EVER SINCE its start six years ago, the United States has been waging the War on Terror chiefly on the Sunni side of the religious divide within Islam. The principal targets have been Al-Qaeda and its affiliates. As recently as September 2006, the White House's counter-terrorism strategy was still focused overwhelmingly on the Bin Laden network and its offshoots, which were seen as the vanguard of "a transnational movement of extremist organizations, networks, and individuals" threatening the United States.
By contrast, the vision articulated by the president in his 2007 State of the Union Address is substantially broader. It encompasses not only Sunni extremists, but their Shi‘a counterparts as well. And, for the first time, it clearly and unambiguously identifies not just "terrorism" but a specific state sponsor-the Islamic Republic of Iran-as a threat to U.S. interests and objectives in the greater Middle East.
So far, however, this shift is still more rhetoric than reality. "Our strategy to combat terrorism is really only a strategy to combat Al-Qaeda", Congressman Jim Saxton (R-NJ) pointed out in these pages not long ago. "We are not prepared to deal-in the event hostilities occur-with terrorist organizations that are built differently, like Hizballah."
Examples of this disconnect abound. The Bush Administration's original September 2002 National Security Strategy ( NSS) refers generically and without distinction to the threat posed by "global terrorism." The updated version of the NSS, released by the White House last spring, does nothing to correct this deficiency. Likewise, the Bush Administration's National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction warns that "terrorist groups are seeking to acquire WMD with the stated purpose of killing large numbers of our people and those of friends and allies", but fails to identify whether some groups may be closer to this goal-or more capable of achieving it-than others. The National Military Strategy of the United States of America issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 2004, meanwhile, simply commits the U.S. military to the generic task of confronting "terrorist forces, terrorist collaborators and those governments harboring terrorists", leaving U.S. troops to draw their own distinctions among the foes that they are fighting.
These ambiguous mission statements poorly serve soldiers in the field, who require clarity when defining their enemy-a crucial element to forming any effective strategy. They also disadvantage America's diplomats, many of whom are locked in acrimonious turf battles with allied nations about the exact scope of the War on Terror. By lumping together insurgents and guerillas, Sunnis and Shi‘a, and state and non-state actors under the generic moniker of "terrorist forces", the United States has put itself at a disadvantage in differentiating, and adapting to, enemies that are anything but homogeneous.
SIX YEARS into the War on Terror, there is considerable debate over the nature of the threat posed by Al-Qaeda. Some say that the organization has devolved from a unitary, cohesive organization into a loose movement of affiliated groups and that its ideology has undergone a similar diffusion. 1 Others believe the opposite, that Al-Qaeda is actually growing in popularity, as its brutal tactics in Iraq and Afghanistan win it sympathizers-and recruits-among idle jihadists and allow it to reconnect with fellow travelers from Chechnya to Southeast Asia. 2 Whatever the actual state of the Bin Laden network, one thing is clear: The disparate groups that make up today's Sunni Islamist movement tend to operate autonomously. Those countries or entities that support these radicals generally serve as enablers, rather than managers; they cannot hope to dictate the terms of the jihad waged against the West, only to sustain it and try to mold it to suit their political purposes. In turn, although organizations such as Al-Qaeda may indeed benefit from the largesse of these sponsors, they do not appear to feel lasting allegiance to them.
Yes, Al-Qaeda may receive funds and support from segments of Saudi society; officially, however, it is an enemy of the Saudi state and the central target of the kingdom's counter-terrorism efforts. In fact, no government in the world explicitly backs Al-Qaeda or extends its full protection to radical Sunni militants. Even where an intimate connection between Sunni groups and state sponsors does exist (as in the case of Syria and Hamas, or of Pakistan and various Kashmiri separatists), this support tends to be limited, carried out away from the public eye and more often than not with plausible deniability.
Shi‘a groups, by contrast, have a more direct-and durable-connection to their chief sponsor: the Islamic Republic of Iran. As Sheikh Naim Qassem, the deputy head of Lebanon's terrorist powerhouse, Hizballah, told an Iranian television channel back in April, his organization "is committed to receiv[ing] religious instruction regarding the nature of the confrontation with Israel from al-wali al-faqih", Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei himself. This direction, Qassem made clear, extends to providing sanction for the types of tactics employed by the Shi‘a militia. A similar connection can be found in Iraq, where two of the country's largest Shi‘a political parties-Islamic Call and the Supreme Islamic Council in Iraq-boast deep historic and ideological ties to Tehran, and where Shi‘a militias such as the Badr Corps and firebrand cleric Moqtada Sadr's Mahdi Army rely heavily on the Islamic Republic for financial aid, operational support and political protection.Essay Types: Essay