WHILE THE potential costs of continuing an aggressive policy of democracy promotion are clear, the question of the cost of discontinuing our policy of democracy promotion has not been sufficiently explored. U.S. support of democracy and democratic activists over the last 15 years has not only helped strengthen democratic institutions and consolidate democracies, it has also changed expectations and perceptions of the United States and altered the global strategic context for America.

It is broadly understood that the Iraq War, for example, has made the United States less popular in many countries. But support for democracy in Eastern Europe and parts of the former Soviet Union has bolstered U.S. popularity. Still, evolving views of the United States are more nuanced than this simple analysis.

There is now an expectation among many reformers in the former Soviet Union, Asia, Africa and, yes, even occasionally the Middle East, that the United States will support their democratic efforts. This expectation coexists uneasily within the same societies-and, in some cases, the same individuals-that have an increased hostility towards the United States. It is not uncommon to witness in countries ranging from the Middle East to the former Soviet Union widespread opposition to the Iraq War, coupled with the hope that the United States will pressure the native government to allow more freedoms or to make the elections fairer.

In the former Soviet Union this is largely due to the preponderant role the United States is perceived to have played in the color revolutions. Democratic breakthroughs in Georgia and Ukraine have raised the hopes of democratic activists in countries such as Azerbaijan, Armenia and Belarus. The United States did not create these breakthroughs, as both supporters and opponents believe, but financial and technical support and guidance from the United States and Europe was an integral component.

In the Middle East, the perception of the United States with regards to democracy is far more ambiguous, where continued support for the Saudi regime, Israel and the ongoing military presence in Iraq has weakened the American image dramatically. However, support for more inclusive elections in Egypt-and the democratic movement in Lebanon-has indicated to some that U.S. policy in the region is evolving.

Many observers in the United States have pointed to Hamas's January 2006 victory in the Palestinian elections as proof that the Middle East is not ready for democracy. But Hamas won a very narrow election victory. There is now a real danger that Hamas will use this victory not to further democracy-the critics are right about that-but to consolidate an authoritarian, Islamist regime. Reducing democracy assistance to Palestine at this time will likely only accelerate Hamas's movement in this direction. This would be the worst outcome for the United States, Israel and Palestine. For the Palestinians, a free media, rule of law, separation of powers, vibrant ngo sector and evolving political parties are the best defenses against the consolidation of power and undermining of existing democratic institutions by Hamas, a party for which less than half of them voted. To maintain those defenses, they need foreign support and assistance.

In general, opponents of authoritarian regimes in the region are largely drawn to Islamist political models and rhetoric. Support for nascent democratic movements in these countries can offer a competing model and possibly bring Islamists into politics in a non-violent way.

And withdrawing support for democratic movements would undermine whatever support the United States has earned among democrats in places as disparate as the former Soviet Union, southern Africa and Asia, and make anti-democratic ideologies, some of which are unambiguously dangerous to the United States and its interests, more appealing. Reducing support for democracy in countries of the former Soviet Union, such as Azerbaijan or Kazakhstan, would help only in the short-term to counter Russia's influence in the region and provide alternative energy sources for the United States. It would also risk pushing the opponents of these undemocratic regimes away from the United States, expanding Russia's power in the region and making other models of political change more appealing. In the case of Azerbaijan this may mean a strengthening of its relationship with its neighbor to the south: Iran.

Iraq is an unusual case because unlike in most countries, U.S. democracy assistance followed a military invasion. The struggles and setbacks are clear to almost all observers, and the chances of Iraq emerging as a viable democracy seem quite small now. This is at least partially due to the insufficient emphasis on democracy assistance in the period immediately following the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime. Clearly, there are no easy solutions in Iraq. Continuing to seek to develop democracy there will be difficult and frustrating, and it may not prevent the civil war that so many observers believe is inevitable in Iraq. But the alternative may be worse. Abandoning efforts to assist those Iraqis interested in moving their country toward democracy would very likely speed the country's descent into civil war. Iraqis needs institutions-however limited and flawed-that allow for deliberation on how to divide powers and resolve conflicts non-violently. Now is not the time to move away from these goals.

IF DEMOCRACY assistance continues to become a retrofitted rationale for misguided military adventures like the one in Iraq, it will become an increasingly difficult policy to defend. The president to assume office in 2009 will have to forge a post-Bush democracy-assistance strategy and should recalibrate democracy assistance to recognize the changed political environment, both domestically and internationally. In order to change the perception of democracy assistance as just another tool of an unpopular foreign policy, the next president must stress the joint endeavors with Europe and keep democracy promotion distinct from other aspects of foreign policy, most notably the War on Terror.

The challenges today are quite different than they were even five years ago. There are far fewer governments that are essentially democratically-oriented but merely need help in implementing reforms than there were during the initial post-Cold War period. Democracy assistance will therefore need to have a greater focus on consolidating democratic gains in semi-democratic countries. These countries, which have some of the structures of democracy, can be helped to move further and more meaningfully down the path towards democracy, but this requires a shift in policy and emphasis. Additionally, U.S. officials must develop better strategies for advancing democracy in semi-authoritarian countries, when the leaders do not want further democratization.

During the last sixty years, U.S. support for democratization has helped key allies mature into democracies and helped cement those alliances. The next administration can play a critical role in getting this policy back on track as an important but discreet and strategic element of U.S. foreign policy.

Lincoln A. Mitchell is the Arnold A. Saltzman Assistant Professor in the Practice of International Politics at Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs. He has worked extensively on democracy assistance programs in the former Soviet Union, the Balkans, Africa and the Middle East.