North Korean leader Kim Jong-un recently traveled on April 25 to meet with Russian president Vladimir Putin. According to their statements, Kim has not changed his position of keeping his nuclear arsenal unless he gets certain unclear “security guarantees” from the United States. Kim also wants sanctions relief as part of any denuclearization deal between Kim and President Donald Trump.

Pyongyang’s primary concern is survival. North Korea is surrounded by more powerful countries, many of which have nuclear weapons. Also, South Korea is allied with the nuclear United States. Kim wants to protect himself against regime change and increased sanctions. Although the big question is how Washington can convince Pyongyang to give up nuclear weapons under such circumstances, another vital question is what happens if Kim refuses and relations become hostile and tense again? If America cannot get rid of North Korea’s nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future, how can Washington at least be sure they will never be used.

North Korea’s Nuclear Program

North Korea has long maintained an interest in the ultimate deterrent of nuclear weapons. In 1992, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) announced Pyongyang had been deceptive about its nuclear program, which was possibly being weaponized. This led to a series of negotiations led by the United States and other regional powers to halt and undo North Korea’s nuclear program.

However, nearly three decades and four U.S. administrations later, North Korea’s nuclear ambitions remain intact. Starting in October 2006, Pyongyang has conducted six nuclear tests, with the latest in September 2017.

The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists estimates “North Korea might have produced sufficient fissile material to build 30 to 60 nuclear weapons, and that it might possibly have assembled 10 to 20 warheads.” Pyongyang could have as many as one hundred warheads by 2020, although there is no way to be certain.

Furthermore, North Korea has a growing arsenal of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that are estimated to be capable—or eventually capable—of hitting all of the United States, from Guam to Washington, DC According to the Arms Control Association, these missiles include the Taepodong-2 (which has yet to be developed as an ICBM) and the Hwasong-14 and Hwasong-15.

North Korean experts have longed debated Pyongyang’s intentions and nuclear doctrine. Are these simply defensive weapons of last resort that three generations of the ruling Kim family only procured to ensure their reign? Or are North Korean nuclear weapons offensive, to be used as blackmail for sanctions relief and to pressure Seoul into accepting unification on Pyongyang’s terms?

There are good arguments to be made for both, but the logic of deterrence remains the same. In theory, none of the parties involved will take action they think will lead to the other side using nuclear weapons. The costs of a nuclear conflict would be devastating and therefore each side would avoid pushing too far, even with lower-level tit-for-tat. The danger is when deterrence breaks down, and previously taboo actions are taken. For instance, if either side believes invasion is inevitable or they could get away with a sneak attack unscathed, then a war could happen. The risk of nuclear weapons use also increases if smaller conflicts or tit-for-tat ever got out-of-hand.

Americans and North Korea

Americans became aware of the threat in late 2017 when Washington and Pyongyang were exchanging increasingly bellicose threats. U.S. officials and media outlets had stunned many Americans by announcing North Korea was further along in its ballistic missile and nuclear warhead miniaturization technology than thought. Suddenly, everyone realized Pyongyang might be able to launch nuclear missiles against the entire United States for the first time.

Although the capabilities and accuracy of North Korean ICBMs are in dispute, it is reasonable to believe Pyongyang has a new ability to threaten America. After all, even if Kim’s missiles might not be all they are made out to be, why would anyone want to find out?

On January 13, 2018, this danger to American lives and security was made awfully apparent to residents of Hawaii when a text message alert about an inbound ballistic missile was accidentally sent by local authorities. Cynthia Lazaroff, a nuclear expert and documentary filmmaker, was living in Hawaii at the time. She wrote a first-hand account of her surreal experience in The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. The text alert stated, “Ballistic Missile Threat Inbound to Hawaii. Seek immediate shelter. This is not a drill.”

Lazaroff recalls the shock, followed by immediate action and sporadic planning. Few people on the island knew what to do, had a plan, or kept emergency supplies. 911 was jammed with calls, and not everyone could get through to find out more. Some people ran for cover, and others got on the quickly jammed roads to find loved ones or to flee. Eventually, officials got the word out that the alert was sent by accident during a test.

That experience was transformational. As Lazaroff wrote,

“I got a gut-punch wake-up call in those 38 minutes in Hawaii when it seemed the world might end. It drove home a joyful revelation: ‘I am still here! My children are still here!’ It was the kind of wake-up call that moved President Kennedy after the Cuban Missile Crisis to reach out to the Soviet Union. It was the kind of wake-up call that shifted the thinking of both Reagan and Gorbachev.”

