SATELLITES MAY be the least thrilling component of the U.S. force posture, but they are vital in providing key intelligence and upholding deterrence. As offensive technology advances and the final frontier becomes increasingly congested with thousands of satellites owned by dozens of countries and corporations, there is growing concern that our space-based assets have become sitting ducks, continuously traveling in the same, predictable orbits and equipped with few defenses.

Why are these systems at risk of being targeted? The conventional military applications that satellites provide cannot be overstated. Satellites produce critical geospatial imaging, near real-time intelligence on missile launches, and help guide troops and munitions via global positioning systems (GPS). According to Department of Defense statements, intelligence and guidance provided by Defense Support Program satellites proved essential to successes in Operation Desert Storm, the 1999 Kosovo air campaign and the 2003 Iraq invasion. A 2017 Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) report entitled “Escalation and Deterrence in the Second Space Age” describes how U.S. utilization of precision—GPS and laser-guided—munitions has increased from 8 percent at the start of the first Gulf War to over 96 percent as of the Syrian Civil War in 2014. Some have argued that the United States has become over-reliant on the national security advantages provided by satellites, calling this growing dependence America’s “Achilles Heel” in modern warfare. Curbing access to these advantageous tactics early on in a conventional conflict would certainly level the playing field for an aggressor.

Some of these same systems would be integral before and during potential nuclear crises, because, by nature of their design, they are also able to provide early warning should an adversary launch an icbm. This intelligence would create a vital window for decisionmaking, missile defense operations and potential retaliation before one’s own targeted weapons might be destroyed. Other satellites enable communications between political and military officials regarding nuclear command and control should such a crisis occur. James Acton, co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, has noted that because many of these satellite constellations have both conventional and nuclear applications, it may be difficult to characterize the intent of an attack and control escalation once one is targeted.

Part of the growing fear surrounding the vulnerability of our space assets comes from the fact that the key major powers in space—Russia, China and the United States—have been unable to fashion any meaningful agreements to limit the types of satellite-threatening weapons or constrain worrisome behavior in orbit—measures in which the Obama and Trump administrations have expressed interest—albeit to varying degrees. Should the international community attempt to pursue such agreements now or in the future, it will have to consider the three obstacles that follow, each of which confounds traditional approaches to norm-building and arms control.

THE FIRST obstacle is that an adversary could use a wide range of tactics to compromise a state’s satellite, some of which are non-kinetic and complicate the notion of what constitutes a “weapon” or an “attack.”

A substantial challenge to any hopes of anti-satellite (ASAT) arms control is the sheer variety of tactics that an aggressor could utilize to harm or disable an opponent’s space assets. For this reason, the United States has repeatedly refused to sign various versions of the Treaty on the Prevention of Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT), a long-winded name for a joint Russian-Chinese un proposal where signatories would refrain from (1) putting any sort of weapon in space, and (2) from threatening or using force against objects in space—all in the noble name of creating a safer commons and preventing anti-satellite warfare.

At first blush, this treaty sounds like an anodyne, collaborative way to temper growing ASAT fears. So why exactly does the United States refuse to sign? Though the proposed agreement purports to restrict co-orbital ASAT systems (satellites capable of offensive operations against other satellites), it does not prohibit the creation, testing and stockpiling of a breakout force of ground-based weapons that could be just as harmful to space assets.

In reality, there are a spectrum of tactics, both ground-based and space-based, that an aggressor could use to harm an adversary’s satellite. The two traditional, kinetic ASAT systems are (1) co-orbital and (2) ground-based direct-ascent systems. These ASAT tactics have heretofore remained unused offensively, but have been flight tested and, in some cases, even displayed in demonstrations where a testing nation’s own defunct satellite is targeted and destroyed. 

