This is something to be concerned about. Failure to obtain a date would severely damage the credibility of the AKP government and its insistence that adherence to reform policies would produce benefits. The leading opposition politician, Deniz Baykal, leader of the Republican People's Party, has voiced criticisms that the government has been too quick to abandon what it perceives as core Turkish interests--including Cyprus--in order to appease the EU.

If no date is given in December, the AKP itself could fracture into a reformist wing and a more Islamist camp--and so be unable to retain its governing majority. Perhaps the "secular" wing of the AKP could join with more secularist forces to continue Turkey's European orientation. However, there is also a strong possibility that a perceived "rejection" by Europe could act as a catalyst for the creation of a more anti-Western, nationalist coalition. In March 2002, the then-Secretary-General of the National Security Council, Tuncer Kilinc, surprised many observers by expressing his frustration with the EU and declaring that Turkey needed to look "eastward" for strategic partners. "I believe that the EU will never accept Turkey", Kilinc stated. "Thus Turkey needs new allies, and it would be useful if Turkey engages in a search that would include Russia and Iran." At the time, Kilinc's remarks found guarded approval, even among some political forces usually seen as pro-European.

There could also be larger repercussions throughout the Greater Middle East. If Turkey, usually perceived as the region's most secular Islamic state, cannot win acceptance, then what chance do other Islamic countries also pursuing democratic reforms have for becoming more closely associated with the Atlantic community? Turkey's snubbing might also foment backlash against the EU and the West throughout the Muslim world. Having their suspicions of Europe's anti-Muslim bias confirmed once more, increasing numbers of Muslims might turn Islamist instead of trying to emulate the Turkish example--something to be concerned about when viewing the prospects for reform from Morocco to Iraq to Uzbekistan.

What To Do Now

Turkey's interests have been best served when American and European visions coincided. While Turkey's EU membership is in the interest of both the United States and Europe, the current state of transatlantic relations, with both Brussels and Washington redefining their agendas and sempiternal drift becoming a real possibility, the question of Turkey's EU membership may fall through the cracks. This is especially worrisome because some European politicians believe that Turkish membership in the EU is an American plot designed to weaken and stultify the Union, rather than a means to firmly anchor the Atlantic community's beachhead in the Greater Middle East.

To keep its EU membership on track, Turkey must continue to implement reforms. It cannot assume that the United States can provide Turkey a pass on the Copenhagen criteria. Nor can it avoid the need seriously to pursue a final settlement on Cyprus prior to May 1, if only to remove the only major argument remaining for the EU to stall the start of accession talks this December. Once Cyprus is no longer on the agenda, the Turks need to lobby their friends inside the EU to make sure the goalposts remain firmly in place. As Europe struggles with issues of secularism and dialogue with the Muslim world, and as it seeks reliable partners in a volatile region, the EU should recognize the benefits Turkey would bring as a full member.

This distinction is very important. Some European politicians--such as Germany's Angela Merkel, leader of the Christian Democrats--have proposed that, in lieu of full membership, Turkey should be offered a "third way", a "Privileged Partnership", as an alternative. This would offer Turkey a "comprehensive free-trade area" with Europe and closer integration in joint military and security efforts, but Turkey would remain outside of the Union.

This proposal might appeal to some segments of public opinion within Europe, but it is not a feasible option for Turkey. Most Turks view the "third way" option as a way to keep Turkey permanently out of Europe. If Turkey meets the criteria for membership, talks should begin. Sometimes people forget that giving Turkey a date to begin accession negotiations does not mean membership; getting a date is not like getting a marriage proposal. If talks begin after December 2004, Turkey would be on a ten-year trajectory to full membership. During this decade, reforms would continue and deepen. More importantly, a Turkey engaged in accession talks would become a more attractive candidate for investment, thus helping to solidify reforms and to improve economic performance. Some of the countries of "New Europe" fear that Turkish membership in the Union could drain away precious resources from their own stabilization programs. But denying Turkey a firm date to open talks does not solve that problem and in fact is counterproductive. If investors know that Turkey is indeed "destined to join the Union" at a set point in the future, Turkey's attractiveness as an emerging market is enhanced considerably.

The United States also has a role to play. Not only should the Bush Administration continue to publicly insist that the EU honor its commitments to Turkey, but it should also concentrate more attention on the "non-traditional" states of Union--"New Europe" and the Scandinavian members--where there is less support for offering Turkey a date.

The June NATO summit in Istanbul will be a great opportunity to open Europe's eyes to the strategic importance of Turkey. The summit will be President Bush's first visit to Turkey. The Bush Administration hopes this historic gathering will also provide an opportunity for Turkey to demonstrate that it shares the West's core democratic and free market principles, as well as the same security concerns. For Europe, the summit can provide an opportunity to make it clear that it would welcome such a Turkey into the European family.

Zeyno Baran is Director of International Security and Energy Programs at the Nixon Center.