Hamas, which grew out of the Muslim Brotherhood, would not exist in the violent form we know today. Still, there would be a Palestinian branch of the Brotherhood that would compete for political power the way the branches of the Brotherhood in Tunisia and Jordan (and Egypt before Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s coup) compete for power in their countries. Even the Hamas we know has shown, when given a chance, its willingness and ability to compete successfully at the ballot box rather than with guns.

Palestinian leaders, whatever their ideological coloration, would have much to lose in this alternate Middle East universe if they were to turn toward violence against Israel, in stark contrast to the desperate, nothing-to-lose nature of much Palestinian existence today. U.S.-backed Israel still would be the most militarily powerful country in the region, capable of crushing any small Palestinian state that had gone rogue. The risk of losing their much-sought state would deter its citizens and leaders from any thought of going rogue.

Terrorism in this alternative Middle East would be significantly less than what the region has actually known, given how large a share of terrorism involving the Middle East has been driven by frustrated Palestinian nationalism. The situation in the alternate Middle East would be analogous to Irish nationalist terrorism after a peace agreement was reached in which the main nationalist movement Sinn Fein became part of a power-sharing arrangement in Northern Ireland and its militant wing, the Provisional Irish Republican Army, laid down its arms. Terrorism subsequently perpetrated by fringe extremist groups that rejected the peace agreement has been a small fraction of the violence that was occurring when the PIRA was still active.

In the alternate Middle East, the multiple wars in Gaza, including the devastating one that is ongoing, would not have been fought. Nor would the multiple wars involving Israel and Lebanon have occurred since each one derived from Israel’s conflict with the Palestinians. Differences between Israel and Lebanon would be limited to negotiable matters such as where to draw the boundary line in a Mediterranean gas field. 

As for what relations between Israel and other Arab states would be like in the alternative Middle East, one does not need to speculate. The Arab League peace initiative was adopted by all Arab states twenty-two years ago, has been repeatedly reaffirmed, and is still on the table. The initiative offers full normalization between the Arab world and Israel provided that Israel withdraws from the occupied territories—with the possibility of land swaps—provides for a “just settlement” of the Palestinian refugee problem and allows the establishment of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital. The Arab neighbors are not out to destroy Israel. They are out to end the subjugation of their Palestinian brethren.

The Need to Work on the Issue

Of course, political leaders have to deal with reality, not with an imaginary alternative universe. Part of the current reality is a decades-long Israeli project of building Jewish settlements in the occupied territories, which has made the establishment of a Palestinian state more difficult than it would have been earlier. Some observers believe that it already has made a two-state solution impossible and that the realization of human and political rights for Palestinians can now be achieved only within a single state shared with Jewish Israelis. A successful one-state solution would confer all or nearly all of the benefits of the alternate Middle East described above.

Whether a two-state solution is still possible and whether a one-state solution could be devised that would satisfy the national aspirations of both Jewish Israelis and Palestinian Arabs is uncertain. However, those are questions that need to be actively and openly discussed, including by the U.S. government, with enough energy to drive toward the implementation of a solution. This means doing much more than ritually saying “two-state solution” as diplomatic boilerplate while doing nothing with U.S.-Israeli relations to bring any kind of solution closer to fruition.

What is most certain is that the Middle East will continue to be a violent place, with periodic paroxysms like it is undergoing now, as long as the subjugation of the Palestinians continues.

Paul R. Pillar retired in 2005 from a twenty-eight-year career in the U.S. intelligence community, in which his last position was as the National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia. Earlier, he served in a variety of analytical and managerial positions, including as chief of analytic units at the CIA, covering portions of the Near East, the Persian Gulf, and South Asia. His most recent book is Beyond the Water’s Edge: How Partisanship Corrupts U.S. Foreign Policy. He is also a contributing editor for this publication.

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