It is yet unclear whether or not China gave its tacit approval to Kim Jong-un’s decision to send roughly 10,000 elite North Korean troops to fight for Russia in Kursk. 

The force, by all accounts, will be insufficient to independently turn the tide of the battle, but it will make a substantive difference in further grinding down on dwindling Ukrainian supplies and forces. The move signals that China might be losing some influence over two states often perceived as their junior partners, Russia and North Korea. 

Indeed, many have remarked in recent months that relations between China and the DPRK have grown chillier. China’s ambassador notably skipped the annual celebrations around the anniversary of the signing of the Korean armistice earlier this year. Trade between Korea and China has also not yet recovered to pre-COVID levels, even as Korean-Russian trade has skyrocketed, although China continues to dominate the vast majority of North Korea's exports and imports. 

As always, China has not directly spoken out against the decision. Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Lin Jian has fastidiously refused to comment on the development beyond urging peace and restraint. When asked about the growing closeness between North Korea and Russia, he simply replied that those were two sovereign countries with the right to grow closer if they wish. 

Nonetheless, Beijing consistently downplays North Korea’s ability to meaningfully help Russia. Furthermore, Xi Jinping excluded traditional language in a letter to Kim that refers to North Korea as a, “friendly neighboring country.” 

The Chinese ambassador to the United States also put out a curious statement the day Secretary Austin confirmed DPRK troops were in Russia. The statement dismissed the idea that there was an axis of upheaval tying China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran together. While propagandistic, the statement is interesting for its timing and potential signal that China wants to distance itself, however minimally, from the grouping of revisionist states.  

The EU and NATO have already started to push China to reign its dependents in, with the threat of increased military activity in the Indo-Pacific as retribution. Kim’s decision has drawn South Korea closer into the West’s orbit and deepened linkages between the “Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific” theaters, in Secretary General of NATO Mark Rutte’s words. And the bad news continues for China also from Europe after the European External Action Service, the diplomatic corps of the EU, confirmed earlier this month that China was directly supplying Russia with lethal aid for its war effort, a major redline for which they have warned there would be significant consequences. 

The European Parliament censured Beijing’s military exercises around Taiwan, rejecting their interpretation of the “One-China Policy,” and condemned the ongoing genocide of Uyghur Muslims in China’s far-western province of Xinjiang. The European Union also approved, over Beijing’s sharp objection, thirty-four percent tariffs on Chinese Electric Vehicle exports. They hinted that a swath of other industries, including timber, tin, steel, and chemicals, would be subject to similar investigations and duties in the coming years unless Beijing’s unfair business practices changed. NATO also invited several defense ministers from its Indo-Pacific Partners to participate in a joint summit for the first time. 

The European-China relationship is souring and looks set to get worse. The confirmation hearings for several prominent European Commissioners included numerous rebukes of China.  All of this spells trouble for China, in its relationship with NATO, its freedom to operate in the Indo-Pacific, and, perhaps most importantly for China’s slowing economy, its trade relationship with Europe. 

What is more, for all the reasons why Chinese-DPRK relations are strained, China can ill afford to undertake a true pressure campaign on the volatile Kim. With Kim’s escalating rhetoric about war with the South and the West, China needs its leverage to preserve peace in its backyard and cannot afford to be seen alienating its only treaty ally. This places China in a serious bind without any real options except to hope that the EU and U.S. lose momentum in their concerted push to address Beijing’s role in the war against Ukraine. 

The election of Donald Trump could portend some good things for China, as Europe now faces the potential of two trade wars if it continues to escalate its defense against Chinese anti-market practices and cannot close a deal with Trump to avert his promised twenty percent tariffs. 

Nonetheless, Trump’s victory also raises the stakes for China: China continues to depend on trade with Europe as a dumping ground for their manufactured goods, as well as imports of several sensitive technologies and other goods and services from Europe. 

Now, however, it seems that their actions, as well as those outside their control, will continue to complicate the economic and security relationship with Europe, at a time when the international system as a whole is growing more hostile to Chinese imports, the Chinese economy is slowing, and security ties between China’s rivals are tightening.  

About the Authors 

Liana Fix is a fellow for Europe at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). She is a historian and political scientist, with expertise in German and European foreign and security policy, European security, transatlantic relations, Russia, Eastern Europe, and European China policy. Dr. Fix is also the author of A New German Power. Germany’s Role in European Russia Policy (Palgrave Macmillan, 2021). She is an adjunct faculty member at Georgetown University in the Center for German and European Studies and the Center for Eurasian, Russian, and East European Studies. 

Benjamin Harris is a Research Associate for U.S. Foreign Policy and Europe at the Council on Foreign Relations. He graduated from Stanford University with a BA in International Relations focusing on Northeast Asia and International Security.  

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