One lesson to be learned by comparing the two conflicts is that the
tactical requirements of insurgency and counter-insurgency warfare
work against the maintenance of a disciplined chain of command for
either the rebels or the forces of order. If either side expects to
be presented with perfectly representative negotiating partners, with
control of all the elements comprising their side, they will have a
long wait, during which time a murderous repression will lead
combatants on both sides to splinter and grow still more extreme.
Moreover, in continuing and even intensifying operations during
negotiations the FIS has simply taken a page from the old FLN (and
Vietnamese communist) playbook, the page that says: Do not stop
applying pressure when it appears you are beginning to prevail. But
the principal reason why talks between Zeroul and the FIS failed last
year was that the government tried to use them to drive a wedge
between the Islamists' political leadership and the more extreme
insurgents. Ignoring the armed bands--either by isolating them from
the politicians or by ignoring the FIS altogether to work with other
parties--will simply force the rebel leaders to prove their
revolutionary bona fides and to shoot their way to the table. As is
usually the case in negotiation, the beginning of wisdom would be for
both sides to understand the problems of the other party and to be
prepared to make concessions, in order that each may retain the
confidence of its constituents.

Unfortunately, when anyone proposes trying to devise a peaceful
transition, appealing to the rebels' sense of reason and
reconstructing a community of interests among all Algerians, they are
usually shouted down: "What of the atrocities, the assassination of
priests, the killing of children in schools? How can one be
reasonable with such men?" This argument is often made by former
members of the FLN, forgetting that their forces also murdered
priests, burned schools, and massacred women and children in the war
for independence. French propagandists put these incidents to good
use, playing on Western suspicions that wanton fanaticism is
intrinsic to Islam. In the 1950s, they compiled photograph albums of
the FLN's most grotesque crimes, albums virtually identical to those
the Algerian government now shows foreign journalists. But in both
cases these present only a partial view. Whether one speaks of the
French of forty years ago or the current military regime, security
forces in Algeria have been no less fanatical than their adversaries.
There are reports accusing the government of summarily executing
hundreds of civilians who were suspected of sympathizing with--or
just being related to--the rebels, and stories relating to the
castration of captured rebels, and the use of napalm on such a scale
that the fires sometimes spill over into Tunisia. Few in Algeria now
doubt that the government commits some of the worst atrocities and
attributes them to its Islamist adversaries.

It is tempting to dismiss the ultra-violence of all sides as
"senseless", as mere "savagery", and so avoid trying to understand
the motives and the meaning of acts the media present as pure
spectacle. Following the hijacking of the Air France jet last
December, French news magazines like Le Point provided page after
page of gripping narrative, wrenching images, and elaborate diagrams
explaining the success of the elite commando unit. The only thing
missing was an analysis of the Algerians' reasons for targeting
France in the first place--the fact, for instance, that Paris sees to
it that the Algiers regime is bankrolled with three billion dollars
in foreign aid each year. It was therefore understandable, if
idiotic, that the editors went on to proclaim that "the
fundamentalist terrorists have forced France to get involved." The
media never did question the French government's claim--based on an
"anonymous tip"--that the hijackers were on a suicide mission (though
it would seem that, while fighting off the police for at least ten
minutes and with four sticks of dynamite readily at hand, they were
quite capable of causing many more casualties). But in succeeding
weeks they did finally begin to scrutinize French policy and the
prospects for disengagement. The hijackers therefore succeeded in
what they sought to do all along--just as their death threats against
foreigners have succeeded in making Algeria's oil and gas industry an
increasingly risky investment, and the assassination of journalists
has undermined the government's propaganda machine. In each case, and
without for a moment excusing the war crimes of either side, one can
discern a rational strategy.

