Over the past three years, Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy has evolved from a confrontational and interventionist posture to one that emphasizes constructive engagement and bridge-building with other regional powers. Riyadh has embarked on an intensive diplomatic change of tack, spearheaded by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) and fueled by abundant petrodollars, robust economic growth, and growing self-assurance.

Engagement allows Saudi Arabia to devote its energies to the economic transformation agenda of Vision 2030 while also enhancing its global influence. However, the renewal of conflicts, both within and outside the Middle East, has revealed Saudi diplomacy’s limitations and highlighted the kingdom’s persistently high level of geopolitical risk.

A “Vision” Imperiled

A confluence of factors, including diminished confidence in U.S. security assurances, the pressing necessity to implement economic reforms, and the moral and material costs of its military intervention in Yemen, have led to a pronounced shift in Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy away from confrontation and towards conciliation.

The pivotal moment in this shift occurred on September 14, 2019, when a cruise missile and drone attack targeting Aramco’s Abqaiq oil processing and Khurais oil field, widely attributed to Iran, disrupted over half of Saudi Arabia’s oil production. In response to the attack and the United States’s decision to refrain from retaliating against Iran, Riyadh initiated its own efforts towards indirect talks with Tehran to de-escalate tension.

Having abandoned the “pugnacious but profitless” policies of 2015-2018, Saudi Arabia emerged from the COVID-19 pandemic with its diplomacy-first approach to regional issues on full display. The January 2021 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Summit at Al-Ula in Saudi Arabia culminated in the signing of an agreement that ended a nearly four-year blockade of Qatar. The year ended with Crown Prince Mohammed embarking on a tour of the kingdom’s five fellow GCC members to bridge intra-Gulf differences and forge a unified position on Iran.

With this shift in approach, Saudi diplomats, working with trusted Omani interlocutors, agreed in April 2022 to a U.N.-mediated cease-fire in Yemen with the Iran-aligned Houthis. Saudi policymakers also reoriented their discourse regarding Turkey, moving away from framing it as a threat to considering it a potential partner. The June 2022 meeting between Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) and President Tayyip Erdoğan in Ankara concluded with the pledge “to start a new era of cooperation in bilateral relations.”

Since then, Riyadh has also backed away from its failed attempt to overthrow the regime of Syrian President Bashar Assad. In remarks made at the February 2023 Munich security forum, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan hinted that Assad’s isolation was nearing an end: “There is a consensus growing that the status quo is not workable … There is no pathway towards achieving the maximalist goals that we all have.” Three months later, Saudi Arabia hosted an Arab League summit in which Assad was welcomed back after a twelve-year suspension, and the work of diplomatic missions in both countries resumed.

Meanwhile, negotiations facilitated by Oman and, at different times, by Iraq over a two-year period finally bore fruit when, in March 2023, Saudi Arabia reached a deal with Iran, brokered by China, to restore diplomatic relations. Last August, The Wall Street Journal reported that Saudi and U.S. officials had made progress on a landmark agreement to normalize ties between Saudi Arabia and Israel.

MBS at the Helm

While Riyadh may have chosen a more careful foreign policy trajectory, it remains decidedly proactive. Crown Prince Mohammed is laser-focused on propelling Saudi Arabia towards a post-oil future, leveraging the nation’s resources to position it as a major geopolitical player with a diversified economic base. Accordingly, Saudi diplomacy is directed at reshaping the region in accordance with perceived Saudi interests and at playing an independent and influential role on the world stage.

Saudi leadership has internalized the idea that the world is now fluid and multipolar. In the face of changing global geopolitics, Riyadh is asserting itself as a self-assured middle power—one that, according to Karen Young, the Crown Prince believes “has the right to work with a shifting constellation of partners to move markets and shape political outcomes.”

Under MBS’ direction, Saudi Arabia strives to cement Riyadh’s status as the leading power in the Arab world and a prominent player in international diplomacy. Accordingly, Saudi Arabia has intensified its diplomatic engagement, focusing its efforts on refurbishing the country’s image and reputation as well as that of the crown prince. The kingdom’s security alliance with the United States is preserved while new ties are strengthened with Moscow and Beijing. Moreover, Saudi Arabia is augmenting its presence in multilateral forums and recasting itself as a peacemaker.

The economic reorientation of Saudi Arabia toward Asia and the deepening of its engagements with China are already well advanced. Yet, despite the growing ties with China, Saudi leadership understands that Beijing is unlikely to supplant Washington as the primary regional security provider in the foreseeable future. Even so, Riyadh has signaled to the United States its reluctance to be pressured into any specific geopolitical alignment. Most notably, it has refused to follow the U.S. and European push to isolate Russia in the aftermath of the Ukraine invasion and continues to work with Russia on oil policy within the OPEC+ alliance.

