Russia in Search of Itself
Mini Teaser: Russia's foreign policy cannot fail to provide for goals and tasks elevated above opportunist pragmatics.
We are having to talk about Russia's foreign policy at a time when it has yet to recognize itself as a state and has yet to shape the attributes of statehood--an army for instance; it does not have borders fixed in accordance with the practice of international law, does not have a sensible and formulated system of national interests on which foreign policy might be built, and has not recognized its particular historical mission.
Foreign policy with us does not emanate from the precepts and priorities of evolved statehood. On the contrary, foreign policy practice, frequently based on search, analogies, and intuition, is helping Russia become Russia. Dealings with the surrounding world are helping shape Russian statehood and helping Russia recognize its interests.
Categorical assertions to the effect that Russia is required to immediately renounce messianism have been heard increasingly often of late. If what is meant by this is a renunciation of the global mentorship of the communist rulers who stinted on neither others' money or others' lives for the sake of the universal establishment of the totalitarian utopia, there is no point arguing with this proposition. But what if we should rush to the other extreme: go so far in our denial of messianism as to jettison the similarly sounding, but not identical concept of mission.
A policy that is built on interests alone is highly vulnerable, and in Russia, in my view, it would be simply disastrous. Aside from interests, a mission, not degenerating into messianism, of course, is needed.
It is said that pragmatism should be the leading principle, virtually, of our foreign policy. This assertion is in need of particular reservations and limitations. Pragmatism not balanced by healthy idealism would with us, alas, most likely degenerate into extremes and cynicism. Russia's foreign policy cannot fail to provide for goals and tasks elevated above opportunist pragmatics.
Russia's mission in the world, from my viewpoint, is to initiate and support a multilateral dialogue of cultures, civilizations, and states. Russia the conciliator, Russia connecting. Russia combining. A state of charity, tolerant and open--within the limits drawn by law and good will, but formidable beyond these limits. A country imbibing West and East, North and South, unique and exclusively capable, perhaps, of the harmonious combination of many different principles, of a historic symphony. Such is my vision of Russia in a renewed world.
This is a perfectly natural role for it since Russia is in itself, by nature, dialogical. It has always bifurcated and acted as an opponent to itself in order subsequently, negotiating a chain of ordeals, to reach an accord with itself. it is pointless to complain at this nature of the historical destiny which has befallen Russia. it is very important for everyone who ventures to speak on its behalf to listen closely to the voice of its essence.
Frankly, I would greatly regret it were some Russian version of the strictly rational school of foreign policy to gain monopoly affirmation in Russia's foreign policy. On the other hand, were a foreign policy school combining both--rationalism and the pragmatic principle and our innate idealism connected with Russia's mission--to emerge, I would be prepared to associate myself with this school immediately. I am not talking about some speculative notions or emotional preferences, what is more.
Russia should appreciably reconsider its role in the United Nations and use its seat on the Security Council for the realization of its mission, for acquisition of a new status. It would make sense, evidently, having appreciably reduced the quantitative presence of Russia's representatives in the UN structure, to pay considerable attention to the qualitative aspect and laying claim to perfectly particular offices which would help Russia realize precisely its inherent mission. The European organizations of the United Nations and also the strengthening CSCE mechanism merit special attention. Russia's new role in these structures would help it not only establish itself as a leading European power but also compensate for its present geographical distance from the center of European international life.
Two lines, which may conditionally be designated in Atlantism and Eurasianism, have, in my opinion, emerged in our foreign policy practice of late. Atlantism gravitates toward the following set of ideas and symbols: to become Europe, to become a part of the world economy in rapid and organized fashion, to become the eighth member of the Seven, and to put particular emphasis on Germany and the United Sates as the two dominants of the Atlantic alliance. This is rational, pragmatic, and natural. There is credit, aid, and advanced technology there.
Its opposite trend--Eurasianism--is not as yet as clearly expressed as Atlantism, but it is already knocking on the door of the tall building on Smolenskaya.
