Can Iran Be Deterred from Going Nuclear?
"By convincing Iranian leaders that their own interests dictate remaining nonnuclear, they will be deterred from seeking a nuclear weapon."
Since Iran’s nuclear program was publicly revealed in 2002, the United States has devoted considerable resources to preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. Although the United States has used a multifaceted strategy to achieve this goal, one potentially effective approach—“deterrence by punishment”—has been entirely ignored. This is a mistake as a “deterrence by punishment” policy could be crucial for preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear capability.
Perhaps the primary method the United States has used to prevent an Iranian bomb is coercion in the form of sanctions. Over the last decade plus, the United States has imposed both unilateral and multilateral sanctions against Iran for failing to comply with UN demands regarding the scope of its nuclear program. In imposing these sanctions, the United States has threatened to further tighten and expand them should Iran’s noncompliance continue. At the same time, the sanctions have been added with the implicit or explicit promise that they will be lifted should Iran’s nuclear behavior change.
Throughout most of the Bush administration, coercive sanctions comprised almost the entirety of America’s nonproliferation strategy toward Iran. The Obama administration has doubled down on this approach by significantly ramping up U.S. sanctions and convincing the UN Security Council and European Union to do likewise.
These stronger multilateral sanctions were made possible by the Obama administration adding another component to U.S. nuclear policy towards Iran: positive inducements. Making good on a campaign pledge, immediately upon taking office, President Obama mounted an unprecedented charm offensive toward Iran that included reaching out directly to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and expressing a willingness to engage in negotiations without preconditions.
To a large degree, this diplomatic outreach to Iran was an extension of America’s coercion policy. To begin with, negotiations aim to facilitate the process by which U.S. sanctions will be lifted in return for nuclear concessions from Iran. Additionally, making a genuine effort to resolve the nuclear crisis enabled President Obama to win international support for tougher sanctions when Tehran failed to reciprocate his administration’s fuel swap proposal in late 2009.
Still, the Obama administration’s outreach to Iran has contained some positive inducements. For example, President Obama promised that Iran would be welcomed back into the international community if concerns over its nuclear program were resolved. Although vague, this suggested that America would end or significantly scale back its longstanding efforts to isolate Iran regionally and internationally. Obama’s promise to welcome Iran back into the international community also indicated a possible willingness to pursue a general bilateral rapprochement with Iran. In addition, nearly from the beginning of its first term, the Obama administration has signaled that it will be willing to recognize Iran’s right to enrichment as part of a final deal.
Along with coercion through sanctions and positive inducements, America’s nonproliferation policy towards Iran has included a “deterrence by denial” component. “Deterrence by denial” attempts to deter an action by convincing the state that the action would not succeed.
The United States has long maintained a “deterrence by denial” policy toward Iran’s nuclear program. For example, during the Clinton administration, the United States put significant pressure on China and Russia to convince them to stop providing nuclear assistance to Iran. This worked in the case of China—which was by far Iran’s most important source of nuclear assistance—but had only limited success with Russia. The Bush administration also sought to limit Iran’s access to sensitive nuclear technologies to deny it the ability to build nuclear weapons. This included busting the AQ Khan proliferation network.
The United States has also used sabotage against Iran’s nuclear program as a means of “deterrence by denial.” Most notably, it co-developed the Stuxnet computer virus that destroyed Iranian centrifuges for years before being discovered. It’s likely that the Obama administration has used or is currently using other cyberweapons against Iran’s nuclear program that haven’t been made public. There have been similar sabotage measures against Iran’s nuclear program—including the assassination of senior nuclear physicists—although America’s culpability in these actions is widely doubted.
Finally, the United States has pursued a “deterrence by denial” strategy against Iran’s nuclear program by threatening to use military force to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear program. Although President Bush pledged that the United States would never allow Iran to get nuclear weapons, his presumed willingness to use force to accomplish this goal allowed him to largely avoid having to explicitly threaten it. By contrast, domestic and allied concerns over his willingness to order airstrikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities have forced Obama to explicitly threaten to use military force on a more frequent basis. Regardless, using airstrikes to destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities is a clear example of “deterrence by denial”.
One approach that has been absent from U.S. nuclear policy towards Iran is “deterrence by punishment”. “Deterrence by punishment” is the more well-known type of deterrence. It consists of one state deterring another from taking an action by credibly promising retaliation that is more severe than any possible gains that could be accrued from taking the action. Perhaps the best known example of “deterrence by punishment” is the Mutually Assured Destruction relationship between the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War.
