The only way to avoid a transatlantic train wreck over Iran is for the EU to convince Washington to enter into direct negotiations, either bilateral or multilateral, with Tehran. The last script is most likely, and a leaf could be taken from the North Korea contact group model, where the EU-3 (France, Germany and the UK), Russia, China and the United States would deal directly with Tehran, working out a grand bargain taking in nuclear issues as well as the full integration of Iran into the Middle East's regional security.

Following intensive EU-Iranian negotiations in September-October 2006, Tehran appears willing to shelve its uranium enrichment program temporarily, at least during negotiations with the United States and other world powers. For Iran, the big prize is entering into direct talks with the Great Satan, America, which seems a rather modest price to pay for the United States in exchange for keeping Iran from going nuclear. Given the escalating violence in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the North Korean nuclear imbroglio, the United States seems prepared to make this concession. As Secretary Rice argued on September 12, 2006, "[T]he question is, are they [the Iranians] prepared to suspend verifiably so that negotiations can begin?"

But before these talks start, the EU and the United States first need serious discussions between themselves to determine how much wiggle room they want to allow Iran to have. Whether the transatlantic partners like it or not, Iran will continue with its uranium enrichment program. Thus, the essential element of the EU-U.S. strategy toward Iran is figuring out how to limit this nuclear activity while leveraging this apparent concession to get Iran to agree to rigorous inspections of its entire nuclear program. Such a strategy could open the door for a grand bargain that lessens Iran's perceived need for nuclear weapons.

Solving, or at least containing, the Iran problem has become all the more important since North Korea's nuclear brinkmanship has gone into overdrive with its nuclear test of October 9, 2006. With North Korea, the other constituent member of the Axis of Evil, the United States has already expressed more willingness to talk. But the so-called six-party talks stalled long ago, since Pyongyang refused to reengage in these negotiations in opposition to U.S. financial sanctions on North Korea's counterfeiting activities. Stagnation of the six-party talks has been counterproductive across the board, leading to North Korea's launching of several ballistic missiles in July 2006 and culminating in October's nuclear test.

The EU, itself not involved in the six-party talks, needs to push Washington to test North Korea's intentions to engage in serious bilateral or multilateral diplomacy. The EU should broaden its geostrategic horizon and directly deal with the North Korean challenge, jointly with the United States. Until now, the EU has left the North Korea problem in American hands, but given the stalled talks and the open confrontation between Washington and Pyongyang, Europe's "good offices" may avoid head-on confrontation and further escalation. If the EU puts its economic and political weight behind the United States, North Korea may well be lured back to the negotiating table, and keep it there as long as possible. The EU-3, following their modestly successful overtures towards Iran, could sway Pyongyang by putting pressure on North Korea's main "ally": China. As the Iran example shows, the EU is rather good at jaw-jaw to avoid war-war. If there is one crisis that can be avoided through a good cop-bad cop scenario, North Korea's WMD crisis is it, on the condition, of course, that both "cops" coordinate their policies.

In the end, the combined Iran and North Korea nuclear challenges show that the allies have to face their divergent ideas on the use of military force in dealing with WMD and terrorist threats. Ultimately, this explains why transatlantic action is so hard to come by. The Iraq War spurred the EU to evaluate and clarify its policy on using force to prevent WMD proliferation. As a result, European leaders decided that the EU would consider, "in case political and diplomatic measures have failed, coercive measures, including as a last resort the use of force in accordance with the United Nations Charter." The EU position underscored that the decision to use force should in principle be endorsed by the UN Security Council. Still, self-defense, based on Article 51 of the UN Charter, remains a basic right for the EU as well, despite the European preference for nice and neat UN imprimaturs.

Just prior to the invasion of Iraq, the United States, at its peril, ignored the Security Council. The United States and its relatively small coalition acted without the final blessing of the UN. While not admitting that he made a mistake in invading Iraq, President Bush has since shown more willingness to work with the EU and other partners through the UN in dealing with WMD proliferation. But the United States still reserves its prerogative to use force unilaterally if necessary to combat WMD. Although as a sovereign entity the United States would not want to forsake this right, an EU-U.S. non-proliferation dialogue should endeavor to gain U.S. commitment for grounding decisions to use military force in the Security Council.

The most appropriate forum to reach consensus on these issues is within NATO. NATO's Strategic Concept has remained unchanged since April 1999. Ideally, NATO allies would formulate a new one that would spell out the alliance's geostrategic priorities, its policy stance on pre-emptive strikes, and the use of military force to deal with WMD and terrorist threats, as well as the role of nuclear weapons.  Of course, arriving at a consensus on any of these contentious issues is extremely difficult, and allies have hence kept this can of worms firmly closed.

An effective transatlantic WMD proliferation strategy has to take into account two realities. First, despite the constant rhetoric that WMD proliferation tops the Euro-American strategic agenda, both allies pursue strategic agendas in which fighting terrorism, creating regional balances of power and safeguarding energy supplies every so often take precedence. Iran has the world's second biggest gas reserves after Russia and the fourth biggest proven oil reserves after Saudi Arabia, Russia and Iraq. Iran's geostrategic position and its network of pipelines make it a key actor in the energy world. Do Europeans really want to antagonize such a country, knowing that energy-thirsty states like India and China are prepared to purchase energy and circumvent any reasonable sanctions regime? Similarly, should the United States isolate nuclear Pakistan and India, or chum up to the former as a crucial ally in the U.S.-led War on Terror, and the latter as the world's biggest democracy and a crucial counterweight to a booming, expanding and volatile China?

Second, while the EU clings to the NPT and associated treaties and regimes, the United States prepares for a post-proliferation world where "allies" may go nuclear, but "foes" have to stick to non-proliferation rules. The case of Israel's long-standing nuclear weapons program is another obvious case in point. But this U.S. approach has a long pedigree. Since 1981, Israel has been in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 487, calling upon Israel to place its nuclear facilities under the International Atomic Energy Agency's trusteeship. Equally, since 1998, Pakistan and India have been in violation of UNSC Resolution 1172, calling upon both states to end their nuclear weapons programs. However, ever since, Washington has treated these countries as strategic allies and has condoned their proliferation sins. Again, NRA slogans seem to inspire U.S. policy: "Nukes don't kill, rogue states do!"

The realities of realpolitik, therefore, stand in the way of a forthright transatlantic WMD proliferation policy. It turns out that the rhetoric of non-proliferation comes more easily than its implementation. Halting the spread of WMD is a priority, but not at all costs. For the United States, winning the War on Terror is a competing concern, for Europe it is a complex mix of energy security and an almost fetishistic commitment to make multilateralism work. Allies realize that an effective non-proliferation strategy has costs, economic as well as political. Dealing with WMD proliferation sounds like a single-issue matter, but it clearly is not. An effective Western non-proliferation strategy requires a joint European-American approach to Russia and the Middle East, export controls and energy security, as well as, ultimately, the role of international law and the UN. This is a tall order. What is not required is another grand EU-U.S. statement.

Like cops, the EU and the United States must establish their non-proliferation partnership in the rule of law committing themselves to all parts of the law, including the nuclear disarmament duties in the NPT and making decisions to use military force consistent with the UN Charter. Also, like singers, they must stick to the same key and tempo, that is, engage in active and frequent consultations on tactics and strategy to produce a resonant harmony rather than the discord that has held back progress in halting WMD proliferation. Finally, they should resist singing the non-proliferation hymn alone. Thus, the United States should join with the EU and other partners in negotiating with Iran, and the EU should join the United States in the six-party efforts to eliminate North Korea's nuclear weapons program.

Essay Types: Essay