China, the United States and, earlier this year, India have all conducted these kinetic tests which result in an unintended side-effect: the creation of significant fast-flying space debris. Traveling at over 17,500 mph, space debris has become extremely problematic, threatening all manned and unmanned spacecraft in orbit. Of particular concern are the smaller bits of debris that cannot be tracked, thereby reducing the warning time for spacecraft to maneuver out of the way—a process which can expend a great deal of fuel. According to nasa, “Even tiny paint flecks can damage a spacecraft when traveling at these velocities. In fact, a number of space shuttle windows have been replaced because of damage caused by material that was analyzed and shown to be paint flecks.” If even a small piece of debris collided and destroyed a spacecraft, it could then create a larger number of debris which could threaten a chain reaction known as the Kessler effect. Further kinetic ASAT testing and any kinetic ASAT warfare could exacerbate the growing space debris problem.

On the subtler end of the spectrum are tactics that include: jamming satellite signals on the uplink or downlink to cause temporary disruption, “dazzling” a satellite’s sensor with a laser, or launching cyberattacks that target ground control stations or “spoof” signal data. Attacks that only temporarily inhibit the function of a satellite may be viewed as less escalatory than a blatantly destructive kinetic attack, and therefore might be a more attractive option to aggressors. Russia has already successfully jammed GPS signals, affecting operations in Eastern Ukraine, Norway and possibly Syria, forcing the U.S. Department of Defense to introduce training measures to reduce dependence on satellite-guided navigation assistance. Russia and China are each developing and testing their own laser “dazzler” systems.

If the international community were to seek a meaningful arms control agreement or behavior-restricting treaty for space, it would need to consider what on the spectrum of offensive ASAT tactics constitutes an “attack” or “weapon,” which are the most likely to occur and which can be reasonably constrained. Kinetic direct-ascent and co-orbital attacks are certainly of great concern, but what about subtler attacks that achieve similar, albeit temporary, objectives? Many of these come with their own regulatory difficulties. Jamming, cyberattacks and lasers all present some degree of plausible deniability to the offender: jamming can sometimes be indistinguishable from noise caused by unintended interference, cyberattacks can be difficult to attribute to a specific actor and tracing a laser back to its source may prove to be more difficult than it sounds. Relatively inexpensive jamming tools are not difficult for states, or even non-state actors, to acquire.

Additionally, the United States must decide which, if any, of these offensive behaviors warrants a response, and what that response should look like. Though jamming or spoofing GPS signals in peacetime would likely not meet the threshold for kinetic retaliation, what would? A non-attributable Stuxnet-type cyberattack that inflicts lasting damage on one or multiple ground control stations? An “accidental” collision of two satellites? The 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review includes retaliation after a “significant” non-nuclear attack on American or allied nuclear command, control and communications (NC3)—which includes sensors and satellites in space—as a legitimate scenario for the potential first use of nuclear weapons. Though this declaratory policy may be deliberately vague, it raises a critical question: what exactly would qualify as a “significant attack” on NC3 or warning and attack assessment capabilities? These, and other scenarios, are important to consider when discussing how we might prevent escalation in space and avoid a potentially catastrophic conflict.

THE SECOND challenge is our inability to characterize a given satellite as strictly peaceful. This complication makes traditional arms control or norm-building approaches unsuitable for space—with verification nearly impossible—and regulation highly difficult. This is another key reason for Washington’s refusal to sign the PPWT “no-weapons-in-space” treaty: it lacks a sound regime to verify that a satellite neither contains a weapon, nor will act as a weapon once in orbit.

Rendezvous and proximity operations (RPOs), somewhat complicated maneuvers that match the orbital speed of one satellite to approach and “hover” alongside a second, are an excellent example of the challenging dual utility satellites present. Though these operations are requisite in developing innocuous abilities to man, fuel and repair another of one’s own spacecraft, they also demonstrate the necessary precision to target and potentially destroy an adversary’s satellite. Not unlike flagrant jet intercepts that “buzz” U.S. aircraft, Russia has been heavily criticized for conducting these sometimes high-speed, close-approach operations without alerting the controllers of the “target” satellites beforehand. RPOs are not restricted or constrained by any international treaties, yet the destructive potential that accompanies each operation is a source of renewed worry for the “target satellite” operators. Recent advances in technology, such as the addition of a robotic arm to Chinese’s SJ-17 satellite, exacerbate these fears—the satellite could repair a loose screw in another of its own spacecraft, or just as easily disassemble or “nudge” an adversary’s satellite out of orbit.