Alternatively, as long as one luxuriates in righteous indignation at
the FIS, or the Algerian military, or both, there is little more one
can say or do. But until now those arguing for negotiations with the
FIS have borne the burden of proof while critics have either failed
to suggest no alternatives to a bloody stalemate or have proposed
fantasies--like the idea that Algerians can rally against both the
Islamists and the military by forming a third, independent force.
They can point to the ten thousand who marched in Paris last December
to demonstrate their "solidarity with the Algerian people." This
rather vague slogan suited everyone from the Anarchists--who perhaps
sense an opportunity for growth--to, more seriously, the Berbers--who
make up approximately 20 percent of the population of Algeria and
fear the FIS will push Arabization even further than did the FLN. But
the most visible and vocal demonstrators were women who, like the
Berbers, have not had it easy in Algeria and see things going from
bad to worse.

Does this really have the makings of a coalition that can take on
both the FIS and the Algerian Army at the same time? Sadly, no. The
turnout for the demonstration was not particularly impressive when
one considers that eight hundred thousand Algerians live in France,
and that much of the crowd was made up of non-Muslims. Regulars from
the Marxist-Environmentalist Faction were joined by many more who
simply do not like what is happening in Algeria, without having any
new suggestions as to what to do about it. Their position is like
that of Albert Camus, who also tried to unite all "men of good will"
during the Algerian War only to discover that he had been manipulated
by the FLN. His was a principled stand, but not a practical one: the
idea that one can make peace without, or in spite of, the main
combatants has always been a mirage, one that appears more real the
greater the distance from Algeria.

What Sort of Algeria?

If the FIS comes to power, either through a compromise peace or the
sudden collapse of the current regime, what could we expect in the
aftermath? After the First Algerian War in 1962 there was fighting
between different factions of the FLN, which also proved either
unwilling or unable to honor the guarantees that it had given for the
safety of the European colonists and those Muslims who had sided with
the French. Similarly, even before the 1992 crackdown some members of
the FIS indicated they would have little consideration for human
rights or democratic practices. Having been deprived of the offices
they won in free elections they are even less likely to respect
liberal principles, whatever they might feel it necessary to promise
in their campaign for Western sympathy. But the key question to ask
is not how to secure an iron-clad guarantee of good conduct by the
rebels, since there can be no such thing. Rather, it is how to
convince the FIS that it is in its own interest to head off a mass
exodus of the Algerian elite. Even the influential Sudanese leader,
Hassan El Tourabi, who has been one of the FIS's main supporters,
warns against a forceful takeover that would cause "three or perhaps
four million Algerians to flee." By exaggerating the danger Tourabi
betrayed a genuine concern. The Islamists, at least, are aware of the
obvious contradiction between the two worst case scenarios suggested
by their opponents: Algeria may soon become a powerful Islamic state
or it may lose its educated cadres in a mass exodus towards Europe,
but it is hard to see how both can happen at the same time. One thing
that is clear is that the longer the repression continues the less
likely it is that the FIS will be in a forgiving mood when it finally
takes power, which even an analyst like Olivier Roy--whose book
attempts to prove The Failure of Political Islam--now concedes is
inevitable.

What are Algeria's long-range prospects under an FIS government? The
country faces economic, environmental, and social problems of
staggering proportions--including foreign debt service that absorbs
70 percent of all export earnings, an agricultural sector that
provides less than half of required foodstuffs, and rapid population
growth that each year adds hundreds of thousands of youths to an
unemp loyment role that already constitutes at least 25 percent of
the work force. But what Algeria under the FIS may lose in terms of
an educated elite and Western aid it can gain through a political
system with popular legitimacy--not because all its policies will be
wise, but because it could at least implement them and so exit from
the political impasse. Thirty years ago the FLN was in a much better
position than its predecessors in calling for sacrifices to overcome
economic and social problems of comparable proportions. Now, with its
mass following and emphasis on integrity in government, the FIS is
more likely to be able to undo the FLN's mistakes than a military
regime that lacks any mandate. Anarchy is the inevitable result not
of allowing Algerians to govern themselves, but of denying them that
right.