To paraphrase Winston Churchill, this is not to suggest that democracy's alternatives are preferable. All it means is that we should not turn democracy into an idol before which we force others to kneel and pray.

And the trouble with democracy promotion, at least when pursued without the consent of target governments, is that it is often precisely these undemocratic governments whose cooperation is indispensable to protecting fundamental U.S. national interests. Common sense suggests that, to a point, America can raise U.S. concerns over domestic practices with these governments without paying much of a price. And, of course, it is important to do so both to stay true to ourselves and to help those abroad who share our values and want to be our allies. But there is an invisible line beyond which aggressive democracy promotion endangers America.

The pre-eminent American national interest, and the number one responsibility of the U.S. government, is to protect the country from apocalyptic attacks, including terrorist strikes with Weapons of Mass Destruction or other equally devastating means. No non-NATO nation today other than Russia is capable of an apocalyptic nuclear attack on America and it is difficult to visualize a scenario in which Moscow would risk self-annihilation. But that is today. The combination of resurgent Russian foreign policy, an energy-driven economic boom, and growth in Moscow's defense spending set against Washington's propensity to support Russian neighbors hostile to the Kremlin-like the Saakashvili government in Georgia-could lead to regional escalation in the post-Soviet space that puts the United States and Russia on a collision course. The probability of such an outcome remains quite low, but since the consequences could be catastrophic, it is important to watch carefully. But neither presidential candidates nor the Congress pay any attention to this issue, preferring to articulate an inalienable American right to support self-proclaimed democratic allies anywhere and believing that no one else should find this objectionable.

Energy security, which in turn requires stability in the Persian Gulf, is another key interest. Have we thought through the impact of a U.S. or Israeli military strike against Iran, especially when the results are impossible to predict? $100 per barrel oil might be among the less dramatic consequences; others include a major interruption of energy shipments from the Gulf, the collapse of moderate pro-American governments in the region and, in those Middle Eastern countries where there are relatively free elections, new governments much less friendly to America than the autocrats currently in power.

Likewise, little thought has been given to the implications of China's quickly increasing military might-beyond telling China that it should be more transparent. No American political leader is asking how the American insistence on hegemonic military predominance is likely to affect Chinese views of their security requirements. And Chinese (as well as Russian) cooperation on non-proliferation and terrorism is clearly quite important to the United States. To the Bush Administration's credit, many officials recognize this-but don't expect much from most in Congress, and particularly from leading Democrats.

The notion that other major powers would expect something in return after accommodating U.S. priorities is an alien and often offensive concept to many on Capitol Hill. But if the United States wants to remain the global leader, the support of other major powers like China, India, Russia and the European Union is essential. And this support cannot be taken for granted.

The international system of the 21^st century will have several centers of power-including economic power. The United States may still have a predominant influence, but will not remain the undisputed center of the world. Consider this: last year, China replaced the United States as the number one source of exports to the European Union, with a volume of €191.5 billion. Russian exports to the EU (mostly energy) increased even more-by 25 percent to €136.9 billion.

The March unanimous Security Council vote on Iranian sanctions does show that the United States is able to achieve consensus among the great powers and to work through the United Nations system when we combine steely determination with tactical flexibility. But if China, Russia and others feel that they are on the receiving end of either or both U.S. moralistic condemnation and efforts to put them in straitjackets in their own regions, America's ability to use the UN or other multilateral venues to promote American objectives will quickly evaporate. Have there been hearings on this major issue? No.

On a separate but related matter-the United States must deal with essentially uncontrolled immigration, much of it illegal, that risks changing America from a melting pot to a tossed salad to the Balkans. If this issue is not adequately addressed, America could become unrecognizable in a matter of decades and, in view of the way the American political process works, could have a vastly different foreign policy perspective. Some Republicans in Congress appreciate what is at stake, but there is little discussion of why, if we believe we can police Baghdad, we cannot police the Rio Grande at much less cost in money and lives. Neither the Democratic candidates nor the Democratic majority in Congress have anything to offer on this.

Too many U.S. political leaders act as if they were trying to confirm George Bernard Shaw's opinion that "Democracy substitutes election by the incompetent many for appointment by the corrupt few." Optimists among us, myself included, believe that the American system is often not effective in responding to forthcoming challenges, but is best in dealing with crises when they come. But the price of playing opportunistic politics grows by the day. We should hear the bell tolling; it is tolling for us.

Dimitri K. Simes is president of The Nixon Center and publisher of The National Interest.