The primary question surrounding the U.S. government’s authorization for the Ukrainian military to fire ATACMS missiles into Russian territory is how will it escalate the war. Will Russia respond with nuclear weapons? That question is undoubtedly on the minds of NATO leaders, not least because their Russian counterparts constantly raise it. 

Russian spokespersons, up to Vladimir Putin, have responded to past changes of tactics with threats to “react accordingly.” Similar warnings have followed announcements of NATO states supplying tanks, fighter aircraft, and other missile systems. 

Russia has responded to past weapons announcements in three ways: destroy Ukrainian civilian infrastructure, appeal to allies for support, and threaten nuclear war. 

Russian missiles have rained down on Ukrainian civilian sites in the aftermath of announcements about Western weapons, leading to the deaths of thousands of Ukrainians. Such attacks are intended to reduce Ukraine’s motivation and capability to continue the war. However, that tactic has hardened Ukrainians’ resolve, as seen in the July 2024 Ukrainian incursion into the Kursk Oblast, and has been met with NATO states supplying more capable weapons. 

Russia has reached out to allies, especially Iran, China, and North Korea, to supplement its weapons supplies and personnel numbers. However, the need for that help is itself an indicator of Russia’s weakness. The infusion of up to 100,000 North Korean troops in Russia’s military force may bolster troop numbers but is a sign of cracks in Russia’s ability to staff its army independently. 

The most potent response Russia has given has been to threaten nuclear war. In light of Russian troops’ inept performance on the battlefield, a nuclear deterrent is the only lever Russia has left to salvage its dignity and dignity is a foundational Russian national security priority. Nuclear threats have been effective in preventing wider NATO involvement because calling Russia’s bluff has potentially devastating consequences. 

What if Russia follows through on threats? 

On November 19, 2024, just after the U.S. announcement, Putin signed a new nuclear weapons doctrine. The doctrine specifies that Russia would use nuclear weapons as a deterrent if a nuclear power is planning to attack Russia, that is expected. But it goes further to threaten the use of nuclear weapons if a non-nuclear power that is backed by a nuclear power, obviously referring to Ukraine, is planning an attack and repelling even a conventional attack that threatens Russia’s sovereignty. 

Why is the new doctrine appearing now? 

The announcement of the doctrine led Putin to issue yet another threat to use nuclear weapons and to raise the specter of World War III. The formal doctrine aligns with statements Russian leaders have been making since before the invasion. But Russia has never responded with nuclear weapons, despite Dmitriy Medvedev’s claim that nuclear threats are not a bluff. Is the public doctrine another brick in Russia’s crumbling nuclear deterrent? Is it just another claim that Russia is not bluffing? 

The new doctrine and its public unveiling are messaging to make a nuclear deterrent appear credible. However, Russian leaders know that using nuclear weapons in Ukraine would unleash a response on Russia that it could never sustain. They understand the Cold War doctrine of mutually assured destruction and have little intent to commit suicide.  

Russian leaders have set “red lines” in the past that NATO states have routinely crossed. How far are the United States and NATO willing to go to call Russia’s bluff? ATACMS is the latest move. But what is Putin’s tipping point? 

So far, NATO has not found it. 

About the Author: 

Kevin Riehle is a lecturer in Intelligence and International Security at Brunel University London. He writes on Soviet and Russian intelligence and national security history. His latest book is The Russian FSB: A Concise History of the Federal Security Service. 

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