But links between bilateral and multilateral agendas are rare. The State Department strictly separates responsibility for multilateral and bilateral priorities, and the bureaucracy is deeply skittish about quid pro quos. The conventional wisdom is that linking unrelated issues complicates bilateral relationships, risking charges of abuse of power. While other countries routinely trade votes on candidates for election to international bodies, U.S. policy forbids it. As a result, on the Human Rights Committee vote we were deserted by some of our closest friends who had committed to trades with other countries in order to advance election campaigns they were waging.

The U.S. government maintains no central ledger in which bilateral relationships are tracked. There is no place to turn to find out what the United States has done for a particular country lately, or what a country may want or fear. We do not keep formal track of which U.S. officials have trusted relationships with which foreign counterparts, of who in the business world might bring influence to bear, or even of what we have learned about how each government makes decisions. An ambassador or State Department desk officer will have part of the picture, but so will officials in Defense, Commerce and other departments and agencies. Likewise, no one tracks what the United States is seeking from others, so that just as one Executive Branch department is trying to curry favor on a top priority, another may be complaining about something petty. Because they are smaller, and their relations with the United States are of high priority, other countries' right hands are much more likely to know what their left hands ar e doing when it comes to relations with the United States. While they can play off a range of policy issues to get what they want Out of the Americans, the United States is poorly organized to do the same.

During the UN dues negotiations, the U.S. delegation repeatedly learned after the fact of loans, debt forgiveness and other concessions made to countries that actively opposed the reform process. At the end of a long and contentious meeting with the Singaporean delegation, one of their diplomats pulled from his briefcase a press report announcing a U.S.-Singapore free trade agreement. "This is what matters", he said, dismissing the importance of the dues issue while steadfastly maintaining his country's refusal to pay more. Without a ledger, Singapore's recalcitrance at the UN had no impact on their favorable treatment at the hands of the U.S. Trade Representative. Had the matters simply been raised together, the free trade cooperation would have provided leverage on the dues issue even without an explicit quid pro quo. Allies and enemies alike know that the United States does not keep track of its bilateral relationships in this way, however, and thus rest assured that opposing the United States in multilateral forums will rarely trigger repercussions in the bilateral relationship.

But links between bilateral and multilateral agendas are rare. The State Department strictly separates responsibility for multilateral and bilateral priorities, and the bureaucracy is deeply skittish about quid pro quos. The conventional wisdom is that linking unrelated issues complicates bilateral relationships, risking charges of abuse of power. While other countries routinely trade votes on candidates for election to international bodies, U.S. policy forbids it. As a result, on the Human Rights Committee vote we were deserted by some of our closest friends who had committed to trades with other countries in order to advance election campaigns they were waging.

The U.S. government maintains no central ledger in which bilateral relationships are tracked. There is no place to turn to find out what the United States has done for a particular country lately, or what a country may want or fear. We do not keep formal track of which U.S. officials have trusted relationships with which foreign counterparts, of who in the business world might bring influence to bear, or even of what we have learned about how each government makes decisions. An ambassador or State Department desk officer will have part of the picture, but so will officials in Defense, Commerce and other departments and agencies. Likewise, no one tracks what the United States is seeking from others, so that just as one Executive Branch department is trying to curry favor on a top priority, another may be complaining about something petty. Because they are smaller, and their relations with the United States are of high priority, other countries' right hands are much more likely to know what their left hands ar e doing when it comes to relations with the United States. While they can play off a range of policy issues to get what they want Out of the Americans, the United States is poorly organized to do the same.

During the UN dues negotiations, the U.S. delegation repeatedly learned after the fact of loans, debt forgiveness and other concessions made to countries that actively opposed the reform process. At the end of a long and contentious meeting with the Singaporean delegation, one of their diplomats pulled from his briefcase a press report announcing a U.S.-Singapore free trade agreement. "This is what matters", he said, dismissing the importance of the dues issue while steadfastly maintaining his country's refusal to pay more. Without a ledger, Singapore's recalcitrance at the UN had no impact on their favorable treatment at the hands of the U.S. Trade Representative. Had the matters simply been raised together, the free trade cooperation would have provided leverage on the dues issue even without an explicit quid pro quo. Allies and enemies alike know that the United States does not keep track of its bilateral relationships in this way, however, and thus rest assured that opposing the United States in multilate ral forums will rarely trigger repercussions in the bilateral relationship.

The multilateral context itself offers some opportunities for low-cost linkages. During the year of the dues debate, the U.S. delegation used support on that issue as a criterion for deciding which countries to support in contested elections to international bodies. While the United States would not back an inappropriate candidate simply because it backed the dues drive, positions on the dues issue were used to decide among qualified contenders.

This year, while the UN will focus heavily on terrorism, it will also debate and pass resolutions on other issuesufor example, combating AIDS, nuclear and small arms proliferation, and global development. While these will pale in significance for the United States next to the anti-terrorism campaign, they will be of prime importance to certain countries. Our handling of their concernsuour level of engagement, flexibility and willingness to listenuwill influence how others treat our priorities.

Another useful measure short of an explicit quid pro quo is engaging cabinet secretaries, members of Congress and other U.S. officials to stump for support in key capitals. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee was heavily engaged in the dues campaign, visiting the UN, lobbying Washington embassies, and even writing to ask foreign leaders to agree to pay more. Near the end of the dues debate the U.S. Trade Representative and the Secretaries of the Treasury and Defense were enlisted to call ministers of finance, trade and defense in counties in which they had close ties. Although these officials were generally unfamiliar with the dues issue and were usually speaking to foreign colleagues equally remote from the UN negotiations, mobilizing these important interlocutors underscored the seriousness of the U.S. campaign and created a useful implicit link to other bilateral priorities.

Though targeted efforts can erode a solid group stance, there are invariably some delegations that cannot be won over. In the dues negotiation, these included Cuba, Libya and others who opposed initiatives simply because the United States had proposed them. But intractable nations can be isolated by convincing others that their opposition is politically motivated or based solely on narrow, as opposed to enlightened, selfinterest. While delegations may be loath to criticize colleagues for ill-founded positions, the silent majority of moderates is willing to work quietly to prevent spoilers from blocking progress.

From December to September

THE QUEST to lower America's dues and settle the arrears problem recedes in importance now that much weightier problems stand before us. It is worth keeping in mind, however, that without the December 2000 deal the United States would be undertaking its delicate coalition-building from the position of being the UN's biggest debtor, on the verge of losing its General Assembly vote. To get out of this awkward corner, the administration and Congress would have had to voluntarily pay the back dues, notwithstanding the proposed Eleims-Biden bargain having been spurned. Likewise the UN membership would have faced a quandary: either refuse the United States in its hour of need, or put aside the dues issue, leaving UN finances in ruin and resentment toward the United States on the rise.

Though that crisis was averted, another very nearly flared. Although the Senate acted in January 2001 to approve payment of the promised arrears on the basis of Ambassador Holbrooke's deal, the House leadership sat on its hands for months, even proposing to attach new conditions to the promised payment. In early September, as the annual opening of the UN General Assembly approached, delegations concluded grimly that, nine months after the deal was reached, President Bush intended to arrive in New York empty-handed. Those who had supported the United States felt sheepish if not betrayed, and our opponents patted themselves on the back for having predicted U.S. faithlessness.