The latency of offensive capability inherent in these inspector satellites and probes makes them difficult to characterize as explicitly dangerous or escalatory, and would, therefore, make them challenging to regulate. Yleem Poblete, former assistant secretary of the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, expressed this concern in her remarks made in August 2018 in Geneva:

What Russia tells us diplomatically and publicly may be the opposite of what it intends to do with that satellite … So the question before this body is: how do we verify what countries say their spacecraft are doing? … It is difficult to determine an object’s true purpose simply by observing it on orbit—unlike inspection for a traditional arms control agreement. Based on the drafting of the treaty language by Russia, there is nothing in the proposed PPWT that would prohibit this sort of activity or the developing, testing, or stockpiling of anti-satellite weapons capabilities, so long as it doesn’t damage another object in space. The only certainty we have is that this system has been “placed in orbit.”

This sentiment echoes Ambassador Robert Wood, U.S. Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament in 2017, where he stated, “The draft PPWT fails to resolve definitional problems of what constitutes a ‘weapon in outer space,’ given the dual-use nature of many space technologies.” Various drafts of the PPWT, along with similar declarations and proposals, have been continually reintroduced since 2008 to no avail. 

In addition to verification challenges for co-orbital ASAT, creating an agreement that restricts ground-based, direct-ascent ASAT would be quite difficult, as breakout capabilities could easily be concealed.

THE THIRD complication for ASAT arms control and norm building is that the dynamics of space behavior are changing and will continue to change as private players represent a growing proportion of the assets in orbit.

The fortification of the commercial space industry, sometimes termed the “democratization of space,” throws a wrench into an already unstable space dynamic. According to the csis report, only about 4 percent of all satellites launched from 1957–1990 were commercially owned. In the “Second Space Age” (from the end of the Cold War on), however, that figure rises to 36 percent.

While it may initially seem like a stabilizing factor to have a higher proportion of non-government satellites in orbit, it poses new potential scenarios where privately-owned satellites can be both victims and aggressors. These new possibilities demand that several questions be answered: Who will be accountable for any irresponsible actions of private players in space? Will these players be considered their own entities, or will the state within which they operate be held responsible? How would privately-owned satellites fit into arms control agreements? To what degree can and should government control industry? Who will protect these commercial satellites from potential aggressors? As of now, there are more questions—many of which echo concerns in the cyber domain—than answers.

Accompanying the rise of privately-owned satellites in orbit is an increasing chance that a commercial satellite’s signals could be mistaken for a military satellite and targeted in the event of an attack. At the very least, commercial satellites would likely become collateral damage in a kinetic ASAT warfare scenario or with prolonged kinetic ASAT testing, held at risk by harmful space debris. With the global space economy valued at roughly $323 billion annually, some are hoping that the creation of a Space Force will provide the luxury of enhanced protection for commercial space assets from either intentional or mistaken enemy advances. Former Air Force strategist Peter Garretson optimistically wrote in a June 2019 Politico article that, 

the national leadership has an expansive view of America’s economic future in space. It is designing the service that will secure and enable an expanding multi-trillion-dollar economy in space and protect its commerce as the Navy protects commerce on the seas. 

Key representatives from the private sector such as SpaceX’s Elon Musk have already enthusiastically praised President Donald Trump’s plans to create this co-equal branch of the military. Yet it is still unclear what the main directives of Space Force will be and to what extent it would protect commerce.

While the influx of private satellites does pose complications to space dynamics, it may also pose some opportunity for stability. For example, the U.S. military has already begun to experiment by “hosting” its sensors on numerous commercial satellites in the hopes of creating more distributed and resilient satellite constellations. This would reduce the likelihood that, in case of an attack, the entire constellation’s capability would fail—a strength that may also help deter an adversary’s attack in the first place. Since 2009, the Department of Defense has hosted three sensor “payloads” on commercial satellites and is planning to expand the effort with three more through 2022. A 2018 report by the Government Accountability Office recommends this strategy to improve survivability and substantially reduce costs. James Acton and others have explored expanding this concept to include early-warning NC3 systems over a series of twenty to thirty host satellites, though it is not clear if this stratagem would be limited only to other government satellites or would ever utilize commercial satellites. Acton notes, however, that this dispersed NC3 system “would be less capable than the status quo of a small number of highly sophisticated satellites dedicated to early warning.”