I myself traveled to Hawaii for an Atomic Reporters Workshop around the anniversary of the false alarm. We talked with local civilians, professionals, and journalists about what happened. Some people didn’t do anything, either falling into a kind of hopeless acceptance. Others continued about their day believing it was either an error or they wouldn’t survive anyway.

Such experiences bring home seemingly far-off nuclear threats. Additionally, most Americans do not know the danger, how to prepare for or respond after an attack, or how much time they would have. In the case of North Korea, Hawaii residents would have had about twenty-five minutes and only about a fifty-fifty percent chance (if not much lower) of intercepting just one missile.

When the Cold War ended, so too did nuclear risks as a conscious part of people’s lives. According to nuclear historian Alex Wellerstein, who was at the Atomic Reporters event in Hawaii, civil defense drills and information on nuclear attacks are few to nonexistent. Wellerstein also heads a project called Reinventing Civil Defense and he has warned:

“The elimination of nuclear risk from the lived experience of Americans has relegated nuclear issues into a near mythical realm, one that has led to both fatalism and apathy… Without this deep awareness, nuclear issues will not command the popular support necessary to inspire meaningful public action.”

Even the federal government’s official disaster preparation site, Ready.gov, features limited information about a nuclear attack. Such information also is not prominently featured on its homepage or widely distributed. Further, during the January 2019 government shutdown, Ready.gov was not “actively managed.”

Real Nuclear Risks

It is not just American citizens who are unprepared. Policymakers in Washington have at several times underestimated the risks, such as when they argue for preemptive attacks on North Korea.

Furthermore, a nuclear attack is possible outside of a deliberate war. As long as some level of mutually-assured-destruction holds, then no two nuclear powers would deliberately use nuclear weapons first. Daniel Davis, a veteran and a senior fellow and military expert at Defense Priorities, explained to the National Interest, “We can remain confident... that Kim would never start an unprovoked war, as he knows he would lose and his nation could be annihilated.”

However, deterrence could breakdown as the result of accidents, miscalculation, misperception, or overreaction. History is full of examples of attacks and incidents which nearly got out of hand.

There are too many close calls of nuclear use to count, but these illustrate that mitigating risk should be a top priority:

• During the Cuban missile crisis, there were several incidents where the U.S. Navy attempted to force Soviet submarines to the surface to identify themselves by chasing them and using practice depth charges. On October 27, 1962, the rattled Soviet commander of submarine B-59 and almost launched a nuclear torpedo but was calmed down and talked out of it. (The U.S. Navy didn’t know he had a nuclear torpedo.)

• In November 1979, an incorrect war simulation tape was used at the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) which caused warning systems to show an all-out Soviet nuclear attack. The national security adviser was woken up from sleep and almost called President Jimmy Carter but was stopped just before when technicians realized their mistake. Three more false alarms also happened between May and June of 1980, all caused by other problems such as a faulty integrated circuit chip.

• On September 26, 1983, a Soviet radar screen malfunctioned and incorrectly showed five American ICBMs inbound for Russia. The soldier on duty was required to alert his superiors to fire back, but he instead declared it to be a malfunction. He was right—a satellite mistook the reflection of sun rays on clouds for missile launches.

• In late 2017, during Trump’s threats of “fire and fury,” he reportedly considered tweeting he would order all non-essential U.S. personnel and civilians to evacuate South Korea. Many experts believed Kim would have interpreted such a move as preparation for a preemptive war and could have then acted preemptively himself.

Every Power Has Its Own National Interests

Considering these numerous close calls, how should America proceed on North Korea given this problem?

Looking at different countries’ interests can provide further clarity here.

For the United States, Washington has repeatedly declared it wants complete, verifiable, irreversible, denuclearization (CVID). America’s main concern is its own physical security as well as the security of its regional allies like South Korea and Japan. If North Korea gave up its nuclear weapons, American cities would be secure against Pyongyang.

Abby Bard, a research associate on Asia Policy at Center for American Progress, told the National Interest, “The U.S. stated end goal should be denuclearization because to publicly declare otherwise would be a major concession and would undermine alliance credibility.” “However,” she added, “the U.S. must also operate under the assumption that denuclearization is a long-term goal.”

Olivia Enos, a policy analyst for the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation, also says denuclearization is here to stay. When asked for a comment Enos wrote, “The U.S.’s primary goal in negotiations should be to get North Korea to commit to [CVID] of its nuclear program. However, it should also seek progress on human rights.”

From America’s perspective, CVID would be the most ideal outcome. However, CVID cannot be pursued at the cost of war. As Davis told the National Interest, “America’s enduring interests are defending U.S. security, safeguarding the conditions for our prosperity, and protecting our liberties. In North Korea, that means deterring the regime from using any of their weapons against us, as we have far greater powers, avoiding unnecessary war, and increasing engagement, primarily through diplomacy and trade.”

Meanwhile, North Korea also wants to be secure. Pyongyang has a long historical pattern of mixing threats or attacks with follow-up diplomacy to keep Washington and Seoul off-balance. The result is North Korea acts nice to one party and tough with another to drive a wedge between the United States and South Korea. This both weakens the military alliance Kim faces and allows him to force the other side back to the negotiating table.

By doing this, successive Kims have been able to get away with provocations while also reducing sanctions or getting developmental assistance in return for promises of improved behavior or curtailment of their nuclear program. As Davis explains, “Kim Jong-un wants his country to survive and prosper—his nuclear deterrent is a fundamental part of both. North Korea’s weapons increase the cost of regime change and provide a bargaining chip for sanctions relief.”

Moreover, as long as Pyongyang is secure from attack, Kim is free to continue the slow liberalization of the North Korean economy instead of focusing on his military. Already, Kim promised his people prosperity and has overseen a period of growth and improvement of livelihoods. North Korea has a rising middle class and fewer collectivized farms. A 2017–2018 Center for Strategic and International Studies study tallied 436 state-sanctioned markets (before they were suppressed) and now free market activity accounts for up to 50 percent of North Korea’s gross domestic product.

The National Interest reached out to Sung-Yoon Lee, a Korean Studies professor at The Fletcher School at Tufts University, for his understanding of North Korea. He wrote, “The end game for Pyongyang is to perfect its nuclear posture and be positioned to bully, extort, censor the richer South at will. And, perhaps with luck, one day, absorb it. It’s a plan with a rational strategy and an end game in mind.”

Therefore, it seems likely North Korea will continue to hold out against CVID for a better deal (or more likely for no deal). Kim knows without deterrence he risks facing the same fate as Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan—all countries that were unable to defend themselves against American military power.

Seoul is also worried about security and economic growth. As North Korea’s neighbor, South Korea knows it would be the worst-hit in any conflict. The Pentagon estimates there would be twenty thousand daily fatalities during a conventional war. In addition, the Stimson Center’s 38North projects there could be between 1.3 and 3.8 million deaths if nuclear weapons were used against Seoul and Tokyo.

With arguably the most to lose, South Korea is wary of war and any actions that could cause one. This is why President Moon Jae-in has worked so hard, despite much criticism, to ensure Trump and Kim meet and keep the diplomatic ball rolling.

Lee told the National Interest, “For Seoul, inter-Korean rapprochement in any form—whether the richer South ends up directly and indirectly subsidizing the North’s WMD programs—is ‘good politics’ no matter what. The majority of the public will support the government’s efforts at de-escalation, as risk-averse as South Korea is.”

Skeptics like Lee believe that South Korea’s outreach is “a myopic ‘spend-now, pay-later’ sort of planning without a plan.” But other watchers argue that there is no other way forward for Seoul.

The National Interest previously interviewed Seoul’s special advisor for unification, diplomacy and national security affairs, Chung-in Moon. He argued: “[T]here are no viable options except engagement in dealing with North Korea. Whereas sanctions and maximum pressures have been of limited effect, military options are unacceptable because of devastating collateral damage.”

Chung-in Moon also believes upfront CVID is a non-starter for South Korea. “Pyongyang is not likely to accommodate American demand of ‘dismantle first, reward later.’ If the choice is framed as ‘all or nothing,’ Washington will continue to get nothing.”

The current administration in Seoul wants peace first and believes economic incentives are essential. After all, South Korean companies want to invest in North Korea to take advantage of cheaper labor and untapped trillions in natural resources as South Korea’s own economy slows down and its workforce ages.

Regardless of one’s view of South Korea’s insistence on a peace regime and negotiations first, the fact remains that Seoul must look after its physical security and that should include both open communication and deterrence.

