The similarity between China’s emerging nuclear doctrine and that of Putin’s Russia is increasingly evident. Delete the words “likely” and “probably” in the Commission assessment and what remains is very similar to President Putin’s nuclear escalation strategy. According to paragraph 19 of Putin’s June 2020 decree on nuclear deterrence states:

The conditions specifying the possibility of nuclear weapons use by the Russian Federation are as follows: a) arrival of reliable data on a launch of ballistic missiles attacking the territory of the Russian Federation and/or its allies; b) use of nuclear weapons or other types of weapons of mass destruction by an adversary against the Russian Federation and/or its allies; c) attack by adversary against critical governmental or military sites of the Russian Federation, disruption of which would undermine nuclear forces response actions; d) aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy.

 

The United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission also noted the significance of the Chinese nuclear buildup stating that, “Beijing’s pursuit of space-based nuclear weapons and potential development of low-yield warheads could also complicate U.S. deterrence by offering the PLA greater flexibility to threaten or engage in limited nuclear use against U.S. forces in the region.”

The Pentagon’s recognition of this is recent and its full significance is absent in the Pentagon’s China reports. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review report stated that, “Our tailored strategy for China is designed to prevent Beijing from mistakenly concluding that it could secure an advantage through the limited use of its theater nuclear capabilities or that any use of nuclear weapons, however limited, is acceptable.” However, in 2018, the massive Chinese ICBM silo construction program and some of its other nuclear programs had not become apparent and the Pentagon’s threat assessment failed to recognize the scope of Chinese plans for MIRVing.

There was evidence that China has been moving toward this for decades, some of it is even appears in the annual Pentagon China reports, at least in an understated manner. In 2002, in a book on the Chinese military, China expert David Shambaugh wrote that Chinese military doctrine “…envisions use of tactical nuclear weapons in a battlefield environment – either airbursts or fired from artillery,” and that China “envisions offensive limited nuclear war-fighting….at a regional, intermediate-range, theater level.” A 2004 publication of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s Second Artillery (now called the Rocket Force), The Science of the Second Artillery Campaigns, became available in the West about 15 years ago. The text is unclassified in the United States, but apparently it is classified as “Confidential” in China and used for nuclear force officer training. The text makes it clear that China’s “no first use” policy will be abandoned in wartime. The document says, “The basic assault force” which would be made up of several missile brigades “…should possess strong combat capability, be fully outfitted, and possess ranges that meet nuclear counter strike requirements, and be able to assure first strike effectiveness.” (Emphasis added). It discusses “adjusting” or “reducing” the nuclear use threshold in wartime to deter conventional weapons attack.

In 2005, Colonel Wen Shang-hsien of the Taiwanese military stated that after the year 2000, China had adopted a nuclear doctrine which allowed for “a preemptive strike strategy” under which the China would use “…its tactical nuclear weapons in regional wars if necessary.”

In 2007, Chinese Major General Cai Yuqiu, Vice Principal of Nanjing Army Command College, stated, “As to whether we will use nuclear weapons first, the above principle can also be followed. If we have been repeatedly ‘attacked,’ then there should not be a limit for our counter-attack.”

The 2009 edition of the Pentagon report stated that “…periodic PRC military and civilian academic debates have occurred over whether a ‘no first use’ policy supports or detracts from China’s deterrent, and whether or not ‘no first use’ should remain in place. Questions also continue regarding whether or not a conventional strike on China’s strategic forces would nullify China’s ‘no first use’ pledge. These debates add a further layer of ambiguity to China’s strategic intentions for its nuclear forces.”

The 2010 version of the Pentagon’s China report stated, “However, there is some ambiguity over the conditions under which China’s NFU policy would or would not apply, including for example, whether strikes on what China considers its own territory, demonstration strikes, or high altitude bursts would constitute a first use. Moreover, some PLA officers have written publicly of the need to spell out conditions under which China might need to use nuclear weapons—for example, if an enemy’s conventional attack threatened the survival of China’s nuclear force, or of the regime itself. However, there has been no indication that national leaders are willing to attach such nuances and caveats to China’s ‘no first use’ doctrine.” This was included in many other editions of the report.

In 2011, Japan’s Kyoto New Agency reported that it had obtained classified Chinese documents which indicated that China’s strategic missile forces “will adjust the nuclear threat policy if a nuclear missile-possessing country carries out a series of air strikes against key strategic targets in our country with absolutely superior conventional weapons…” That year, the Pentagon’s China report noted that “there is some ambiguity” over the conditions under which China’s no first use policy would apply, “including whether strikes on what China considers its own territory, demonstration strikes, or high altitude bursts would constitute a first use.”

The 2017 edition of the Pentagon’s China report stated, “Some PLA officers have written publicly of the need to spell out conditions under which China might need to use nuclear weapons first; for example, if an enemy’s conventional attack threatened the survival of China’s nuclear force or of the regime itself.”

In 2021, then-STRATCOM Commander Admiral Charles Richard stated that Chinese capabilities are “…very inconsistent with a no first use policy and the implied minimum deterrent strategy that follows.” Also, in 2021, General John Hyten warned that China could launch a surprise nuclear attack on the U.S. noting that the new Chinese orbital hypersonic weapon and the new silos “look like a first-use weapon[s].”

In 2023, General Cotton observed, “Significantly, the PRC’s investment in lower-yield, precision systems with theater ranges points to investment in asymmetric capabilities that could be employed coercively during an escalation crisis, similar to Russia’s irresponsible nuclear saber-rattling during its war against Ukraine.”

Conclusion

At the end of the Cold War, China was way behind the United States in missile and nuclear weapons technology but this has changed because of decades of massive Chinese investment in these capabilities with the United States going into the opposite direction. China appears to be on the verge of exceeding the United States in nuclear weapons numbers. The report of the Strategic Posture Commission is an important step in recognizing the scope and significance of this problem.

Dr Sari Arho Havrén, Royal United Services Institute Associate Fellow, has observed that, “….China may have learned from Moscow’s capitalisation on European fear regarding Russian nuclear weapons in order to, at a minimum, delay help for Ukraine. Similarly, triggering fear by threatening the use of nuclear weapons could rein in Japan’s and other US allies’ willingness to defend Taiwan, if the People’s Liberation Army tries to take the island by force.”

China’s opposition to Putin’s use of nuclear weapons in the Ukraine war appears to be self- serving. China probably does not want to risk overturning the apple cart when things are clearly moving in China’s direction. According to Admiral Richard, “…it isn't going to be very long before we're going to get tested in ways that we haven't been tested in a long time,” and “As I assess our level of deterrence against China, the ship is slowly sinking.” The Biden Administration’s nuclear deterrence policy clearly minimizes the deterrent to future Chinese nuclear escalation if China needs to do so to win. The Biden Administration’s assertion that the United States can deter nuclear escalation with space capabilities (apparently not weapons) and cyber capabilities borders on the ridiculous.

About the Author

Dr. Mark B. Schneider is a Senior Analyst with the National Institute for Public Policy. Before his retirement from the Department of Defense Senior Executive Service, Dr. Schneider served as Principal Director for Forces Policy, Principal Director for Strategic Defense, Space and Verification Policy, Director for Strategic Arms Control Policy and Representative of the Secretary of Defense to the Nuclear Arms Control Implementation Commission. He also served in the senior Foreign Service as a Member of the State Department Policy Planning Staff.

This article was first published by RealClearDefense.

Image: Creative Commons.