Since the antitank rifle was an imperfect answer, the Red Army developed new tactics and doctrine to enhance their effectiveness. The antitank rifle required a two-man crew consisting of a gunner and loader. Compared to large-caliber antitank cannons, the antitank rifle crew could put its weapon into action more quickly and fire its rounds faster than the cannon. The crew could be readily concealed since the antitank rifles were relatively small and sat low to the ground. One drawback of this low profile was the amount of dust or snow kicked up by the muzzle blast. In the dry conditions of a Russian summer or the snow-covered landscapes of winter, the muzzle blast could easily give away the gunner’s position and draw deadly counterfire. To solve this dilemma, soldiers could wet the ground around their position or place a blanket or poncho under the muzzle area.

In one well-documented case published in the Red Star, a Russian unit reported success using squads of soldiers armed with three antitank rifles. The weapons would be placed 15 to 20 yards apart, far enough to keep them from being knocked out en masse by enemy fire but still close enough to allow them to concentrate their fire on the same part of a single target. Massing their fire allowed these teams to have a greater chance of disabling a tank than a single shooter. Gunners often let tanks rumble past their position so that they could target the thinner armor in the rear.

Russian infantry also used the antitank rifles in defensive positions. The Red Army supplied its artillery batteries with them to give them a weapon that could be repositioned quickly if necessary to fend off a flank attack by enemy armor. Artillery officers usually tried to position them with the best fields of fire toward a direction where tank attack seemed most likely, such as along roads and open fields. When placing antitank rifles in a trench system, circular pits were dug to allow the weapon 360-degree traverse. Each position was connected to rifle and machine-gun positions to provide supporting fire. The leftover dirt would be used to create false positions to distract enemy fire. When possible, the antitank rifles would be tied into a layered defense with antitank mines, obstacles, and other weapons in the hopes of luring German panzers into kill zones where they could be immobilized and destroyed in succession.

Just as in other armies, the Russians published pamphlets containing lessons learned for their soldiers. Allied armies frequently swapped tips to help their respective soldiers improve their combat performance. The November 1942 issue of the Intelligence Bulletin contained a list of key tips from Russian antitank riflemen. The list stressed teamwork between the gunner and loader. It also advised the crews to let enemy tanks approach to within 200 yards so as to make their hits more effective and advised targeting the lead tank on a narrow road to block the path of following vehicles.

Further instructions included where to aim and how to lead a target. If a tank was moving at 36 miles per hour, which was roughly the top speed for many light and medium tanks, the gunner would have to lead the target by one yard for every 100 yards of range. Examination of German tanks revealed firing at the center of the rear half of the tank made it more likely a shot would damage the engine, while a shot to the rear of the turret was more likely to hit the tank’s ammunition or gunner. The 14.5mm round was heavy enough that corrections for wind were generally unnecessary at ranges under 400 yards. Soldiers aware of such details could increase the chance of damaging a panzer.

Both antitank rifles proved equally effective in combat, enough so that almost a quarter million were manufactured during 1942 alone. Although it might seem the semi-automatic PTRS would be the preferred weapon of the two, the PTRD’s simpler operation and robust construction placed it above its more complex brother. The PTRD was also lighter and a little smaller, making it easier to operate overall. With a trained crew, the single-shot weapon could fire fast enough to get the job done, eight to 10 rounds per minute being easily possible. Eventually production shifted exclusively to the PTRD, though both weapons remained in service through the end of the war.

As the war progressed, the Russians and Germans began a tank arms race, each side racing to construct ever more powerful tanks with thicker armor as well as more powerful antitank guns to defeat the thicker armor. In this circular competition, the antitank rifles gradually became obsolete. New tanks such as the Panzer V “Panther” possessed thick, sloped armor and most of the various tank destroyers the Germans were producing in 1943 and the years after were equally well protected. The Red Army had to accept that the antitank rifle had fallen hopelessly behind the curve. By late 1944 production of the weapon type ceased altogether.

Although their usefulness as a tank killer was over, the PTRD and PTRS were far from useless on the battlefield. Even with the manufacturing lines closed, there were hundreds of thousands of them still in the hands of soldiers. Even in the cauldron of the Eastern Front tanks were not everywhere, but trucks, half-tracks, armored cars, and tractors were common enough. Antitank rifles had always been used against these softer targets when the opportunity arose and they continued in this role. They therefore became what in modern military parlance are called antimaterial rifles. In this fashion, both designs served until the end of the war.

After World War II, the Soviets distributed both weapons to their allies around the world. Both the North Korean and Chinese armies used them during the Korean War. During this conflict an enterprising American ordnance officer, Captain William Brophy, wanted to create a long-range sniper rifle. Brophy was a World War II veteran of the Pacific and a competitive shooter since the 1930s, so he knew such a rifle was possible. The existing .30-caliber weapons were simply inadequate for the distances he contemplated. He took a captured PTRD and fitted it with the barrel from an American .50-calliber machine gun along with a scope. The weapon worked, and Brophy was able to hit targets as far out as 2,000 yards. The U.S. Army subsequently tested the hybrid at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland.

The Soviet antitank rifles seemed to fade from the battlefield as newer antitank weapons, such as the rocket-propelled grenades, took precedence. They can still be seen in museums. Some are in the hands of private collectors, a few of whom still shoot them. A quick Internet search reveals videos of them being fired, showing the noise and muzzle blast to good effect.

The Soviet Union was renowned for keeping old weapons in storage against future need and the PTRD and PTRS are no exception. Stories abound of vast warehouses holding hundreds of thousands of old small arms, many of which hit the world’s arms markets after the Soviet Union disintegrated. While the veracity of these tales is open to dispute, there is no doubt old Soviet weapons continue to surface. During the war in Eastern Ukraine, a video of soldiers inspecting a weapons cache showed machine guns, rifles, RPGs, and a battered-looking PTRD sitting atop an armored vehicle.

The antitank rifle led a relatively short life in combat because it just was not powerful enough to keep up with the rapidly advancing size of the tank itself. There were several other designs that are nothing more than footnotes in military history. The Soviet PTRD and PTRS have enjoyed longer lives than any of those designs. These venerable antitank rifles still manage to appear in conflicts more than 70 years after they were hurriedly designed and put into the hands of Red Army soldiers in an effort to slow the German blitzkrieg.

Originally Published January 17, 2019

This article by Christopher Miskimon originally appeared on the Warfare History Network.

Image: Reuters