Should Israel invade Gaza or not? This is not the first question to ask. Most important, now and for all future generations, is: How do we prevent events like those of October 7 from happening again? And with that question, another one immediately arises: How did we get here? How did Hamas take and retain hold of the Gaza Strip? What role did the 2005 Israeli disengagement from Gaza and other dynamics of the Israeli-Palestinian issue play in Hamas’ growth? Is it possible to completely dissociate Gaza residents from the Hamas leadership, as many Western politicians and pundits like to do? Most likely not. Gazans democratically elected Hamas to power in 2006. While they now express mixed support for Hamas policies, the movement has so far enjoyed popularity due to its social and welfare policies and the fact that it responds—in one way or another (many in Gaza also abhor murder and violence)—to the inhabitants’ felt need to keep the Palestinian question on the table.

More considerations are necessary before taking any decision on militarily entering Gaza. Why have successive Israeli governments proved unable to block Hamas from preparing the slaughter on what is now called the “Black Sabbath”? What has been the link between these governments’ Gaza policy and their positioning towards the Palestinian Authority? Which regional and global support has Hamas enjoyed throughout the years and ahead of the October 7 attacks?

As hinted at by the above questions, it would be delusory to think that any “crushing,” “eradication,” or “annihilation” of Hamas, if at all achievable through military means on the ground, would provide enough guarantees to avoid a similar massacre in the future. Indeed, a few commentators have pointed out in the past weeks that Hamas is also an “ideology.” While some of them have used the term to equate the movement with ISIS erroneously, the Palestinian question indeed is one, if not the main raison d’être for Hamas. As long as no progress is made in that respect, it is only a matter of time before any elimination of Hamas leaders and militants or destruction of infrastructure will be undone by new people stepping in and capabilities being redeveloped.

Without a lasting solution in sight, it is also necessary to keep in mind the costs of any protracted confrontation between the IDF and Hamas. First and foremost, the toll of lives on both sides, with Hamas’ entrenchment and reaction to a ground offensive likely leading to more Israeli losses, and it is impossible to avoid large numbers of civilian casualties in what is one of the world’s most densely populated areas. Even global players expressing their support for Israel and its “right to defend itself” will not be able to ignore such a scenario. Secondarily, the current situation has already taken a high socioeconomic toll on Israeli society, which is already facing a number of significant challenges in terms of small business survival, social welfare efficiency, healthcare, and education. A war of weeks or months can worsen the situation even further. 

Finally, Hamas’ ties in the region and elsewhere are of utmost concern. A little over a century ago, the world “slithered over the brink” into World War I after a relatively “local” conflict between Serbia and Austria-Hungary spilled over through the “activation” of several alliances, many of which were secret. Cognizant of alarming antagonisms in today’s Middle East and worldwide, anyone considering a ground offensive in Gaza would better think twice. And, in attacks not only on its southern but also northern and eastern flanks, the first to suffer heavily is bound to be Israel itself. 

Dr. Alexander Loengarov is a senior affiliated fellow at the Institute for International Law at the University of Leuven and a former European Economic and Social Committee official of the European Union. He coordinated the first rounds of the EU’s grant scheme for academic mobility with Israeli and Palestinian institutions. In addition to his thesis on the entanglement of politics and law in the issue of recognition of Palestinian statehood, he has published analysis for think tanks like the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and Israel Policy Forum, as well as opinion pieces on the Middle East and Israeli politics for the Brussels Times. His writings reflect solely his views, not those of his employers or affiliates.

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