A policy of total warfare against the Chechens has been a remarkably consistent element of Russian military tactics since the mid-18^th century - from Tsarist to Soviet to modern times. In the days of General Yermolov during the early 19^th century, the harsh punishment of civilians drove them into the arms of Islamic leaders like Kazi Mullah and Shamil'. The damage of these centuries will probably never be repaired. But if Russia wants to obtain a modicum of legitimacy among the Chechen population, it must discipline its forces. It should create clear chains of command and institute court-martial procedures for soldiers who commit human rights abuses. Not in the name of human dignity - although that too, one hopes, should play a role - but in the name of its own self-interest and security.

The lessons of Chechnya apply to Iraq as well, where the U.S.-led Coalition forces have undertaken a strategy to mount more lethal and high-profile counterstrikes in response to increasing resistance. But if this tactic results in increased civilian casualties, as it very well might, any benefits gained from a tough stance will be overshadowed by the increasing dissatisfaction among the Iraqi people. In a post-war occupation, civilian unrest is more important than militant insurgency because it legitimizes and perpetuates the resistance. A recent CIA report confirmed as much, stating that the Iraqis are losing faith in the occupation forces, which is in turn increasing support for the insurgents. By ignoring civilian needs, the U.S. now finds itself in the dangerous position of repeating the mistakes of Russia in Chechnya and Israel in Palestine - mistakes that have turned both conflicts into prolonged and irresolvable quagmires.

If enough houses are destroyed and if enough people are killed or injured, Iraqi civilians will find themselves aligned with the militants. Once that is the case, the terrorists will become far more entrenched and difficult to find. The Allied forces have been doing a good job of keeping civilian casualties to a low through high-precision bombing. They certainly have not pursued any deliberate attacks on civilians or their property the way Russia's army has done. But in a setting of precarious legitimacy, the cultural divide between the forces and the Iraqi people is too great to prevent potentially fatal mistakes. "Collateral damage" is no longer a byproduct of war, but an important factor in determining its long-term success, and the military planners should pay it more heed.

Seva Gunitskiy is a research associate at the Center for Defense Information (www.cdi.org).