Turks in general are far more sanguine about the Turkmen. On a recent trip I took to Turkey, I asked almost everyone I met with what their preferences would be for the Turkmen in the event of a three-way split in Iraq along sectarian and ethnic lines. Invariably-with very few exceptions-Turks answered that they saw the future of the Turkmen in an Iraqi Kurdistan. The Kurds and the Turkmen, especially with partial access to the local oil riches of northern Iraq, are likely to be an attractive commercial partner for Turkey. It is far better for Ankara to have a prosperous partner in northern Iraq than an economically poor appendage, much like today's northern Cyprus. Oil revenues can help further consolidate this relationship. Turkey's concerns with respect to the Turkmen can better be addressed through an arrangement with the Kurds because a separate Turkmen entity is not in the cards. The KRG constitution already calls for respecting minority rights and languages, and Turkey can make sure that Kurds live up to these promises.

Iraqi Kurds have much to give in return: They are secular, anti-Shi‘i or Sunni fundamentalism, most interested in relations with Turkey-and beyond it with the West-and are anxious to find a patron in Ankara. Their future is very much dependent on how well they connect with Turkey. Iraqi Kurdistan can serve as a secular buffer zone for Turkey. As a landlocked territory surrounded by potentially hostile powers, such as the rump state of Iraq, Iran and Syria, Turkey will have a great deal of leverage over the Kurds. Oil pipelines from northern Iraq already flow into Turkish ports on the Mediterranean and will continue to do so as their capacity expands, benefiting the impoverished southeastern Turkish provinces that have historically been the source of the Kurdish insurrections.

Moreover, a grand bargain with Iraqi Kurds would have a salutary impact on Turkey's domestic Kurdish problem. Turkish Kurds have always been sensitive to developments in northern Iraq and are likely to moderate their militancy if Turkey emerged as a protector of a Kurdish state-even an autonomous one within a federal Iraq.

The KRG, especially the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) led by Masoud Barzani, son of the legendary Kurdish leader Mullah Mustafa Barzani, has a great deal of influence over some Turkish Kurds by virtue of language affinities, conservative political outlook and history. Despite this affinity, it is not clear that Turkish Kurds also would seek independence or would fall for possible, though improbable, irredentist games. Turkey is far more prosperous, and the EU accession process promises to satisfy most of the Turkish Kurds' cultural and representational needs. For many Kurds outside northern Iraq, the emerging federation there represents something akin to what Israel means to Jews around the world. Similarly, not all Kurds desire to live in northern Iraq or become part of a greater Kurdistan, but as a traumatized population, it is important to know that such a place exists where not only Kurds are genuinely free-but as with the Jews-it could be a place to flee to if necessary.

It is in Iraqi Kurds' interest to see the PKK disbanded, not just removed from their territory. It is clear that the PKK-or for that matter any armed rebellion-will not and cannot improve conditions for Turkish Kurds, and worse, it could prevent Iraqi Kurds from consolidating their quasi-independence-at least the most they have achieved to date. During the last years of his presidency in the early 1990s, Turgut Özal had succeeded in earning the confidence of many Turkish Kurds with his overtures to the Iraqi Kurdish leadership. Iraqi Kurds were instrumental in getting the PKK, which was near the peak of its power, for the first time to unilaterally declare a ceasefire.

In the early 1990s, the Turks asked and received the collaboration of the two Kurdish groups in northern Iraq. With the Turks, they fought the PKK in large and small engagements and suffered serious casualties in the process. They were then beholden to Turkey, which hosted the American-led Operation Provide Comfort that prevented Saddam's forces from re-entering the Kurdish enclave. Today, domestic-nationalist considerations drive a war of words between Ankara and Iraq's Kurds-especially Barzani-over Kirkuk. The accusations and acrimony have served only to increase tensions further and prevent dialogue.

