Following the rapprochement between North Korea and the United States in 2018, relations between the two countries have noticeably cooled again since 2019. While constructive dialogue was already lacking before the outbreak of the coronavirus crisis, the pandemic and its resulting lockdowns and travel restrictions have further narrowed the space for dialogue, thus additionally complicating diplomacy with North Korea for the time being.

At the same time, however, North Korea returned to what I have described elsewhere as an “autonomy-seeking” policy (as opposed to an “influence-seeking” policy of 2018), repeatedly reaffirming the necessity (and the will) to further develop its defense capabilities. For instance, during the Fifth Plenary Meeting of Seventh Central Committee of Workers’ Party of Korea in late December 2019, Kim Jong-un essentially refused Steven Biegun’s invitation to return to the negotiation table, promised to pursue military modernization to counter the United States’ “hostile policies,” threatened to unveil a “new strategic weapon,” floated the possibility of resuming long-range ballistic missile tests, and prioritized economic self-reliance (charip) in the absence of prospects for easing of the tough international sanctions regime.

While Pyongyang has thus far restrained from both long-range ballistic missile and further nuclear tests, it has considerably ramped up the testing of conventional weapons since May 2019, testing different types of SRBMs (KN-23, KN-24, KN-25) as well as one SLBM (Pukguksong-3). The question remains whether North Korea, in the year of U.S. presidential elections and the celebration of the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Korean Workers’ Party, intends to put more immediate pressure on Washington by conducting further nuclear and/or long-range missile tests. In view of the upcoming presidential elections, Donald Trump certainly hopes that North Korea will not cross this red line. Given North Korea’s continued progress in expanding its conventional weapons program and the absence of tangible progress towards the country’s denuclearization, the freeze in North Korean nuclear and long-range ballistic missile tests ultimately is Trump’s only achievement. Should Pyongyang conduct such a test before the November election, Trump’s North Korea diplomacy will be seen as having failed entirely—and it should be assumed that the decisionmakers in Pyongyang are well aware that this vulnerability represents a source of leverage that could be exploited.

Ultimately, North Korea’s actions will depend on whether strategic or domestic political considerations prevail. That is, if the current situation is perceived as relatively permissive and stable and thus considered preferable to any expected retaliation associated with a major provocation. On the other hand, if Kim Jong-un perceives his domestic position to be vulnerable, he may conclude that major provocations could reinforce his power at home by demonstrating strength and resolve. In any case, given that North Korea continues to view its nuclear weapons as “essential” and is therefore not intend in giving them up without a fundamental transformation of U.S.-North Korea relations, Washington is faced with the choice of either compromising below the maximum goal of full denuclearization, continue to sideline the North Korea issue as long as there is no additional nuclear or ICBM test, or escalate militarily.

While for both Trump and Kim a tangible foreign policy success would be important, current developments, characterized by missile tests, an absence of negotiations, and a global health crisis that have turned the focus of both Washington and Pyongyang inwards leave little room for a diplomatic breakthrough in the near term. With a crucial election ahead, Trump is unlikely to want to risk either a failure in negotiations or enter into a military conflict with unpredictable consequences. In the coming months, he is therefore likely to continue his efforts to by and large ignore the nuclear conflict and thus practice his own version of “muddling through.”

Eric Ballbach is a research fellow at the Institute of Korean Studies.

Image: Reuters.