Attempting at the close of the 20th century to resuscitate the idea of Russia's reorientation toward the East and the counteracting of Russia's Europization in its extreme forms would be just as pointless and unproductive, evidently, as hastily pulling onto the broad Russian shoulders the Atlantic dinner jacket and a bow tie. It is obvious that it is necessary to seek a new balance of Western and Eastern orientations characteristic of the present Russia and our times. Initially, for that matter, it will most likely be necessary to pay special attention to a strengthening of our positions in the East, straightening the manifest distortion permitted by the creators of the "common European home" concept.
There is no way that the present Russia can escape a combination of old and new realities. The fact is, for example, that we are now separated from Europe by a whole chain of independent states. We have become further removed from it geographically and geopolitically, which will inevitably entail quite an appreciable redistribution of our resources, our possibilities, our ties, and our interests in favor of Asia, in favor of the eastern direction. In addition, the development of the domestic political situation, which will inevitably be reflected in foreign policy, is pushing us in this direction also.
There will be a most difficult search for accord, mutual understanding and cooperation with the Turkic and Muslim components, which haver performed a tremendous role in the history of Russia. Our state emerged and strengthened as a unique historical and cultural amalgam of Slav and Turkic, Orthodox and Muslim components. Relations between them currently are on the brink of a fateful exacerbation. Avoiding this exacerbation and finding harmony here, finding a synthesis, allowing Russia to once again feel itself to be the combining, connecting conciliator is of categorical importance.
The shaping on the territory of the collapsed Union and around it of an appreciably different configuration of strategic interests is confronting Russia with a new historical challenge. We are seeing how the influence of the Muslim world, both close to us and not so close to us geographically, on our domestic political situation is growing, how zones of influence on the territories of contiguous Asian republics and on the territory of Russia are gradually emerging and how an arc of crisis, to use the well-known image of the seventies, from the Transcaucasus through North Caucasus toward the Volga region is taking shape step by step. Ignoring this circumstance is impossible. Not to understand which dominants of the Near and Middle East (Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia) are displaying a heightened interest in the arc of crisis is also impossible. We should be preparing to respond purposefully and consistently to the emerging intricate knot of counterinterests and influences. It is possible, evidently, to talk about a revival of the Eastern question in Russia's foreign policy in something close to the classical understanding. But we have as yet, alas, no ideologists capable of formulating the Eastern question at the modern level, nor are there the men of practice capable of offering effective answers.
The preservation and gradual strengthening of the special relationship with the states of the CIS (permeable borders, close economic and cultural ties, allied relations in the military and political spheres) correspond to Russia's long-term strategic interests. But there are in the realization of this tendency distinct limitations.
In order to broaden for itself the field of political action as much as possible Russia must quickly become self-sufficient that is, provide itself with all the vitally important means and resources from internal sources or from several independent sources within the framework and outside of the CIS.
In increasing the volume of treaty relations with its CIS partners Russia should approach them in differentiated fashion. It will inevitably be necessary to distinguish between those which use the CIS merely as a means of dividing up the Union inheritance prior to a "definitive" parting and those for who the Commonwealth is a fundamental historical choice. Concessions to the first in the name, allegedly, of preservation of the CIS are pointless and dangerous, and nonpower competition with its treaties recording results beneficial to Russia are more appropriate here. The second group of states, on the other hand, has the right to expect the preference of strategic allies.
There is no need for Russia to endeavor to have each document consolidating its relations with its CIS partners contain the signatures of all members of the Commonwealth without exception. Rather there be fewer signatures and more precise meaning, clearer consequences, and higher quality of the document.
It is frequently maintained that Russia's concern for the fate of Russians in neighboring states signifies interference in the internal affairs of the independent states. Russia cannot, in my view, agree with this interpretation. the proclamation of independence and its recognition in international law are only the first step on the long path of the formation of full-fledged statehood. It is the obligation of a new state laying claim to a worthy role in the international community to come to terms in humane and civilized with the legacy of the former era, adopting a solicitous attitude toward people and their fate, and cautiously doing away with the most painful contradiction.