Each of these hypothetical scenarios and unanswered questions could impact escalation dynamics, norms-building or arms control measures and need to be considered should additional draft legislation be introduced.

WITH AN increased focus on space, more voices are advocating for gaps in international space policy to be filled. Skeptics counter that arms control and norm building will constrain U.S. freedom to act in space—something too valuable for Washington to negotiate away. But America’s overreliance on and hefty investment in this domain might incentivize us to proactively safeguard our assets where possible. As Michael Krepon, co-founder of the Stimson Center and director of its space and nuclear programming, argues in a 2014 SpaceNews article,

A free-for-all in space would impair everything the United States has gained and stands to gain in this domain. Freedom of action to engage in certain types of bad behavior — such as anti-satellite (ASAT) tests that generate long-lasting, lethal space debris — can ruin space for everyone.

One thing is clear: proposals like the PPWT are not treaties the international community needs. They are poorly-concealed attempts to constrain American primacy in the domain rather than an earnest, thoughtful measure to make space a safer place.

The reality is that any useful or worthy arms control agreement would need to consider each of these three obstacles that complicate norm building or blur accountability for potential inappropriate space behavior: challenges to potential verification regimes, the full kinetic and non-kinetic spectrum of offensive ASAT tactics (both space-based and ground-based), and the increasing proportion of commercial assets in orbit. If the key players in space reach a point where ASAT arms control is a desirable goal, working groups and delegations should first consider and define what constitutes an “attack” or “weapon,” taking into account which of these are most likely and most harmful. Then they should decide which of these can be reasonably constrained and to what benefit. Conversations should also consider novel technologies that are being tested, developed, planned or funded (space-based 3d printing is of some concern). In some scenarios, the benefits that particular capabilities offer may have to be weighed against the threats that they can pose. Modest steps that have been floated include a limited test ban or a norm against debris-causing ASAT tests, or an agreed exclusion zone around satellites. Each idea will come with its own tradeoffs, challenges and level of utility.

Until we get a promising draft that satisfies these concerns, we’ll have to resort to other solutions. It might be useful to look at norm-building strategies and lessons learned from another Wild West domain: cyberspace. A number of experts believe that cyber restraint—summarized by Brandon Valeriano and Benjamin Jensen in a 2019 paper from the Cato Institute as “preserving the digital commons for commercial and social interests, thus limiting military action to the greatest extent possible”—can help shape norms in the international community and make escalation taboo. As Ambassador Wood, the eu delegation to the Conference on Disarmament and others have suggested, the most practical approach, for now, may be to aim for transparency and confidence-building measures in lieu of more formal, binding arms control agreements.

And, like many national security trends, the moral of this story seems to be this: if you can’t constrain, harden. The first in a series of up to ten GPS III satellites from Lockheed Martin, designed to be more jam-resistant, was launched on December 23, 2018. A new, more cybersecure GPS ground control station project called OCX is also underway but won’t be fully functional until 2021. Tech companies are designing some satellites to be much smaller, easily replaceable and ready for launch into orbit as needed. Many in the nuclear security community are pressing for the funding and creation of a next-generation NC3 system to phase out the existing one.

In the meantime, we can only hope that full-fledged ASAT warfare will remain just as it is today: a hypothetical scenario far, far away from the grind of daily life on Earth.

Mary Chesnut is a Program Manager at the Nuclear Security Working Group at the George Washington University. Mary has an MA in National Security Studies from the University of Kentucky’s Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce, and a BA in Russian from Rhodes College. This research was part of her work in the Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) Nuclear Scholars Initiative at the Center for Strategic & International Studies. The views reflected in this article are the author’s alone and do not reflect the views of any of the institutions mentioned above.

Image: Reuters