If judged by the standards of the three rising-versus-dominant great-power competitions of the last century, the Sino-American competition appears well-placed to be much safer. Certainly, war between the two is not impossible because either or both governments could make a serious misstep over the Taiwan issue. War by miscalculation is always possible, but the potential cost of nuclear conflict restrains both actors, minimizing miscalculation. Moreover, the high economic interdependence and the lack of intense ideological competition between the two help reinforce the pacific effects mutually assured destruction induces. Apart from Taiwan, then, it is hard to figure out how to start a war between the United States and China.

These three factors should make us cautiously optimistic about keeping Sino-American relations on a peaceful rather than a warlike track. The peaceful track does not, by any means, imply the absence of political and economic conflicts in Sino-American relations, nor does it foreclose coercive diplomatic gambits by one against the other. What it does mean is that the conditions are in place for war to be a low-probability event, if policymakers are smart in both states, and that an all-out war is nearly unimaginable. By the historical standards among rising and dominant powers, this is no mean feat.

Finally, it also helps that China and the United States broadly agree on important Asian issues, even if they differ on the proper approach to them or their priority.

I have identified six overarching U.S. interests in east Asia. They are: first, preservation of Sino-American mutually assured destruction; second, stability in the Taiwan Strait and a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue; third, the denuclearization and ultimate unification of the Korean peninsula; fourth, the preservation of the U.S.-Japan alliance and the maintenance of Japan's non-nuclear status; fifth, the peaceful settlement of China's maritime disputes with its neighbors and the preservation of freedom of commercial navigation in the South China Sea; and finally, the preservation of economic openness in east Asia.

Beijing shares all these interests. After all, China wants to have a secure second strike capability. It prefers stability in the Taiwan Strait, a peaceful resolution of Taiwan's status and no unilateral moves towards independence engendering war with the United States over Taiwan. China favors denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and its ultimate re-unification, if that does not bring U.S. troops up to its borders-and especially if it leads to U.S. troops leaving the peninsula altogether. Beijing certainly favors preventing Japan from going nuclear, even if it no longer sees the U.S.-Japan alliance as firm a constraint on Japan as it once was. China appears to favor the peaceful settlement of its maritime disputes with its neighbors; it clearly benefits from economic openness with the United States and with states in the region, and it does not want to see economic closure with either.

To stress that China and the United States share many common goals for east Asia is not to make light of their many differences. But disputes over means to achieve ends are easier to manage than disputes over goals. There is clearly more room for bargaining, horse trading and successful negotiation in the former case than in the latter.

Principles of Policy

THERE ARE no big surprises on the general principles of policy that the United States should follow over the long haul with respect to China's increasing power; they flow from the basic assumptions about China and the nature of America's interests in east Asia laid out above. Moreover, none of the six recommendations below are new to long-time students of U.S.-China relations, though they remain important.

First, do not undermine Sino-American mutually assured destruction. For general stability in Sino-American relations, particularly for crisis stability, it is crucial that China believe that its nuclear deterrent is not vulnerable to a U.S. first strike or that a U.S. missile-defense shield could render useless its retaliatory capability. This requires two things from the United States.

It should not make a political issue of China's efforts to develop a larger and more secure strategic nuclear force. Because it is dangerous for either or both states to feel vulnerable to a first strike, it is, ironically, in America's interest that China modernize its strategic nuclear forces. China does not need a strategic nuclear force as large and sophisticated as America's, but it definitely needs one that is larger and more advanced than its current force. The United States should welcome its arrival.

Additionally, Sino-American stability requires that if the United States persists in building a missile-defense system, then that system should remain limited enough so as not to challenge China's strike-back capability. It is wasteful of resources, and potentially dangerous to boot, for the United States to stimulate an offense-defense arms race with China by building a missile-defense force-should it ever work-large enough to neuter China's strategic nuclear force.

Second, the United States must continue to draw two unambiguous red lines on the Taiwan issue. That means making crystal clear to China that the United States will not permit it to resolve the issue forcefully and informing Taiwan that the United States will not allow it to move towards de jure independence.

Maintaining these red lines requires, in turn, that the United States do these three things: maintain a strong naval and air presence in east Asia, not permit U.S. domestic forces to push for a more independent Taiwan and keep a firm hand on any Taiwanese moves towards independence. In regard to the last, the United States must continue to make it unequivocally clear to any Taiwanese government that takes provocative steps towards independence that: "Do so and you are on your own." President Bush said as much on December 2, 2003, when he stated, "We oppose any unilateral decision by either China or Taiwan to change the status quo." The United States does not owe Taiwan political independence from China; it owes Taiwan the opportunity to have its status resolved peacefully with China.

Third, avoid policies that produce adverse self-fulfilling results. The principal policy prescription here is to avoid taking actions against China that appear simultaneously punitive and unprovoked. Punitive actions may be necessary at times, but if they are unprovoked, or more importantly, if they appear to be so in the minds of America's allies and friends in east Asia and elsewhere, they will backfire politically within China and will not receive the required multilateral support. Actions that seem like premature containment-military encirclement, economic warfare and the like-should be avoided, unless they can be credibly justified as responses to Chinese aggression or heavy-handedness with its neighbors.

Fourth, maintain the cohesion of America's east Asian alliances and security arrangements. The United States has a number of formal alliances and strategically important security arrangements with Australia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, South Korea and Japan. At present, it is in America's interest to maintain these alliances and security arrangements if it wants to remain an east Asian military power.

Eventually, the end of the U.S.-South Korean alliance may well be the price of Korean unification, but the price is well worth it if the peninsula is denuclearized or if North Korea's nuclear weapons fall into the hands of a democratic Korea. Should the U.S.-South Korean alliance pass into history, it will not destroy America's position as an east Asian military power.

While the alliance with South Korea is expendable, the one with Japan is not. The U.S.-Japan alliance remains the key to, and the bedrock of, America's maritime presence in east Asia. It is Japan's strategic location, economic might and military power that make it America's most important regional ally. Therefore, the nurturing and preservation of this alliance remains a central task for every American administration. Of course, to preserve the U.S.-Japan alliance while maintaining good relations with China, the United States must square the circle: use the alliance with Japan in ways that serve both U.S. and Japanese interests, but in doing so, minimize the friction that the alliance causes with China.

A more powerful Japan allied with the United States is clearly not China's first choice (a weak Japan), but rather a second-best solution, and yet one that is clearly better than the worst outcome (a powerful and unaligned Japan). China's leaders need to be constantly reminded that the second-best solution is mutually beneficial: It is better for both powers that Japan remain tethered to the United States rather than independent of it. The real choice for China is not between a militarily strong or weak Japan, but between a powerful Japan tied to the United States and an even more powerful Japan, probably nuclear-armed, independent of it.

Fifth, preserve U.S. maritime supremacy in east Asia. This supremacy is essential if the United States is to remain a significant political-military player in the region. After all, states there will not want to remain allied with the United States if it cannot back up its political actions with credible military power. Maritime supremacy means that the United States can defeat China in a conflict on the high seas, maintain freedom of the sea lanes in the area and protect the region's insular nations from Chinese political-military coercion, attack and conquest-except for Taiwan. There the United States can prevent coercion and conquest but cannot thwart a devastating mainland air and short-range ballistic missile attack, should the mainland launch one.

Essay Types: Essay