Finally, there are China’s interests. Beijing wants regional stability and security on its border. Although China also is interested in exploiting North Korea’s resources and labor, Beijing is mostly concerned with using Pyongyang against Washington and ensuring Kim’s regime is stable.

Gordon Chang, a China and North Korea expert, explained to the National Interest, “Beijing should want the same things we do: the complete disarmament of North Korea. As a nuclear weapons state, China’s power is diminished by the presence of other ones… [But] they have been supporting Pyongyang’s weaponization efforts with technology, components, equipment, and materials. Evidently, they think they can get concessions from [America] on a range of issues by dangling cooperation on North Korea.”

China wants to grow its regional influence at the expense of the United States. But primarily, Beijing must prevent the chaos of a North Korean collapse. China does not want to deal with the thousands, if not millions, of refugees who would come streaming across its border. Furthermore, Beijing does not want to worry about loose nukes and the question of who would try to control them and how.

Finally, Beijing also worries a war or collapse could result in North Korea being absorbed by South Korea because fighting would likely bring the American military alliance right to China’s doorstep. China entered the Korean War in 1950 to push U.S. forces back across the 38th parallel and it is likely to do so again should it appear American forces intend to reach the Chinese border and stay there. This is why it should be assumed China will go to great lengths to keep Kim in power, no matter how much of a nuisance he is.

 

Assessing the Paths Forward

The options facing America are stark and difficult. Given nuclear deterrence, risks, and each country’s interests, anything that might plausibly lead to war is a no-go. This means attempts at denuclearization by force—whether a preemptively strike, bloody nose attack, or full-on invasion bent on regime change—should be off the table.

This appears to have also been the conclusion of all three previous U.S. administrations. All three presidents before Trump considered military attacks but realized they were not worth the risks.

So where does this leave Washington’s policy on Pyongyang?

Kim is unlikely to ever give up all of his nuclear weapons, although some limited rollback, ideally with a missile and nuclear test ban and caps on North Korea’s types and numbers of ICBMs, might be possible. As Sue Mi Terry, the Korea Chair senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies wrote to the National Interest, “There is no ‘endgame’ per se.” However, Terry elaborated: “An interim freeze deal or a deal on ICBMs is still possible, although unlikely, and either would acknowledge North Korea as a nuclear weapons power, which will have huge consequences.”

Terry told the National Interest: “Rather than imagining that the North Korean threat will disappear soon, the U.S. needs to continue to act to contain, deter, and reduce the threat. The best way to do this is through a sanctions policy designed to deplete the North’s hard currency holdings and a military strategy designed to integrate regional missile defenses between the U.S. and its allies.”

Enos also wrote to the National Interest that Washington should focus on human rights in addition to CIVD: “The U.S. should... pursue a more comprehensive strategy in negotiations with North Korea—one that recognizes that U.S. policy reflects a variety of policy priorities toward North Korea that include promotion of freedom for the North Korean people.”

A comprehensive strategy is certainly needed as is some level of deterrence and containment. The catch is while CVID or containment via maximum pressure slows North Korea down, it has limits.

For instance, on the one hand, Kim’s globetrotting normalizes him and makes it harder to enforce sanctions. China’s interests in keeping Pyongyang afloat also means Beijing will often flout sanctions. Moreover, if other powers are willing to break sanctions, Kim may survive just as his father and grandfather have. For example, in 2018, countries as wide-ranging as Mexico, Turkey, Uruguay, Ghana, and India all violated North Korea’s textile export ban by purchasing millions worth of clothing. Meanwhile, Washington’s bandwidth is limited by new crisis and America is busy fighting multiple wars in Yemen, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Somalia.

Yet, on the other hand, America might not want to push too hard. One possible scenario of sanctions gone wrong would be if economic pressure coupled with a crisis causes Kim to believe war is imminent and so he must act first. Alternatively, sanctions and Pyongyang’s mismanagement could cause a coup or collapse, as nearly happened in 1995 during a severe famine. But, regime change might not have positive results for Washington.

Pyongyang’s new leadership could be more openly hostile than Kim. There is also a chance the military would take control and would place their nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert in case of South Korean or American intervention. Beijing could even take military action to maintain order and secure North Korea’s nuclear stockpiles. But, of course, during a collapse, there is a high likelihood Seoul and Washington would also send in special forces to do the same thing. What would happen then? Could all of Pyongyang’s nuclear materials and weapons be accounted for? Would Chinese and South Korean and American forces work together or stumble into a third world war by surprise and accident?

