Compounding the problem is Xi’s flamboyant attack on corruption, which is endemic from top to bottom. For example, official banquets are supposed to include only “four dishes and a soup.” This reflects a perceived need to respond to public cynicism about officials who thrive on payoffs and kickbacks; Communist leaders warn repeatedly that the party’s long-term survival requires restoring public trust. Those at the very top are probably safe—Xi can’t risk Politburo infighting and his own family has profited somehow—but his targets may include a few plenum members, and without doubt some of their friends and relatives. The campaign already faces resistance from party cadre who are skilled at self-protection; it’s not certain just how determined Xi really is.

Xi Jinping may be both party leader and president, as well as chairman of the crucial commission that oversees the military; he clearly is more decisive and innovative than his robotic predecessor, Hu Jintao. Yet Xi is no dictator, and lacks the undisputed authority of past leaders like Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. He cannot rule by decree and must have party backing to make serious reforms effective. There are no guarantees that he will get all that he wants at the plenum.

This week’s SED meeting undoubtedly will produce the usual optimism about greater cooperation in the years just ahead. But the October plenum may say more about what will really happen.

Robert Keatley is a former editor of The Asian Wall Street Journal and the South China Morning Post, both of Hong Kong.