Ukraine’s bold move into Russian territory has given the country and its supporters a much-needed morale boost, but one that is accompanied by a clear recognition of the risks involved. It’s clear though that for now, the incursion has brought multiple positive results for Ukraine.  

For all the drama of shifts in the front line after a long period of stasis, the greatest impact may be psychological, in how the war is seen to be progressing among three key audiences: Russia, Ukraine, and Ukraine’s international backers. The incursion shows clearly that Ukraine is not a passive victim but can take the initiative, and this in itself may bolster the confidence of Ukraine’s wobbly supporters that backing Kyiv is the right choice. Confidence is also vital at home, since morale and resilience, and the astonishing endurance of the Ukrainian people, are a decisive factor in Kyiv’s ability to sustain the war.  

Taking Russian prisoners is a significant element of this. With both military and civilian Ukrainian prisoners subjected to systematic torture by Russia, their return is a permanent concern in Ukrainian society, leading to noticeable pressure on the government to arrange their release. The capture of large numbers of Russian soldiers including conscripts has meant that Ukraine is now negotiating prisoner exchanges from a position of advantage, which has led to a swift reinvigoration of the process. This too will provide a significant boost to morale and resilience within Ukraine.  

Russia’s early response to the incursion was characterized by confusion and incapacity. That in itself provides Ukraine with valuable information to inform future operations against Russia. In particular, it underscores how bold maneuvers in the right front-line sector can overcome Russia's advantages in numbers.  

Even so, expectations that Russia would be forced to pull forces from other front sectors to respond to the incursion have been only partially justified. Russia is still trying to advance towards Pokrovsk, whose significance has been described in similar terms to the sieges of Bakhmut and Avdiivka before it. But the continued push in that sector has obscured the fact that elsewhere along the front line, Russia's offensive has largely subsided. 

In addition, the incursion has clearly shown that Russian manpower reserves are not inexhaustible, and the results of other Russian responses may not be immediately visible. Russia will be left with little option but to bolster other sectors of the border to avoid another embarrassing demonstration of its inability to protect its territory and citizens. That ought to include not only forces directly on the border but also an operational reserve ready to respond to incursions. All of these will reduce the availability of Russian forces to continue offensives within Ukraine.  

On the Front

Meanwhile, around Pokrovsk itself, Ukrainian forces are sporadically falling back, but not before inflicting substantial costs on the advancing Russian troops. The process shows the value of holding territory not only for its operational significance but for the number of casualties Russia will incur while trying to take it. Part of Ukraine’s essential task is to destroy Russia’s land forces faster than Russia can reconstitute them and thus not only preserve Ukraine itself but contribute to the safety of the whole continent by continuing to defer the date when Vladimir Putin may feel those forces are ready and able to attack beyond Ukraine. 

Another objective successfully achieved was the prevention of Russian attacks; both disrupting preparations for a Russian offensive that Ukraine says was to be launched from the region, and creating a security zone to end the cross-border shelling that had been taking a steady toll in destruction and lives lost on the Ukrainian side of the border.  

Fighting on Russia’s territory has comprehensively put an end to suggestions that this could be a circumstance that could prompt Moscow to radical escalation. Crossing the border has joined the long list of other supposed red lines that have now themselves been irrevocably crossed. But the secondary benefits of proving that point have, as yet, been limited. Ukraine’s most committed backers needed no further convincing, while those most fearful of “provoking” Russia, such as the United States and Germany, cannot be convinced—as I conclude in a forthcoming book, Who Will Defend Europe? 

They have already decided that it is not in their broader strategic interest for Russia to be defeated.

Biting Off More than Ukraine Can Chew?

All of these achievements are balanced with risk. After the first couple of weeks of the incursion, Ukraine resisted the temptation to push further into Russia and focused on digging in and consolidating what it had gained. Nevertheless, concerns persist that Ukrainian forces have over-extended and left their thinly stretched troops vulnerable, especially now that Russia is building up its efforts to counterattack.  

When that counterattack comes, it will be determined and persistent. Kyiv has stated clearly that while Ukraine aims to retain Russian territory under its control for now, it has no long-term ambition to hold or occupy it. But for as long as it does so, Ukraine holds a trump card when it comes to any eventual ceasefire negotiations with Russia. At the same time, Moscow still needs to be alert to the possibility that the Kursk incursion may not be the last or only attempt by Ukraine to set a new reality along the front line by way of incursions.  

Kyiv knows the clock is ticking, and it has a limited time to maximize its advantage. The support Ukraine enjoys from the United States, although conditional, remains greater by volume than from any other coalition partner, but Ukraine has to make the best possible use of it while it is available before the November presidential election and the possible abrupt end of U.S. backing. And as ever, it must guard against the danger that the outcome of the war will be dictated not through Ukrainians’ efforts, however courageous or audacious, but through their Western backers deciding enough is enough and that it is time to surrender to Putin. All of this means that the move into Kursk Oblast may not be the last bold stroke we see from Ukraine in the coming weeks.  

About the Author

Keir Giles is a Senior Consulting Fellow with the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House. Previously, he worked with the BBC Monitoring Service and the UK Defence Academy, where he wrote and advised on the Russian military threat to its neighbors and adversaries further afield. Keir has authored multiple publications over the last two decades explaining and predicting the Russian approach to conflict and warfare. His next book is "Who Will Defend Europe?" (Hurst, 2024) considering Russia's next war after Ukraine.

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