Nonetheless, the Iraqi Kurds are the only ones who have any chance of prevailing on the PKK and its support base to abandon both the armed struggle and Iraq. The success of the Kurdish experiment in northern Iraq is far too important to Turkish Kurds to jeopardize. Barzani and Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, also a veteran Kurdish leader, can exercise their considerable influence to whittle away at the PKK and isolate its leadership. They are unlikely to let the PKK stand in their way of concluding a genuine deal with Ankara, even if this means engaging in military action against PKK fighters who refuse to quit.

What is in it for the United States? An agreement between Iraqi Kurds and Turkey would help defuse a deteriorating situation and prevent northern Iraq from resembling the rest of that country. Similarly, as the most corrosive dimension of the U.S.-Turkish relationship, such a deal would halt the slide in relations with Turkey, arguably the United States's single most important strategic ally in the region. Such an accord would also strengthen Washington's hand in dealing with Iraq's other meddlesome neighbors by denying them Turkey's possible allegiance or cooperation. In other words, Turkey would help anchor stability in Iraq. The more the United States can negotiate accords designed to enhance local stability, the easier it will be to disentangle itself from Iraq in the future. For both the Iraqi government and the United States, a deal with Turkey is more likely to satisfy the Kurds' long-term needs and reduce the risk of separation in the context of a loose federation.

A GRAND bargain could be a win-win proposition for all, but the obstacles along the way could be daunting. For reasons discussed below, its realization will require extensive behind-the-scenes diplomacy, preparation of the respective publics in both Turkey and northern Iraq and a commitment by the United States to see it through. Both the Turks and Kurds will have to make some substantial commitments and sacrifices of their own in the negotiations.

At the beginning of the Iraq War, the Turks had made it clear that a robust federal Kurdish autonomous region in the north was unacceptable to them. With changes on the ground and the introduction of the new Iraqi constitution, which delineated the Kurdish region, they were obliged to soften their stand.

Nevertheless, their fear of their own Kurdish minority-estimated at 20 percent of their population-is as neuralgic as it is existential. Since the inception of the Turkish republic in 1923, Turkish Kurds, in one form of upheaval or another, have agitated for greater rights and recognition. These efforts at times assumed a violent character, as with the PKK-led insurgency in the 1980s and 1990s, or more often than not have followed a path of increased political mobilization. Either form of activity has been seen as dangerous by the state, which until a little more than a decade ago had refused to acknowledge the Kurds' existence.

The fear of further Kurdish mobilization in Turkey has hampered Ankara's cooperation with the KRG. Ankara has tried its best to ignore the KRG's existence on the grounds that the Iraqi constitution has yet to assume its final and definite shape. The outgoing Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, despite the Turkish government's entreaties, has obstinately refused to invite Iraqi President Talabani to Ankara simply because the latter is a Kurd from northern Iraq. The Turkish Chief of the General Staff, Yasar Büyükanit, forced the cancellation of an unofficial meeting between the Turkish foreign minister and the KRG Prime Minister Nechrivan Barzani by publicly admonishing his government for meeting with people who he claimed were "supporting the PKK militarily."

A compromise over Kirkuk lies at the heart of any solution. A first step over the sharing of existing oil revenues has been taken between the Kurds and the Iraqi government. There remain differences over future oil finds that will have to be worked out. In view of some Turkmens' anxieties and Ankara's objections to the manner in which the incorporation of Kirkuk into Iraqi Kurdistan is planned, the Kurds have to expend some energy providing ironclad assurances to the Turkmen and other non-Kurdish minorities. This may require special constitutional arrangements for the city itself-as opposed to the province-that include cultural and political rights for all minorities. In this context, the referendum should be postponed. It is unrealistic to expect that all the prerequisites for holding it, such as the normalization of Kirkuk-which includes the redrawing of provincial boundaries to correct for Saddam's ethnic manipulation and the conducting of a census-can be accomplished in an orderly manner before the end of the year. Here, it is important that the Kurds agree to its postponement for technical reasons, not because of foreign or domestic threats, and without conceding the constitutional principle underlying the reason for the referendum.