In its efforts to advance the country’s interests, Riyadh has worked towards expanding its involvement in multilateral forums, both internationally and regionally. The kingdom’s financial power enables it to play a significant role within the Group of Twenty (G20) framework, the world’s largest economic bloc. The G20 has proven to be a valuable mechanism for furthering Saudi objectives. During the September 2023 summits, Saudi negotiators skillfully led efforts opposing a proposed “fossil fuels phaseout,” as they had in the previous summit in July, agreeing to language in the “New Delhi Leaders' Declaration” on renewables only after the text included a mention of other technologies to limit emissions. On the sidelines of the September 2023 Summit, the India-Middle East-Corridor (IMEC), with Saudi Arabia’s backing, was announced. If realized, IMEC, a multinational intermodal transportation network, has the potential to position the Gulf region as a focal point of global commerce and could present unprecedented opportunities beyond energy for Saudi businesses.

Riyadh has also waged a vigorous soft diplomacy campaign aimed at countries in the Global South, especially across Africa. Last November, Riyadh hosted the inaugural Saudi-African Summit, a gathering that brought together leaders from fifty countries across the continent. At the summit, Crown Prince Mohammed pledged to support “innovative solutions” to tackle African debt, with the Saudi Finance Ministry announcing plans to disburse some $533 million worth of development financing. The convening of the summit underscored Saudi Arabia’s vision of integrating Africa into its diversified foreign policy and trade priorities and of demonstrating global leadership by nurturing stronger bonds between the Arab region and the Continent. It also formed part of a well-executed, successful campaign to secure the endorsement of African states of the kingdom’s candidacy to host Expo 2030 and the 2034 FIFA World Cup.

Saudi Arabia’s proactive multilateral diplomacy has expanded its horizons eastward as well. In March 2023, the Saudi cabinet approved a decision to join the Beijing-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as a dialogue partner. Four months later, the inaugural summit-level meeting between the GCC and the five Central Asian states was held in Jeddah. This collaboration could pave the way for Saudi Arabia to increase its market access and engagement in clean energy and other Central Asian projects. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia’s decision on whether to accept the invitation to become a full member of BRICS—a group composed of China, Russia, and a handful of major developing countries, is pending. Should it opt to join BRICS, the kingdom would offer further evidence of its pursuit of a progressively nonaligned course and be better positioned to act on its expressed interest in becoming a champion of the Global South.

Mediating conflicts is not a new role for Saudi Arabia. Despite achieving mixed results (i.e., leading to temporary cease-fires rather than sustainable peace), Saudi Arabia has actively participated in mediating some of the Middle East’s most intractable conflicts, particularly the Arab-Israeli conflict and Lebanon’s civil war. However, the most recent mediation activities undertaken by the kingdom reflect a desire to establish itself as a middle power with influence beyond its immediate neighborhood.

In September 2022, Saudi Arabia and Turkey collaborated to facilitate a prisoner exchange between Russia and Ukraine. Three months later, the Saudis helped broker a prisoner swap between Washington and Moscow. In May 2023, Jeddah hosted cease-fire negotiations between Sudan’s army and paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), part of a joint effort with the United States. Last August, Riyadh hosted a two-day peace summit on Ukraine, attended by representatives from more than forty countries across the Global South.

These diplomatic initiatives signify Riyadh’s transition towards a peace-oriented role, marking a significant shift away from more than a decade of confrontational and interventionist policies. The Ukraine talks in Jeddah not only thrust Saudi Arabia into the global spotlight on a critical issue but also afforded MBS a chance to position himself as a world leader with “convening power” and influence reaching far beyond his region despite ongoing challenges in ending his country’s involvement in the Yemen conflict.

Saudi Diplomacy’s Mixed Results

Despite the vitality, imagination, and competence evident in Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic strategy, the results of its efforts have been mixed, and significant hurdles stand in the way of achieving its aims.

Intra-GCC reconciliation has given way to heightened rivalry. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have continued to spar over influence over global oil markets and policies regarding Yemen, Sudan, and the Red Sea basin. They are also competing to be the top commercial and tourist hubs and to attract foreign investment. Yet, despite the current fragility in Saudi-Emirati relations, observers often exaggerate the disagreements between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, much as they might have initially overstated the depth of their alliance.

