Fake Bullets: Why Russia's Military Looks More Powerful Than It Is

https://www.sandboxx.us/blog/russias-high-profile-weapons-are-all-smoke-and-mirrors/
January 3, 2021 Topic: Security Region: Europe Blog Brand: The Reboot Tags: RussiaRussian ArmyPropagandaActive MeasuresMaskirovka

Fake Bullets: Why Russia's Military Looks More Powerful Than It Is

The term is Maskirovka and the Russians have successfully used this strategy of deception many times.

Despite the Cold War ending decades ago and the great threat that was once the Soviet Union giving way to a financially anemic Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin’s Russian regime has managed to remain at the forefront of American defense concerns consistently throughout the modern era. Today, Russia shares the role of antagonist in military strategy discussions and near-peer level opponent training with China, another nation with a significantly smaller military footprint than the U.S. The real threat these nations pose to American security and interests abroad serve as a valuable reminder that a nation doesn’t need to match America’s defense spending to pose a legitimate threat to America’s defense apparatus.

But China’s far reaching and expansive military modernization efforts coupled with aggressive policies in places like the South China Sea make China’s massive People’s Liberation Army perhaps the most potent threat to American dominance globally. Russia, on the other hand, primarily poses a direct military threat in Europe, where the close proximity of Russian ally Belarus and the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad creates a narrow passage between Poland and Lithuania called the Suwalki Gap.

Russian Strengths in the Grey Zone

NATO officials recognize already that a concerted effort to capture the Suwalki Gap made by Russian forces would likely succeed, severing the Baltic states from their NATO allies. While efforts are underway to mitigate this threat, the real strength of NATO’s position comes from the knowledge that Russia’s economy likely couldn’t sustain prolonged warfare at the scale a conflict with NATO would demand. Put simply, Russia’s aggression is often tempered more by its pocketbook than the presence of NATO forces.

So why, then, does Russia seem to dominate American discussions about defense and security, when China’s stated aim of replacing the United States as the world’s diplomatic and economic leader poses a more direct threat to American interests? While a question of this magnitude could be answered in a number of ways, one of the most significant reasons Russia remains the subject of our collective concern is nothing more than good old fashioned marketing.

Like the Soviet Union before it, Russia has placed a significant emphasis on “grey zone” operations and narrative management in its foreign policy and military endeavors. Grey zone, in this case, meaning military operations that lead up to the very edge of overt acts of war, but stop just short of sparking a real conflict. Examples of these sorts of operations include gaining access to America’s electrical grid, conducting assassinations on foreign soil, and even attempts at curbing investigations into their violations of international law, among many others.

Reflexive Control and the Russian Narrative

Russia has made real headway in the narrative realm of geopolitics thanks to its adoption of a practice known as “reflexive control,” dating back to the Soviet era. Reflexive control was perhaps best summed up by Georgetown Security Studies Review writer Annie Kowalewski, who also cited the work of Mark Mateski in her description:

“Reflexive control is a ‘uniquely Russian’ concept based on maskirovka, an old Soviet notion in which one ‘conveys to an opponent specifically prepared information to incline him/her to voluntarily make the predetermined decision desired by the initiator of the action.’”

Reflexive control is not a conspiracy theory imagined by Western researchers, but rather a legitimate military strategy taught in Russian military schools and training programs, as well as included in Russia’s Gerasimov Doctrine, which is a part of the nation’s national security strategy. Reflexive control has been a known quantity in the defense sphere for decades, but despite America’s familiarity with this practice, the nation has still proven susceptible to influence campaigns in the digital age, bolstered by Russia’s adoption of social media as a means to the same ends.

While many would attribute Russia’s efforts to meddle in America’s 2016 presidential election to this practice, a perhaps more valuable example could be in the political havoc that followed. Russian narrative efforts extend far beyond one election or candidate, and in truth, involve nearly every facet of conflict woven into the fabric of American culture. Russian influence campaigns have been attributed to candidates in both political parties, the American debate about vaccination, and even summer blockbuster movies. Anywhere Russia sees an existing rift between the American people (or the people of any other opposing nation), they work to exacerbate the conflict, weakening opposing nations from within.

