The plan risks immediate pushback, political as well as potentially violent, from Palestinian groups in the West Bank and Gaza, depending on how quickly Israel moves toward implementing parts of the proposal. The White House is pressuring Israel to implement parts of the plan within six weeks. In the worst-case scenario for Palestinian leaders who want to see an end to annexation, Trump's plan will just serve as an excuse for Israel to move forward with annexation of some parts of the West Bank once the Palestinians are blamed for being obstructionist if they don't go along with it. Indeed, Netanyahu said on Jan. 28 that he will move forward as soon as the coming week with annexing the Jordan River Valley and other West Bank settlements. Palestinian leadership will want to push back but their ability to do so is limited, especially because Palestinian political factions are trying to preserve what support they have among the Arab Gulf states and from Turkey, neither of which will support outright violence against Israel but will likely turn a blind eye to popular demonstrations in the West Bank and Gaza against the plan that could grow violent.

 There are near-term impacts for the Israeli and Palestinian political spheres as well. The plan has the potential to give a small boost to Netanyahu or his rival Benny Gantz in Israeli elections on March 2 and will help Trump court the vocal pro-Israel part of his base before November's presidential election. The Israeli election, the third in a year's time thanks to the repeated failure to form a government, will be subject to the same public currents that shaped the last two elections; right-leaning policies that are tough on security vis-a-vis the Palestinians polled well then and will poll well now. For the Palestinians, the plan's introduction could create an opening for a more hard-line government in Ramallah if the Palestinians feel they lack other options. It is fitting that the architect of the two-state solution from the Palestinian side — Mahmoud Abbas, a longtime negotiator for the Palestinian Liberation Organization and current Palestinian Authority president — is aging and nearing the likely end of his term just as the two-state solution he envisioned faces a likely demise. Faced with the common threat of an emboldened Israel, rival Palestinian parties and militant groups Fatah and Hamas might even paper over some of their profound differences in the name of finding strength through cooperation.

Long-Term Impact

The Trump plan's major implication is that it legitimizes the process of Israeli annexation of West Bank territory that's been a de facto reality for years. The plan underscores how far the goalposts have moved over the past few decades on the fundamental tenets of the Israeli-Palestinian peace issue, from a discussion between two sides willing to negotiate to a stalemate between two increasingly hard-line positions. Of the handful of traditional issues underpinning long-stagnant peace talks — including security, borders, the return of refugees and the status of Jerusalem — Trump's plan leans in favor of the current Israeli government's preferred policies on all of them. This codification means it will be difficult to walk back or change the basic pillars of the conversation on peace if future U.S. or Israeli governments wish to move in a different direction.

The newly unveiled plan could also mark a breaking point between Arab states and the Palestinians they rhetorically support. Arab Gulf states will struggle to say no outright to a plan put forth by Washington, an ally they need and want, and Israel, a quiet ally they increasingly have built ties with in recent years, even if they view its policies as entirely unfair to the Palestinians. Ambassadors from Bahrain, Oman and the United Arab Emirates attended the announcement of the Trump plan at the White House, and the Arab League will meet on Feb. 2 to discuss it. No Arab or Muslim state wants to overtly oppose Palestinian claims to their territory, but no Middle Eastern state wants to risk its own diplomatic or economic standing with the more powerful United States in favor of being a patron for the Palestinians. Even the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, which have the regional sway and gravitas to make a difference, likely won't move dramatically in favor of the Palestinians. Part of the reason is the issue no longer matters from the view of the region's population. Among the traditional patrons of the Palestinian cause — Jordan, Egypt, Syria and the Arab Gulf states, and to a lesser extent Lebanon and Turkey — the Palestinian issue is no longer as galvanizing as it once was.