In addition, the Syrian government approved, ­ for the first time since Syria nationalized its banking system, ­ three private banking licenses and specified a period of seven years to restructure the economy (mainly so Syria can join the World Trade Organization and the EU-Mediterranean free trade zone).

At the same time that these reforms were introduced, the government revoked the license of Al-Domari. Importantly, none of the reformers' main demands were satisfied. Admittedly, the Ba'ath party still dominates the political process (two thirds of Syria's 250 parliament seats are reserved for the Ba'ath party and its affiliate the National Progressive Front). In addition, the composition of the new government indicates that reform will not be its top priority. The new government comprises 17 Ba'athists, controlling the most important portfolios-Foreign, Defense and Interior Ministries, 6 independents and 7 PNF members. Obviously, the reforms are still selective and of an ad hoc nature meant to blend dominant state power with economic development without breaking the system. This is the crux of Bashar's democratic experience. In fact, Bashar has so far given no indication that he is willing to introduce reforms that will threaten his regime. At the same time, it is going to be very difficult for Bashar to pursue selective reforms and reconcile incompatible policies without endangering the very system his father built. 

The reform movement and Ta'dudia face three main challenges. The Syrian leadership has not resolved the dilemma over how much change is acceptable before the regime itself is threatened. The dilemma lies in the fact that, unless the institutional and constitutional advantages of the Ba'ath party are revoked, reform will be insignificant and inconsistent.

The reformers will most likely fail in pushing for significant reform without outside help. Absent support from NGOs and governments for reformers, the Syrian leadership will have little incentive to introduce reforms paving the path to a peaceful transition to democracy.

Finally, Bashar has to decide whether to partner with the reformers and wean himself from the old guards by putting Syria on a true path of reform, or wither in the stagnation of maintaining the political status quo.  

Yet, as a prominent Syrian recently told me, "change is inevitable in Syria despite all the blockage from the government. It is about time. The extent and scope of changes taking place both in the region and in Syria may well in the near future compel the Syrian leadership, mainly the Alawi barons, to reach a compromise with the opposition. The barons may opt to play the role of gatekeepers of a Turkish-like parliamentary model of government from their army barracks. This will form the basis of political pluralism with which we can live." In this case, political pluralism will take place at the expense of "politicized" religious pluralism, mainly political Islam. 

 

A portion of this article was adapted from a talk delivered at John Hopkins University. Dr. Rabil served as chief of emergency with the Red Cross in Lebanon, taught at Suffolk University, and was project manager of Iraq Research and Documentation Project, Washington. He is a contributor to the Daily Star and author of Embattled Neighbors: Syria, Israel and Lebanon (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003).