Realists are often accused of disliking democracy and even of being anti-democratic. This is a bogus charge. Every realist I know would be thrilled to see Iraq turned into a thriving democracy. Realists, however, are well aware of the difficulty of spreading democracy, especially by military means. They also understand that even if the enterprise is successful, that is no guarantee that peace will break out. Democracies as well as non-democracies like having nuclear deterrents, and both kinds of states support terrorism when it suits their interests.

Neoconservatives and realists have two very different theories of international politics, which were reflected in their opposing views on the wisdom of invading and occupying Iraq. Actually, the war itself has been a strong test of the two theories. We have been able to see which side's predictions were correct. It seems clear that Iraq has turned into a debacle for the United States, which is powerful evidence--at least for me--that the realists were right and the neoconservatives were wrong.

John J. Mearsheimer
R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science,
Co-Director, Program on International Security Policy,
University of Chicago

Debating the Red Cross

In "Double-Red-Crossed" (Spring 2005), Lee A. Casey and David B. Rivkin, Jr. challenge the effectiveness of the work of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), particularly in relation to the United States.

First, in relation to the applicability of international humanitarian law, the United States and the ICRC enjoy a healthy debate and open dialogue. Both the United States and the ICRC are inevitably bound by and have the deepest respect for the rule of law. The ICRC has been mandated by the community of nations to monitor the application of international humanitarian law and, indeed, will do its utmost to honor its responsibility in the interests of the persons the law is designed to protect.

"Double-Red-Crossed" fails to do justice to the ICRC's public and confidential efforts in favor of U.S. POWs captured after World War II. Even a cursory glance at its publicly accessible archives reveals that the ICRC actively sought access to American POWs throughout, among others, the Korean, Vietnamese and Iraqi conflicts. That these efforts, as in other contexts, did not result in full access to persons deprived of their liberty reflects the overall authority of states to comply with their understanding of the rules of law and their political will. The ICRC's efforts undoubtedly pale when compared to the suffering endured by American POWs and their families. But they were not negligible.

Over 12,000 ICRC staff strive to provide protection and assistance to vulnerable populations affected by armed conflict around the world. As President Bush stressed when he met with ICRC President Jakob Kellenberger in February, the humanitarian values the ICRC stands for have long been consistent with the objectives of U.S. national and foreign policy.

Geoffrey Peter Hugh Loane
International Committee of the Red Cross,
Washington, DC

CASEY & RIVKIN respond: In its response to our essay, the ICRC asserts that we failed "to do justice to the ICRC's public and confidential efforts in favor of U.S. prisoners of war captured after World War II." The ICRC further suggests that "even a cursory glance at its publicly accessible archives reveals that the ICRC actively sought access to American POWs throughout, among others, the Korean, Vietnamese and Iraqi conflicts." The ICRC does not, however, give any detail to support this claim. Unfortunately, this is typical of that organization's assertions in this area--its claims are broad, but the detail is wanting.

In fact, having given rather more than a "cursory glance" at the public record, including ICRC materials and others, we have been unable to identify any systematic efforts during the post-World War II period by the ICRC to ensure that Americans received the legal rights to which they are entitled under either the Geneva Conventions or customary international law. The ICRC, in the person of its president, did seek to visit three American servicemen who were captured during the 1999 war with Yugoslavia. However, as we heard the story, the ICRC took this action only after receiving complaints from U.S. officials because of its initial inaction.

In any case, we assume that there were isolated ICRC efforts to visit American POWs in Korea, Vietnam and Iraq; we never suggested otherwise. What is very clear, however, is that the ICRC never undertook the type of determined, public campaign on behalf of captured Americans that it has launched for the benefit of the enemy combatants detained at Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere in the War on Terror. Assuming that the ICRC failed, as it claims, to ameliorate the conditions of captured Americans, especially in Korea and Vietnam, because of "the overall authority of states to comply with their understanding of the rules of law and their political will", a truly "impartial" organization would have attempted to change the policies of North Korea, North Vietnam and Iraq, just as it has attempted to change the policies of the United States. The ICRC simply fails that critical test.