For many years now, the overarching and forward strategic presence of the United States—including its bases, alliance system, and clear military superiority—has played a crucial role in deterring authoritarian powers, reassuring democratic allies and upholding a particular international order (that for all its current discontents is remarkably prosperous and free by historical standards). If this strategic presence becomes detached or uncertain, there is no reason to expect that the benefits of that particular order for the United States will continue. If we adopt what is in effect a strategy of offshore balancing, whether or not we call it that, then we will have adopted a strategic approach that is at least internally coherent and in line with current projected defense cuts. But we will have done so by giving up on key commitments and features of a stabilizing U.S. presence overseas going back several decades. And if we give up on that presence, we cannot assume it will be easy or cheap to buy back. It never has been before.

We have to stop cutting national defense. Because if we don't, we will soon be left with no honest strategic options other than some form of offshore balancing—and such a choice could have negative consequences on a scale we can barely foresee today.

But let's at least not join the president in strategic denial. Let's not pretend we can maintain existing commitments while continually cutting military capabilities. Let's have a genuine debate over U.S. defense strategy, if necessary both within and between each major party.

Because when it comes to national defense, we can do more with more. And we can do less with less. But we can't actually do more with less.

Colin Dueck is an associate professor in the Department of Public and International Affairs, George Mason University.

This essay is based upon testimony before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, on February 24, 2013.