With regard to the Iran example, the United States would seek to deter Iranian leaders from seeking nuclear weapons by promising to respond in ways that would far outstrip any gains Iran can accrue from going nuclear. For example, the United States could threaten to: 1) provide Israel with nuclear submarines and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs); 2) forward deploy tactical nuclear weapons in the Middle East; 3) form an anti-Iran NATO-like alliance with Arab nations; 4) seek to undermine Shia control of Iraq and Syria, 5) support the Taliban in its effort to regain control over Afghanistan; 6) directly intervene militarily against Hezbollah in Lebanon, and/or roll up its operations abroad; 7) more aggressively root out Iranian intelligence networks throughout the Middle East, Africa, Latin America and Europe; 8) dramatically ramp up support to anti-Iran militant groups in Pakistan and elsewhere; and 9) drastically increase America’s military presence in the Middle East.
This is only a partial list of possible retaliatory actions the United States could take in response to an Iranian bomb, and not all these measures would necessarily be needed or advisable. Regardless of the specific threats used, the goal of a “deterrence by punishment” policy would be to convince Iranian leaders that they would be worse off with nuclear weapons. In other words, it would attempt to convince Iranian leaders remaining nonnuclear is in their interest.
It’s not difficult to ascertain why the U.S. has largely eschewed a “deterrence by punishment” approach. Successive U.S. presidents have promised that America will never allow Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. Outlining how the United States would respond to a nuclear Iran would seemingly contradict this policy by suggesting that Iran might be allowed to build the bomb.
This is a reasonable concern that must be taken into account in adopting a “deterrence by punishment” policy. However, it is not as formidable of a barrier to adopting the policy as it may first appear. Indeed, it’s fairly easy to imagine how U.S. leaders could actually strengthen their current position by conveying a “deterrence by punishment” policy.
This could be achieved by a senior U.S. leader up to and potentially including the president giving a prominent speech(es) that begins by acknowledging the high costs involved in attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities. The speech would then pivot to arguing that the administration is nonetheless committed to bearing these costs because the alternative of a nuclear-armed Iran would be far more costly for the United States. The speech would then outline all the steps the United States would have to take if Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons. It could conclude by emphasizing that as costly as America’s response would be, the steps outlined would be absolutely necessary.
Astute readers may recognize that the administration already takes a nearly similar position in emphasizing their commitment to use any and all options to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran. The only difference is the administration usually explains why it must prevent a nuclear-armed Iran by listing all the adverse consequences a nuclear-armed Iran would have on the region, such as: sparking a nuclear arms race, potentially leading to a nuclear war by miscalculation, reducing America’s freedom of action in the Middle East, emboldening Iran and its allies like Hezbollah, shoring up the Iranian regime and causing a spike in oil prices.
These are all good reasons why America should prevent a nuclear-armed Iran. At the same time, most of these are also reasons why Iranian leaders would benefit from a nuclear arsenal. Given that most of the American people and nearly all its elites are in favor of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, it would be more sensible for the administration to outline how Iran stands to lose from seeking a nuclear capability.
Indeed, deterring Iranian leaders from seeking the bomb could be essential to preventing a nuclear-armed Iran. The U.S. intelligence community currently believes Iran is technically capable of building a nuclear arsenal but that its leaders have not made the decision to do so. Therefore, even as it seeks to reduce its capabilities, the top priority for the United States and its allies should be convincing Tehran that it is not in its interest to pursue a nuclear capability. The three elements of America’s current policy are poorly suited for this task.
Sanctions aren’t likely to deter Iran from seeking nuclear weapons for at least three reasons. First, the Islamic Republic has faced U.S. sanctions since its inception, and these have become increasingly comprehensive in recent years. Pro-nuclear Iranian leaders would likely argue that sanctions could only be increased slightly if Tehran builds the bomb, and the Islamic Republic could easily absorb these.
Secondly, many influential parts of the Iranian regime, such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, benefit from the sanctions. Incidentally, these are usually the same factions of the regime that are said to be the most pro-nuclear already. This is not unique to Iran. Some of the political science literature on nuclear proliferation suggests that only states that are isolated economically pursue nuclear weapons.
Thirdly, pro-bomb Iranian leaders would point to the examples of states like Pakistan and India in arguing that any increase in sanctions would be short-lived. Indeed, over the medium and long term, these leaders would argue, having the bomb would help Iran get the sanctions lifted as the international community would be forced to accept Tehran.