But Russia’s narrative control efforts aren’t limited to giving simmering conflict a signal boost. These same practices are also leveraged to make Russia seem like a more threatening opponent to some, and a valuable distributor of military technology to others.

Using Narrative to Convey Strength

Russia’s annual defense budget tends to hover at around $60 billion, which places them on fairly equal footing with nations like the UK, despite maintaining a force that is significantly larger than that of its spending peers. As a result, Russia has been forced to make hard decisions regarding the allocation of its meager budget–sacrificing the capabilities of its surface fleet at times to bolster spending on new submarines and limiting orders of technologically advanced platforms like the T-14 Armata main battle tank and Su-57 stealth fighter to little more than “token” numbers, as a few examples.

Russia continues to develop these systems, despite the inability to fund their mass production, in part because merely having a military capability is often enough to get your name mentioned in the media alongside more formidable opponents like the U.S. or China. Russia’s troubled stealth fighter, the Su-57, serves as a good example of how Russia develops “capabilities,” that aren’t practical in a conflict, but do garner headlines.

The list of operational fifth generation fighters around the world isn’t a long one: America and its allies have the F-35, America has the F-22, China has the J-20, and Russia has the Su-57. Most wouldn’t find that list surprising, but what many might be surprised to learn is that the United States maintains a fleet of literally hundreds of operational fifth generation jets, while Russia has only 12 or so (and only one with the engine intended for the platform). Russia’s tiny fleet of stealth fighters wouldn’t represent any real military capability worthy of note, but just having the jet gets them mentioned in the same breath as the U.S.

Likewise with the T-14 Armata, which unlike the Su-57, is widely seen as a highly capable and technologically advanced platform worthy of the media bluster that surrounds it. However, like the Su-57, Russia can’t afford to put the T-14 into mass production. Once more, despite not offering any literal military capability, Russia manages to stay relevant in the global tank conversation because they have some advanced tank platforms.

Technologies Purpose-Built for Narrative

Of course, the T-14 and the Su-57 are not the only high profile Russian defense programs to capture headlines in recent years. In fact, it could be argued that both are small potatoes compared to efforts like Russia’s Poseidon nuclear “doomsday” submarine drone, their massive RS-28 Sarmat nuclear ICBM, and of course, their “invincible” nuclear-powered cruise missile.

While each of these weapons represent real threats to Russia’s opponents, they are once again hampered by the inability to mass produce any of these platforms (or in one case, even getting it to work), but that ultimately doesn’t matter. Each of these platforms was purpose-built to offer the Russian government specific leverage when dealing with foreign nations.

The “Doomsday Sub” Status-6 Oceanic Multipurpose System

There was a time when Russia’s Status-6 (often referred to as Poseidon) weapon was considered an urban legend, but after it was leaked that the U.S. included the weapon in an intelligence report, Russia took advantage of the press coverage and announced that their “doomsday sub” was indeed real.

The Poseidon is a submersible drone equipped with either a 50-megaton or a massive 100-megaton (depending on your source) nuclear weapon that can be deployed by Russia’s large submarines. To provide a frame of reference, the largest nuclear weapon ever detonated had a 50 megaton yield, making the occasional Russian 100-megaton claim all the more disconcerting. In practice, the platform would sneak into American coastal waters and detonate, combining the destruction of a massive nuclear weapon with an irradiated tsunami crashing down on shoreline communities.

While this platform may indeed work, it doesn’t actually offer Russia any increase in nuclear capability. Their nukes were already sufficient to hold up their end of the “mutually assured destruction” bargain, making the Status-6 less a strategic weapon (as its use would usher in the same nuclear war we’ve worried about for decades), and more about messaging. The Poseidon, like the RS-28 Sarmat, is about instilling fear in Russia’s enemies.

The RS-28 Sarmat or “Satan II”

Russia’s latest heavy thermonuclear intercontinental missile carries multiple warheads designed to evade modern missile defense systems and can deliver a whopping 50-megatons of nuclear power to a target. Russia famously qualified the scope of their new missile as powerful enough to destroy a land mass the size of Texas or France, and it’s worth noting that this weapon does indeed absolutely dwarf even the biggest nukes in America’s arsenal.