Unfortunately, a number of states which were formerly a part of the USSR has opted for a different path. Nationalist forces essentially driven by paranoid ideas of historical or national vengeance have bestirred themselves there. They are exerting one-sided pressure on the authorities. As fragmented minorities, the Russian communities are not in a position to balance out this pressure, and, as a result, as has been the case in Estonia and Latvia, are falling victim to discriminatory citizenship legislation which is in fact introducing apartheid practices.
Russia does not have the moral right to remain in the position of passive observer. The response to any discriminatory decision or action in respect to the Russian population and, more broadly--the Russian heritage (graves, monuments, schools, churches, monasteries, museums)--should be rule No.1 of both our embassies in our "near neighbors' and of our Foreign Ministry.
The attitude toward the Russian population and the Russian heritage is a most important criterion for Russia of the attribution of this state or the other to the category of friends. The entire set of our bilateral relations--from the question of the fate of the army through the economy and finances--cannot, in turn, fail to depend on this.
Contrary to all the charges of an imperial syndrome, such a policy has nothing in common with imperialism. On the contrary, it is for Russia a legitimate and natural aspiration to the erasure of conflicts and the harmonization of relations on the territory of the former USSR, and Russia will invariably take the part of the undeservedly insulted and unjustly persecuted, what is more.
Unfortunately, the insufficient diplomatic assertiveness of Russia in the sphere in question is leading to a distorted perception by some European politicians of what is happening in the states of the former Union.
We cannot, for example, overlook the speeches in Estonia of Madame Lalumiere, secretary general of the Council of Europe. She made common cause, in fact, with the idea of the separation of peoples into indigenous and nonindigenous in this region. This extremely dangerous idea will never be accepted by Russia and is categorically rejected by the Russian Government. We cannot permit a division whereby "nonindigenous" peoples are unequal. We consider such an approach unacceptable on both moral and political grounds.
The subject of the defense of the rights of the populace ethnically connected with Russia will inevitably be a very important topic throughout the negotiating process with the states of the former Union. It is inevitable that Russia will endeavor persistently to incorporate the corresponding provisions in international documents of various levels. It is time here, evidently--this is my opinion, in any event--for Russia to adopt a tougher tone than has been the case hitherto. Without, naturally, overstepping the bounds of absolutely necessary restraint, but, for all that, displaying far greater insistence for the appeals which have been made thus far have not been heard.
Stability is a priority, a most important value, which must be present in Russia's foreign policy. I would add to this value another--balance, which is a most important condition of stability. Balance both along East-West lines, which we have already mentioned, and along North-South lines. There are giant, as yet unutilized possibilities here. A rapid move onto the markets and full-fledged integration into the system of economic relations of such states as the United States, Japan, and the economically developed states of Europe are highly problematical. We are obviously assigned here for many years to come, at best the role of junior partner who should not be admitted.
At the same time, on the other hand, there are far broader and qualitatively better opportunities connected with other states, other countries of, conditionally speaking, the second echelon, which are at a similar historical frontier to us, that is, at the frontier of historical breakthrough. These are the countries lying to the south of our traditional partners: in Latin America, Mexico, Brazil, Chile, and Argentina; in Africa, South Africa; further in the direction of Europe, Greece; then Turkey; in Asia, India, China, and the Southeast Asia countries.
These states are attempting to accomplish historical tasks similar to ours: integration into the world economy without losing their identity and defending their own interests; transition to a new technology structure; implementation of comprehensive reforms encompassing both industry and agriculture; acquisition of financial, food, and other self-sufficiency.
Interaction with them, use of the potential available to both parties, movement onto their markets and the use of the potential of our market--these are the opportunities which cannot be overlooked. They have thus far for incomprehensible reasons remained on the periphery of our foreign policy activity.
The world is changing rapidly, and new intersections of interests and new regional formations with an independent orientation are emerging therein. All this is affording Russia opportunities to obtain propitious geopolitical positions in key regions and to rank in time among the world leaders.
Sergei Stankevich is state counselor of the Russian Federation for Policy Issues. This essay is adapted from "A State in Search of Itself: Notes on Russian Foreign Policy", published in Moscow's Nezavisimaya Gazeta (March 28, 1992) and reprinted in abbreviated form in FBIS (April 9, 1992).
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