Positive inducements would be unlikely to deter Iran from building nuclear weapons for similar reasons. First, the United States would only offer limited positive inducements for Iran remaining nonnuclear. Second, many important factions in the Iranian regime would actually oppose Iran rejoining the international community and especially a rapprochement with the United States. This position would not be limited to the IRGC; many hardline clerics fear that a rapprochement with America would leave Iran vulnerable to U.S. culture exports. This would not only undercut their own influence but also leave Iran at risk to a so-called “color” revolution.
Third, an important faction inside Iran argues that a confrontational foreign policy best advances the country’s interest. According to this camp, by taking a hardline and assertive stance, Iran raises the costs of Israeli, Arab and American efforts to isolate it. Eventually, these costs will become so high that these countries will be forced to engage Iran from positions of weaknesses.
Pro-bomb elements of this foreign-policy faction would argue that nuclear weapons would be ideal in forcing its adversaries to come to terms with Iran. To back up their argument, they could point to the fact that the United States began exploring a rapprochement with Maoist China shortly after it became a nuclear weapon state. At the very least, they’d argue, the United States would be forced to create crisis mechanisms in order to reduce the possibility of a nuclear miscalculation between it and Iran or Israel and Iran. Proponents of a confrontational foreign policy would argue that Iran could use this initially limited engagement to effect a broader rapprochement.
In some ways, then, air strikes are likely the most effective means the United States currently has for deterring Iran from seeking atomic weapons. Iranian leaders regularly boast about their ability to deter and defend the nation from any external attack. Massive U.S. air strikes would demonstrate the hollowness of their claims, which would be a domestic embarrassment for the regime.
On the other hand, U.S. airstrikes would in many ways benefit Iran, particularly on the nuclear front. In fact, it’s likely that Iranian leaders believe airstrikes would be a necessary part of acquiring a nuclear weapon.
The Obama administration appears to believe that airstrikes would only be necessary if Iran made a clear, indisputable dash for the bomb. Alas, as is so often the case, the situation is not likely to be so black and white.
Rather, Iran would likely seize upon a crisis to justify taking an action that would provoke U.S. airstrikes while allowing Iran to retain plausible deniability. Most likely, Iran would use a breakdown of talks, more assassinations, a new cyberattack or significant new sanctions to justify kicking out international inspectors and/or withdrawing from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Iranian leaders would frame their action as being a proportional response to the hostile action, while maintaining their peaceful nuclear intentions.
However, without international inspectors on the ground, the United States would have no way to verify Iran was not enriching weapons-grade uranium for use in a nuclear bomb. The U.S. president would face immense Congressional and allied pressure to order airstrikes before Tehran is able to acquire the necessary fissile material to construct a nuclear bomb. It’s likely that s/he would order airstrikes in short order.
Despite the setbacks mentioned above, Iran would gain tremendously from the military attack. Some of the benefits would be irrespective of its nuclear program, such as using the attack to reduce sectarian tensions in the greater Middle East. Most of the benefits would pertain to the nuclear program, however. By continuing to insist it never wavered from its peaceful intentions, Iran would use America’s “unprovoked” aggression to reduce international support for the sanctions. It would specifically aim to convince non-Western powers that defying the sanctions is necessary to show that the United States can’t impose its will on weaker powers by military force. This would resonate strongly in much of the world. Indeed, states that already resent the sanctions because of lost economic opportunities could use the U.S. airstrikes to justify no longer complying with them.
More importantly, U.S. airstrikes would allow Iranian leaders to justify actually building nuclear weapons. Since the inception of the nuclear crisis, Iranian leaders have repeatedly maintained that they are not pursuing nuclear arms. This includes Supreme Leader Khamenei issuing a fatwa declaring that nuclear weapons are against Islam. They will therefore need to find an excuse to justify reneging on those promises. A military attack would be the most convenient excuse for them to use. Iranian leaders could maintain that, while they didn’t want a nuclear arsenal, they have a sacred duty to protect the Iranian nation and Islamic world. As the airstrikes demonstrated, they cannot do this without a nuclear arsenal. Thus, Iranian leaders will claim that the United States had forced their hands.
Thus, the three main components of America’s current nonproliferation policy are ill-suited for deterring Iran from building a nuclear weapon. Complementing its current policy with a “deterrence by punishment” component would likely be much more effective. By convincing Iranian leaders that their own interests dictate remaining nonnuclear, they will be deterred from seeking a nuclear weapon.
Zachary Keck is the Managing Editor of The Diplomat. He can be found on Twitter: @ZacharyKeck.
Image: Iran president