American Power and Liberal Order

American Power and Liberal Order

An excerpt from Paul D. Miller's new book on a conservative grand strategy.

Editor’s Note: The following is excerpted from American Power and Liberal Order: A Conservative Internationalist Grand Strategy by Paul D. Miller. © 2016 by Georgetown University Press. Reprinted by permission.

Over the past year, real-estate tycoon Donald Trump mesmerized the American media during his run for the presidency. He broke every rule of expected conduct for presidential candidates and not only survived—he thrived. Many of his attention-grabbing departures were matters of style and character. But among his heresies were some novel policy proposals—especially in foreign policy. Trump called into question NATO’s usefulness; promised to start trade wars with China, Mexico, and Japan; and openly admired the autocratic ruler of Russia while disparaging the leaders of the United States’ democratic allies. He embraced waterboarding and threatened to kill terrorists’ families while simultaneously promising to keep America out of foreign entanglements and let Russia sort out the Middle East. During his first major foreign policy address in April, he openly called for an “America First” grand strategy. He argued that the United States has been taken by its allies and rivals alike, played for a fool by free riders coasting on America’s overly-generous provision of global stability. It is time, in Trump’s view, for America to step back and the rest of the world to pay up.

Trump’s foreign policy vision amounts to a repudiation of the liberal international order—an order of which the United States has been a chief architect, beneficiary, and guarantor since World War II. Trump’s message cannot be dismissed simply because the messenger is unattractive: he is echoing, in a more populist and belligerent register, an argument advanced by credible and respected scholars since the end of the Cold War. Immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union, Eugene Gholz, Daryl G. Press, and Harvey M. Sapolsky argued that the United States can and should withdraw most of it military forces deployed abroad, pull out of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO) and other alliances, and need not be concerned about the success or failure of democracy in other countries. With the end of the Soviet threat, the United States no longer needed to sustain the costs of its global presence and leadership. The United States enjoyed unparalleled security, in their view, and could afford to withdraw its overseas military presence and wind down its alliance commitments.

Their argument has gained ground since the failure of U.S. efforts in Iraq. Barry Posen in his recent book Restraint distrusts hypothetical causal chains that purport to explain how small incidents would lead to major threats: “The United States should focus on a small number of threats. . . . It can do that because the United States is economically and militarily strong, well-endowed and well-defended by nature, and possessed of an enormous ability to regenerate itself.” Posen believes that the United States can choose the threats it focuses on because they are small enough compared to its strength and argues that the United States should redeploy its military forces homeward and withdraw from most alliance commitments.

Whether or not Trump wins in November, and his foreign policy ideas are increasingly popular. In a recent Pew Research public opinion survey , a majority of Americans said that the United States should “mind its own business internationally” and expressed the belief that the nation plays a less important and less powerful global role than it did a decade ago. The number of Americans holding these opinions was the largest in over four decades of Pew asking those questions. Other candidates than Trump, including Rand Paul and Bernie Sanders, echoed many of the arguments of the “restraint” school of thought in their recent campaigns. Even some aspects of President Obama’s foreign policy, such as his withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan, his hesitance to intervene in Syria, and his open doubts about the feasibility of military force against Iran, seem to reflect an instinct for restraint.

The advocates of internationalism face an urgent task: to explain why liberal order matters and why the advocates for restraint are wrong. The United States should sustain its leading role in world affairs, including its global alliance network and far-flung military deployments, for the foreseeable future—not because the U.S. is in imminent danger of invasion or to check an aspiring Eurasian hegemon, but to invest in culture of liberal order in the world’s key regions. The advocates of restraint have an impoverished view of what constitutes world order and why it matters; consequently, they have an overly narrow view threats to American interests. A broader view understands that American power and liberal order are mutually constituting; that liberal order is the outer perimeter of American security; and that sustaining liberal order in the world’s key regions is a cost-effective grand strategy for the United States.

American Power and Liberal Order