has a legitimate government. The moderate Islamist regime in Turkey is likely to continue supporting moderate Islamists in Syria, but the weakness of pro-American secular forces makes this the best outcome Washington could reasonably expect.

Washington also should prepare for failure. It is possible that Assad’s fall will be the beginning, not the end, of a long and chaotic period in Syria’s history, with civil war continuing and the conflagration inflaming neighbors. Even with neighboring states such as Turkey capable of intervening, by the time the international community determines how to respond, the honeymoon period may have passed, severely raising the costs of intervention and reducing the likelihood of success.

Part of why the Iraq War went so wrong was that U.S. leaders misunderstood not only Iraq but also U.S. capabilities. To avoid repeating this mistake in a post-Assad Syria, Washington must better anticipate what might go wrong and be more humble about its own capacity to remake Syria.

Daniel Byman is a professor at Georgetown University and the research director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. Renanah Miles is a program analyst in the Office of the Deputy Chief Management Officer at the Department of Defense. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

This article was derived entirely from open-source, unclassified material. The authors are happy to provide extensive original footnotes and a bibliography upon request.

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