Contemporary Russia has a weak hand to play in international affairs. Following a classic strategy in the Russian version of the card game "Preference", the Kremlin team engages in "defensive bidding" at this time, seeking to build a stronger hand. In matters such as the termination of the ABM Treaty or America's decision to go to war in Iraq, the Putin team calculated that Russia had nothing to gain by engaging in fruitless attempts to forestall American action. Its overall foreign policy objective has been to give Russia the breathing room it needs to complete its reform process, which is, after all, a very Stolypinesque policy.13

Putin has no illusions about the country's weaknesses. In November 2001 he castigated the Russian defense establishment, describing it as "archaic" and unable to "meet modern military and political challenges." A more open Russian society--and one that is more integrated into the global economic system--is the only way Russia can obtain the funds and investment needed to conduct "technical and technological modernization" in a timely and efficient manner.

Yet Russia does possess several valuable geostrategic cards--oil and natural gas, geographic location and intelligence assets, among others. And the current regime is not gambling for the world as did its Soviet predecessors. It has more modest and achievable wants--restoring Russia as the regional hegemon of Eurasia and retaining membership in the club of the world's great powers.

Unlike the Stalinist Soviet Union after World War II, contemporary Russia is prepared to accept a role within an American-led international system, provided it has the ability to influence the agenda. Putin is not seeking to return to any sort of superpower rivalry with the West, but he also does not believe that Russia should have little or no influence in the world.

Indeed, when one looks at the major foreign policy issues that bedevil the United States, Moscow believes that Russia has the contacts, the network and the infrastructure that can facilitate positive outcomes for the United States in support of its vital interests. Winning the War on Terror, achieving a non-nuclear Korean peninsula, stemming the proliferation of WMD technologies, putting the Western world's energy supply on a more secure footing--Russia is an integral part of the solution.

In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the Kremlin hoped that the United States would recognize Russia as a "regional superpower" and provide appropriate levels of support so that Moscow could act as Washington's proxy in Eurasia. Many in the Russian foreign policy establishment were heartened by Secretary of State Colin Powell's proclamation that the war against international terror, beginning in Afghanistan, would be a joint effort. Some even envisioned a "special relationship" with Russia as America's interlocutor to Central Asian and continental European states alike.

Yet, if a closer relationship with the United States does not help to realize these objectives, the Kremlin is prepared to utilize an alternative strategy: raising the cost for the United States to act unilaterally by declining to offer active support for U.S. initiatives and by working with other powers--France, Germany and China, in particular--to try to counterbalance U.S. actions. Here, Putin's policy is designed, in part, to force the United States to prioritize its own strategic interests. The Russians want to make it clear that the United States cannot take their country's acquiescence for granted. In particular, Washington cannot ignore or oppose Moscow's concerns while expecting the Kremlin to accommodate American priorities.

Putin believes placing the U.S.-Russia partnership on a firm footing is a desirable goal--but only if both sides benefit. Should partnership not be forthcoming, however, Russia still has other options. While the United States may be the world's only remaining superpower, it cannot be everywhere at once or at all times--and this is especially true in Eurasia, Russia's traditional backyard.

The Near Abroad

It should be clearly stated: restoration of the USSR is not a goal of the present leadership. Yet there is a reason Russians of all political stripes refer to the other Eurasian states as "the near abroad." Russia's lines of communication to the rest of the world pass through these states. They, particularly the Central Asian states, shield the Russian heartland from hostile forces, especially Islamic radicalism. There is an intricate web of markets, infrastructure nodes (such as pipelines and railways), cultural institutions and even shared personal ties that define a "common Eurasian space."14

There is almost universal agreement with the proposition advanced by the former foreign minister, Igor Ivanov, in his 2002 book The New Russian Diplomacy that "it is natural to suppose a pivotal role for Russia in [Eurasia] by virtue of its size, its population, and its economic capability." Even if Russia is poor and underdeveloped by Western standards, it remains the metropolitan power of Eurasia. And as the leading power of the region, it is committed to a strategy that prevents any outside actor from undermining Russian interests. On this point, the liberal democratic parties are in accord with the Kremlin, even if they differ over means. On September 25, 2003, speaking at a commencement ceremony in St. Petersburg, ANATOly Chubais, one of the leaders of the Union of Right Forces, proposed the creation of a Russian "liberal empire" through the wholesale expansion of Russian business interests throughout the Eurasian space. "Russia should provide assistance to other cis [Commonwealth of Independent States] countries as it has the highest standard of living and is the natural leader among CIS countries." In this view, Russia can remain a great power and a peer of the United States, China and the European Union only by reconstituting a Russian-led Eurasian zone. Washington's favorite Russian politician, Yabloko leader Gregory Yavlinsky, has been more circumspect--warning that the aggressive promotion of Russian interests in the CIS might lead to conflicts with other states--but even he acknowledges that a revived Russia would nonetheless "become the center of gravity" within Eurasia.

Thus, "the problem of creating a new system of international relations in the space of the former USSR continues to be one of the highest foreign policy priorities for the Russian leadership", Ivanov observes. Of particular concern to Russia is when other Eurasian governments seek to involve outside powers as a way to exercise leverage against Russia--a Russian version of the Monroe Doctrine, if you will.

And a leadership that embraces managed pluralism at home applies this mindset in structuring its relations with its Eurasian neighbors. Just as the Putin Administration has no desire to renationalize economic assets (and thus take over direct management), there is little enthusiasm for re-incorporating the other states into a new Soviet Union. No responsible figure in Russia wants to divert the country's precious resources to recreate the failed Soviet empire. Maintaining independent states suits Russian interests, since it means that other Eurasian governments must take upon themselves primary responsibility for meeting the social welfare needs of their populations. (Why should it be Russia's problem whether citizens in Tbilisi, Tashkent or Kiev have sufficient power and heat during the winter, or an effective healthcare and educational system?)

So, within limits, Russia has no objection to other Eurasian states developing supplemental political and economic ties to other states--so long as Russian vital interests are respected. But Russia wants to create a Eurasian economic and political zone where Moscow sets the overall agenda.

The recovery of the Russian economy from the 1998 crash coupled with high oil prices over the last several years have given Russian economic conglomerates a good deal of cash with which to purchase key economic assets in Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and the Central Asian states, as well as in the former "Soviet bloc" countries of eastern Europe. In some cases, this process has been aided by the departure of U.S. and European firms which have sold assets--in Georgia, Lithuania and Bulgaria, for example. Russian influence has also grown in the last several years as leaders in other Eurasian states uncertain of their own position have sought to improve relations with Moscow. For the first time since the Soviet collapse, Russia now has real opportunities to shape everything from the composition of governments to the promulgation of economic policies in the other Eurasian states.

Russia has been using these levers to try to bring about the following outcomes. Its principal goals are to ensure that no other Eurasian state can obstruct Russian engagement with the outside world through its territory and that no foreign troops are based anywhere in Eurasia unless such a deployment occurs with Russian blessing (for example, to combat international terrorism). No Eurasian state should belong to a military bloc or alliance of which Russia is not also a member. In this regard, Russia has promoted the development of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)--bringing together Russia, China and the Central Asian states--as a more preferable alternative for enhancing collective security in the region than the U.S.-sponsored GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Moldova) grouping. (And there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the SCO has been more effective, from promoting anti-terrorist cooperation to laying the groundwork for closer economic cooperation among its members, than GUUAM, despite active U.S. assistance to the latter organization.)