Regarding the Saudi-Iranian détente, Riyadh and Tehran have managed to stabilize their rivalry and prevent militarization. The diplomatic thaw has allowed them to focus on their pressing domestic agendas. However, Saudi Arabia and Iran have yet to sign, let alone implement, any substantive agreement, and the broader security risks associated with Iran’s network of proxies have been somewhat contained but not eliminated.

Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic outreach to Africa, investment pledges, and advocacy for the suspension of debt service obligations for Africa have likely generated goodwill and may enhance economic ties and practical cooperation. However, other aspects of Riyadh’s conduct, such as remaining engaged with post-coup leaders of African states suspended by the African Union (AU)—Gabon, Niger, and Sudan—could strain Saudi-AU relations.

A recent Wall Street Journal editorial claimed that BRICS “has evolved into a diplomatic bloc bent on countering Western influence.” Crown Prince Mohammed has sought to dispel this impression, stating that “BRICS is not a group against America or the West.” Not all the members of the recently expanded grouping necessarily share that view. The evidence suggests that Riyadh feels less bound to the United States and the West. Nevertheless, under MBS, the kingdom continues to seek support and cooperation from Washington and its European partners—a goal that could become more challenging if Saudi Arabia joins BRICS and MBS’s view proves incorrect.

It can be argued that Saudi Arabia’s mediation efforts have failed. However, such efforts are highly complex, much like the conflicts they try to resolve. Regarding Riyadh’s high-profile diplomatic intervention in the Russia-Ukraine war, it is worth noting that despite various plans and mediation proposals from China, Brazil, and other nations, none have gained traction. Aspects of Riyadh’s diplomatic involvement may have displeased Moscow. Yet, it did not disrupt the bilateral relationship, allowing Saudi Arabia to garner diplomatic points with Kyiv and European supporters.

The Israel-Hamas war has disrupted the region's stability, presenting challenges for Saudi diplomacy and complicating the realization of its goals. Riyadh has reaffirmed the centrality of the Palestinian issue and a common Arab approach supporting a “comprehensive and just settlement.” However, Qatar and Egypt—not Saudi Arabia—have led negotiations with the United States. 

Looking ahead, should Riyadh be unable or disinclined to deploy troops to postwar Gaza or extensively finance reconstruction, its diplomatic efforts could be seen as empty. Meanwhile, the viability of the IMEC now rests on the revival of normalization talks between Saudi Arabia and Israel, whose prospects, at present, have dimmed. The Saudi foreign ministry recently affirmed its position that there will be no diplomatic relations with Israel “… unless an independent Palestinian state is recognized on the 1967 border, with east Jerusalem as its capital.”

The Imperative of Regional Stability  

As part of the crown prince’s modernization drive, there has been a push towards forging a more autonomous foreign policy, with national interests taking precedence over longstanding ties established in a different era. Accordingly, in recent years, Saudi Arabia has taken a more proactive approach to diplomacy, concentrating its efforts on easing tensions with regional and international counterparts, enhancing the kingdom's standing as a prominent middle power, and nurturing an economy capable of flourishing amid the global energy transition.

Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic efforts, underpinned by its immense financial clout, have seemingly aided in restoring its international reputation, marred by years of controversial interventions. Nevertheless, the kingdom faces heightening tensions between its traditional security ally, the United States, and its critical market, China, as well as the fallout from the collapse in Russia-West relations over Ukraine and the Israel-Hamas war. The Sudan conflict and Houthi attacks on international shipping are particularly problematic for Saudi Arabia, given Crown Prince Mohammed’s aspirations to reduce reliance on fossil fuels by diversifying the economy, a plan that heavily relies on developing the Red Sea coast.

The resurgence of conflict, both within the Middle East and beyond, has, to some extent, exposed the limitations of Saudi diplomacy yet has also underscored the enduring influence of geopolitics. It may also serve as a reminder that attaining Saudi Arabia’s lofty economic goals hinges on stability in the Middle East. This, in turn, requires that Riyadh carefully balance security-seeking and status-seeking behavior while maintaining a robust partnership with the United States. Likewise, it demands that the United States encourage and support Saudi efforts to pursue constructive diplomacy and ensure effective deterrence.

Dr. John Calabrese teaches international relations at American University in Washington, DC. He is the book review editor of The Middle East Journal and previously served as director of MEI's Middle East-Asia Project (MAP), and as general series editor of MEI Viewpoints. He is the author of China's Changing Relations with the Middle East and Revolutionary Horizons: Iran's Regional Foreign Policy. Follow him on X: @Dr_J_Calabrese.

Image: U.S. State Department