Summary and Key Points: The concept of a new "Axis of Evil" comprising China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia poses a significant threat to the U.S., potentially leading to a multi-front war for which the U.S. is unprepared. Historically, the U.S. was equipped to handle two major regional conflicts (MRCs) simultaneously, relying heavily on the Marine Corps' combined arms capabilities.

-However, since 2019, the Marine Corps has shifted focus away from its traditional roles, divesting key combat capabilities to adopt a China-centric strategy.

-This change, coupled with the Navy’s amphibious shipbuilding challenges, has left the U.S. at a strategic disadvantage, sparking concern among military experts and analysts.

The Marine Corps’ Strategic Shift: Are We Ready for a Two-Front War?

The term "axis of evil" (AOE) originally coined by President George W. Bush in response to the attacks on September 11^th, 2001, included adversarial foreign governments that sponsored terrorism and sought weapons of mass destruction, namely Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. Certainly not a Warsaw Pact-like organization. However, today's axis of evil may come closer to threatening the U.S. with a multi-front war, a war we are not ready for.

The new AOE, if it exists, consists of China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. US intelligence suggests there are plans afoot to coordinate any Chinese attack against Taiwan, East China Sea, or South China Sea with military action elsewhere. The most likely candidate is Iran. Russia is otherwise engaged, and North Korea is not ready to engage in a major regional conflict (MRC),

Until 2019, the United States was reasonably well-positioned to wage a two-front war. The theory was win-hold-win. Win in the major theater (in this case, China). Hold in the secondary theater (Iran here); then win in MRC 2. 

The key to the two MRC strategy was the United States Marine Corps. The Marine Corps had several capabilities vital to the second MRC.

The Marine Corps previously had a rapid reaction air-alert capability that could put a light infantry force on the ground within twenty-four hours. This, combined with army light infantry, (82d Airborne, 101st Air Assault, and 10th Mountain divisions). These elements would act as a tripwire to discourage the adversary from crossing the line of departure or as a blocking force on the brink of hostilities.

The real Marine Corps contribution would come with the arrival of a Marine Corps Expeditionary Unit with a small, but potent combined arms team replete with armor, artillery, aviation, and assault engineers. In the Iran example, it would be the MEU stationed 24/7 in the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean region. Next would come a full combined arms capability in the form of a Maritime Pre-positioned Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MPS) with a full complement of tanks, artillery, combat aircraft, and assault engineers.

In the Iranian case (second MRC), the MPS set stationed at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean would be used. As needed, the other two MPS sets could be added to make up a full division/ air wing/ logistics team or corps-sized Marine Expeditionary force. If needed additional divisions, and air wings could reinforce the MEF as needed. This was exactly what happened in Desert Shield/Storm and Iraqi Freedom, but that capability no longer exists. 

Inexplicably, starting in 2019, the Marine Corps transformed itself from a robust combined arms team into a combination of light infantry and coastal artillery.

Even if the Marine Corps had retained the combat capabilities lost through divestment, it would have been crippled by the failure of the Navy’s amphibious shipbuilding deals made for the Marine Corps.

These divestments were made to allow the Marine Corps to implement its poorly conceived first island chain, China-centric Force Design concept that has the Corps buying anti-ship missiles for use in a blue water fight that will likely never happen.

Most naval and geopolitical experts are appalled by the concept and the resulting loss of combined arms capabilities. A recent report by the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) bemoans the loss of that combined arms combat power. This is particularly disturbing because CNA is the Federally funded research and development center think tank designated to support the Marine Corps.

Like the retired general officers who generally advise the senior active leadership, CNA was apparently cut out of the process.  Wargaming supporting Force Design minimized the lack of logistical support and the viability of platforms such as the landing ship medium. MCCDC (Marine Corps Combat Development Command), responsible for the development of future operational concepts was also absent from Force Design planning.

The Former Commandant and his team that rushed Force Design into development overlooked or willfully disregarded the nation's capability to fight and win two MRCs. Legendary Marine Corps hero "Chesty Puller" was fond of saying that "the road to Hell is paved with the good intentions of Second Lieutenants," now the same can probably be said for Four Star Generals.

About the Author 

Gary Anderson retired as Chief of Staff of the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab.

This article was first published by RealClearDefense.

Image Credit: Creative Commons.