But third, the soundest concepts will get the contenders nowhere unless they’re actionable. Weapons and people combine to form a crucial determinant of success in any conflict. Whether ideas can be executed, in other words, depends on the quality as well as quantity of matériel and people. Gauging the quality of foreign armaments poses a vexing problem. Strategist Edward Luttwak observes that military platforms and armaments amount to “black boxes” in peacetime. Forecasting how they will perform in wartime is hard in part because of deliberate secrecy. Military chieftains disclose facts about their hardware selectively, revealing just enough to leave the impression that they would be the likely winner in any contest of arms. They conceal the rest in order not to squander tactical advantages. For example, the U.S. Air Force has carefully stage-managed photos of its new B-21 Raider stealth bomber. They imply and hide much. 

It’s also impossible to say for sure how even a friendly weapon system will perform under the duress of combat, the sternest arbiter of them all. Rigor in peacetime field trials is no guarantee of success in action. 

But any widget, no matter how capable, will underperform unless operated by a skilled, motivated wielder. The finest weapon is no better than its user. A century-plus ago Admiral Bradley Fiske pointed out that only a proficient soldier, sailor, or airman can wring maximum design performance out of equipment. Individual performance is central. But people operate within organizations with ingrained cultures that shape how members of the organization go about their business. Institutional culture could help people achieve optimal performance; it could have neutral impact, neither helping nor hindering; or it might work against them. Which side curates the better fighting culture, culture of proficiency, and derring-do ethos will improve its prospects for success in a U.S.-China war. 

So with thanks to Yogi Berra, Carl von Clausewitz, and George Orwell, there are three keys to victory with no effort at prophecy. Want to win in the Western Pacific? Tend to your alliances, fashion solid ideas about warfare, and apply yourself to make sure the executors of those ideas are in fighting trim. 

About the Author: Dr. James Holmes 

Dr. James Holmes is J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the U.S. Naval War College and a Distinguished Fellow at the Brute Krulak Center for Innovation & Future Warfare, Marine Corps University. The views voiced here are his alone.

All images are Creative Commons.