With the difficulty of sanctions enforcement and the possibility of maximum pressure backfiring, some North Korea watchers have suggested only playing nice in the hope of trying to flip Pyongyang into an American ally like Vietnam.

However, such a bold goal is unlikely to work. There are still North Korea’s cycle of escalation and diplomacy to deal with and Trump cannot remove all sanctions unilaterally even if he wanted to. That is because in 2016, Congress enacted a law preventing economic relief for Pyongyang without clear progress on CVID.

Besides, Kim might not be a true economic and political reformer. Although Kim has made many reforms, being an economic liberalizer who wants to avoid famines doesn’t necessarily make one less of a nationalist. Even though Kim seeks prosperity and political stability through some reforms, his baseline goal remains staying in power and coveting at least influence—if not eventual dominance—over South Korea.

Additionally, as North Korean defector Ji Seong-ho told the National Interest in a previous interview, “[I]f North Korea undergoes reform and opening, their foundation of hereditary succession of power will be threatened. As long as Kim Jong-un wishes for a long-term dictatorship, he will neither reform nor open under any circumstances.”

The Only Real Options

So what is left if North Korea cannot be fully contained, forcibly made to comply with CVID, or completely transformed into an American partner?

Some variation on diplomacy with deterrence appears to be the only real answer at least for now. America needs a stable power and deterrence dynamic. If two traditionally hostile powers are to coexist indefinitely with nuclear weapons, they must at least have crisis management mechanisms in place if they cannot fundamentally alter the relationship.

As Alexandra Bell, the senior policy director at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, explained to the National Interest, “[The] Hanoi [summit] was a failure for many reasons, not the least of which was lack of preparation. It also seemed that the Trump Administration had wildly unrealistic expectations about the scope of issues that could be handled in one summit.”

Bell wrote further: “Don’t add more sanctions assuming it’s some sort of magic wand to use when talks aren’t going well. Diplomacy is hard. The Administration needs to accept that. Get back to the negotiations with a real idea of what we want to talk about and it cannot be ‘everything.’ We need achievable, short-term goals. We can then build on success.”

This is why pragmatism is needed. It is difficult to lower the risks of accident, miscalculation, misperception, and overreaction, but Washington must seriously start somewhere.

Part of this can be done at home, where America has the greatest ability to avoid a future crisis. Washington must make a point to double check on its own nuclear arsenal and alert systems. It is not safe for the world’s most powerful country to have false alarms or accidents.

Also, America should encourage South and North Korea to maintain their hotline which was finally brought back online in January 2018. The United States itself has back channels to North Korea through the United Nations in New York and through British and Swedish diplomats. This is not good enough.

Washington and Pyongyang must set up their much-talked-about liaison offices. Having a more direct line of communication will vastly improve mutual understanding during a crisis. America also needs better coordination and preparation with South Korea and with China in case things ever do start to get out of control.

Finally, as Chung-in Moon advised Washington during his interview: “Going forward, it would be useful for South Korea, North Korea, and America to institutionalize a trilateral crisis monitoring and management mechanism. If the United States and North Korea progress toward normalization of relations, that would of course also dramatically improve their ability to sustain dialogue, including during a period of crisis.”

Continuous Crisis Management As a End Goal

It would be a mistake to trust North Korea completely, but Pyongyang is not so dangerous to be worth risking nuclear war. Kim is powerful, but he is not the leader of Russia or China which have more resources, modern armies, and vastly more numerous and advanced nuclear weapons. Washington should just manage North Korea so it can focus on real competitors like China and Russia.

After the Hanoi summit, both sides wisely left the door open to future diplomacy. Kim and Trump understand there is more at stake than whether one individual meeting is a success or failure.

Washington must continue its outreach to Pyongyang while also holding the line where necessary. But Trump must do this while tending to the relationship and ensuring crisis management is baked into talks.

As Davis told the National Interest, “The only way we lose in our relations with North Korea is if we engage in the unprovoked use of military force.”

CVID may not be possible any time soon or at all. But that is okay if both sides can avoid escalation in the future. America coexisted with the Soviet Union and can do so with a weaker North Korea.

John Dale Grover is an assistant managing editor for the National Interest. This project was completed in collaboration with Brad Howard, a U.S. Air Force veteran who writes about the military.

Image: Reuters