The news about North Korean troops that have joined Russian forces to participate in Russia’s full-scale war in Ukraine has spread quickly and generated a vivid debate within the expert community. While the exact number and role of the troops remain unclear, Pyongyang’s decision to deploy soldiers represents a pivotal moment of the war not only for Ukraine but also the international community. 

However, North Koreans are not the first foreign citizens joining the war on the Russian side. Unlike the Ukrainian army, where the presence of international forces has been well documented, the Russian army has been portrayed as ethnically diverse but fully made up of Russian citizens. Ethnic minority Russians, such as the Buryats, Kazakhs, and Tuvans, are indeed not just present but overrepresented in the Russian army. 

However, there have been persistent media reports about the recruitment and deployment of Central Asian migrants who either have no Russian citizenship or have recently received it through naturalization.  

According to the Russian Interior Ministry, Russia currently hosts over 10 million labor migrants from Central Asia, primarily from the former Soviet states of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Many of these migrants are employed in low-skill positions in the shadow economy. Given the lack of economic opportunities in their countries of origin, the availability of jobs across Russia, and pre-existing migrant networks, the number of Central Asians in Russia is not declining despite the upsurge of anti-immigrant sentiment. 

Since February 2022, one of the riskiest but best-compensated jobs for Central Asians in Russia has become service on the frontline of the Ukraine war. Initially, Central Asians were drafted from Russian prisons by the infamous paramilitary outfit known as the Wagner Group. In return for six months of combat, they were promised a generous salary, Russian citizenship, and prison parole. 

At present, army recruiters approach Central Asians not only in prisons but also anywhere Central Asians are found in great numbers, such as mosques, metro stations, or migration centers, where they go to obtain and renew their work permits. 

It is difficult to estimate the number of Central Asians deployed as combat troops in the Russian army, particularly since many of them are also naturalized citizens of the Russian Federation. However, there is evidence to suggest that the number of Central Asian servicemen has not lived up to Russian officials’ expectations despite the recruitment effort. 

“Where are the Tajik battalions?” asked Mikhail Matveyev, Russia’s State Duma member from the Communist Party, last year. 

One of the reasons for the lack of recruitment success is the threat of punishment back home. Central Asian labor migration to Russia is circular, meaning that the migrants go back and forth between Russia and their country of origin. Central Asian authorities have repeatedly warned their citizens against taking part in military conflicts abroad and pressed charges against their citizens returning from the war zone.  

However, given how dependent Central Asian states are both from Russia and the remittances sent home by the labor migrants, these warnings and individual cases of prosecution should primarily be seen as a recommendation for any former combatants not to return home. 

Central Asian participation in the Russian war effort suggests that Moscow has the potential to tap into more human resources for the war than the West likes to think. It is not only Kim Jong-un’s praetorians that are at Putin’s disposal. 

About the Author:

Kristiina Silvan is a Postdoctoral Fellow in Russia, EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood and Eurasia research program at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs. Her research focuses on state-society relations in Central Asia and Russia’s role in the region. Follow her on X: @KristiinaSilvan.

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