Why North Korea Loves Donald Trump's So-Called America First Strategy

Reuters
August 17, 2020 Topic: Security Region: Asia Blog Brand: Korea Watch Tags: North KoreaSouth KoreaDonald TrumpAmerica FirstWar

Why North Korea Loves Donald Trump's So-Called America First Strategy

President Donald Trump’s America First policy has strained allied relationships across the globe, leading to the announced withdrawal of thousands of troops from European ally and powerhouse Germany. Alliance-undercutting policies have enormous consequences globally but could prove especially costly on the Korean Peninsula.

The United States and the Republic of Korea have been facing off over irreconcilable differences for over a year. Rumors about Kim Jung-un’s health and speculation over North Korean succession brought renewed interest to the peninsula that one of the United States’ staunchest allies and greatest enemies cohabitate. But battles over finances have put a once stable U.S.-South Korea relationship on the rocks. And American hard-lining over South Korea’s contribution to United States Forces Korea operations is turning the South Korean public against the United States. This breakdown isn’t just putting long-standing alliances at risk, it is lending strength to enemies and competitors.

South Korea has historically been a strategic stronghold for the United States, with military bases positioned for an East Asia and Pacific presence. Checking China, maintaining open sea lanes, deterring a nuclear North Korea—U.S. objectives in the region are broad, including interests from security to commerce. But the current administration’s approach to international relationships is changing all of that, and the winner in this relational death by a thousand cuts is not the United States; it’s North Korea.

President Donald Trump’s America First policy has strained allied relationships across the globe, leading to the announced withdrawal of thousands of troops from European ally and powerhouse Germany. Alliance-undercutting policies have enormous consequences globally but could prove especially costly on the Korean Peninsula, where South Korea has historically made its commitment to U.S. exclusivity clear despite pressure from overbearing neighbors. Even when China punished South Korea economically for the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense missile deployment, costing South Korea almost $25 billion, their commitment to the alliance didn’t waver.

But as Trump asks President Moon Jae-in’s government for a dramatic increase in monetary contribution to U.S. military operations in South Korea—where it is less expensive to house soldiers and sailors than in the United States—South Korean patience is growing thin and communication is breaking down. Korean public opinion has soured to the enormous demands and is increasing pressure on the government to not give more ground than is necessary. Any good relationship counselor would see red flags, but separation is not viable for either party. For the United States, the strategic value of South Korea cannot be overstated. For South Korea, the deterrent value of U.S. forces is inimitable.

And the United States is already ceding ground in other areas of interest. China is resuming its preeminent role in the region, and the United States has been slow to react to their forgone Pacific hegemony. Economically, China is already in the driver’s seat in the Asia-Pacific region, and even countries cozy with the United States can’t afford to lose Chinese trade, including South Korea. This financial dependency on China isn’t burgeoning. It’s a fact. And putting U.S. ties under more pressure by badgering allies isn’t going to help the United States maintain their footing in the region.

As regional naval power grows, China’s in particular, there will be even greater threats to the freedom of navigation that the United States, and the world, relies on to move goods through both the East and South China Seas. Roughly one-third of all maritime trade passes through the South China Sea, so ceding both relational and tangible ground (or water) to China by jeopardizing the U.S. foothold in the region flies in the face of U.S. security and commerce interests.

And then there is North Korea—arguably the biggest beneficiary in this mad dash to alienate friends. Most recently, North Korea has capitalized on the quarreling between the United States and South Korea by pressuring South Korea to ban leaflet dropping, a key exercise in getting information to the North Korean public, then lashing out even when met with appeasement, partly to pressure test how far the United States will allow South Korea to be pushed. The Moon administration has proven that it prefers appeasement, so the further the United States and South Korea drift apart, the more opportunity the Kim regime has to make demands. This could have massive ramifications for trade, exposure of North Korean human-rights violations, and avoidance of war, not just on the peninsula but globally. The more control North Korea exerts over the peninsula, the less nuclear deterrence the world can count on, the less likely it is substantive steps will be taken toward denuclearization, and the more possible a second Korean War, with a nuclearized North Korea, becomes.

With huge implications hanging in the balance, a little marriage counseling for the unhappy couple might go a long way. Tactics like communication, compromise, and trust-building are all applicable. Based on negotiations so far, it seems South Korea, despite negative public opinion, is willing to negotiate in good faith and make reasonable concessions. (The offer of a 13 percent year-over-year increase is nothing to scoff at.) But it appears President Trump is not interested in working it out. Lowering a demand of cost-plus-fifty to a requested 300 percent increase is significant but not reasonable. The United States has, in an effort to appear strong, significantly weakened its position, not just in South Korea, but by extension across the Asia Pacific, emboldening North Korea.

Perhaps more than a divorce proceeding, the situation calls to mind a game of chicken. But instead of two cars speeding recklessly towards each other, South Korea is at a complete stop, head stuck out the window, yelling, “Can’t we just talk about this?” while the United States menacingly speeds toward the halted vehicle. In the end, there is only one winner in such a dangerous game: North Korea.

Camille Freestone is a Master’s Candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and a Gregory Henderson Scholar for Korean Studies. Her research and studies focus on U.S.-ROK diplomacy, nuclear nonproliferation, Asia-Pacific maritime affairs, and ROK-Japan security relations. She is currently conducting research at the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea.