As calls for Europe to take charge of its own defense and security grow louder in Washington, Brussels is quivering in fear in response. A permanent shift in how both sides of the Atlantic view each other’s position could provide the push the EU needs to become a less dependent, more capable, and more equal ally to the United States.

The possibility of a second Trump presidency (and a Vance vice-presidency) has European Union (EU) leaders worrying about the security bloc’s security again. Evidently, the 2016–2021 debates about total reliance on NATO and the United States for the EU’s defense have not reached a satisfactory conclusion.

In 2016, NATO defense spending as a percentage of GDP increased for the first time in seven years. Russia’s neighbors Sweden and Lithuania reinstated or increased the length of mandatory military service. In Brussels, the revision of the European Defence Action Plan introduced the need for the Union to aim for Europe’s “strategic autonomy,” and the EU increased its military spending and formalized its structure for military cooperation accordingly. 

Between 2018 and 2021, Brussels also initiated the European Defense Funds, enabling the EU to finance its protection collectively and requiring member states to allocate “a minimum of 20 percent of their defense budget to equipment, and 2 percent to technological development,” allocating €90 million to fund defense research on the union-level from 2016 to 2020 specifically and €13 billion between 2021 and 2027 to industrial defense policy generally. 

Changes to the military cooperation among member states included efforts to coordinate military expenditures and identify common security policy projects. Such willingness for cooperation, increased spending, and concrete plans for change point to an EU willing to become more than just “America’s lap dog”—at least for the time being.

The political climate in which the EU attempted to move toward a more robust autonomous security strategy might offer some insight into why it did not take root. The 2016–2021 period has brought the most direct and consequential threats to EU security since World War II. Since the 2014 annexation of Crimea, Russia’s menacing power has become increasingly apparent, decisively manifesting itself in the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. President Trump’s continued characterization of NATO as “obsolete” and unable to meet its spending goals made change to the seven-decade-old security arrangement increasingly probable.

However, President Biden’s win in the 2020 election was not only enthusiastically welcomed by Brussels but also laden with expectations for the reconstruction of the transatlantic friendship. With a leader more sympathetic to European protection returning to the head of the United States, the EU could turn its attention to anywhere but the provision of its own security.

And it did. In May and December of 2023, the EU launched a civil mission in Moldova to reinforce the country’s security sector and approved a security and defense initiative in support of West African countries in the Gulf of Guinea. In terms of defense of its own borders, Brussels returned to its familiar talking over walking. This included French president Macron’s Discours Sur L’Europe at Sorbonne University this April, ironically, admitting that there has been little progress since his first address for a geopolitically stronger Europe seven years ago and a June meeting of EU leaders to discuss critical capability gaps and the European defense industry strategy and program. 

To its credit, in 2022, Brussels approved the Strategic Compass, an “ambitious plan of action for strengthening the EU’s security and defense policy by 2030,” and member states continue to increase defense spending. However, it needs to be acknowledged that despite a more Europhilic American president, the threat of a menacing neighbor has only intensified. Even so, with one threat to its security averted, the EU seemed ready to let active efforts to increase its defense capacities cool down. 

Such change in attention paid to defense capabilities suggests firstly that European security advances remain reactionary to threats to EU safety. Secondly, and more importantly, this behavior indicates that it is not a lack of ability to recognize and address areas in need of improvement or the absence of resources that has kept the Old Continent from developing significant means of self-protection. Instead, it is the ideology of reliance on the United States and NATO for security guarantees engrained in EU leaders that has kept Brussels from developing significant means of self-protection. The EU does not need yet another alarm clock to start providing for its defense. It needs a permanent mindset shift that evidently cannot be forced by one American presidency alone.

In that, the EU is not alone. Washington, too, should assess its perception of Europe’s position and its role in Europe’s dependency. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, roughly coinciding with the signing of the EU’s founding treaty, which also defined objectives for a common foreign and security policy, Washington could have withdrawn active involvement in European security. Instead, until 2016, every administration has reaffirmed its commitment to providing the EU with protection, at times to the point of discouraging meaningful investment in capabilities that could have ensured EU security more independently of the United States and NATO. 

In 1996, President Bill Clinton, in a speech on the enlargement of NATO in Europe, declared America to be “the world’s indispensable nation” that at times “[makes] the difference between war and peace, between freedom and repression, between hope and fear.” In 1998, Clinton’s Secretary of State Madeleine Albright “welcome[d] a more capable European partner [...]” yet as “[a]ny initiative must avoid [... delinking from NATO], avoid duplicating existing efforts, and avoid discriminating against non-EU members.” In making these statements, the administration discouraged significant action by European leaders. The George W. Bush administration followed a similar line: accept stronger European defense capabilities as long as they do not overshadow NATO or the United States. 

U.S. influence on the continent sought to preserve EU dependence on the United States, preventing it from becoming a competent rival. In 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton described European security as “far more than a strategic interest” and “an expression of our values,” which “cannot and never should be broken.”

After years of sweeping promises to protect Europe mounting at times to discouragement from building up security capabilities, it seems less surprising that European leaders are struggling with the task of ramping up the Union’s ability to protect itself and rely less heavily on the United States and NATO. A true mindset shift in Washington away from a desire to keep Europe subordinate and toward genuine support of a Europe with increased security capabilities, thus allowing the EU to become a more able and equal ally, might be what the EU needs to remember that it was capable of starting the process of relying more on itself for its defense and security.

And it might be a gift to Washington, too. 60 percent of American voters agree that the EU is too reliant on American military support, and 70 percent of adults believe the United States is spending too much money assisting other countries. The United States is already entangled in multiple conflicts, and China’s military growth and activities are increasingly demanding a pivot of attention from the U.S. to Asia and the Indo-Pacific. 

A less dependent Europe facilitated by an American mindset shift might not only respond to voter concerns but also allow Washington to be more selective in its military engagement and, thus, more effective in the aid it provides. Ukraine’s burden could be shared in a meaningful way. A more confident EU that can provide for its own security has advantages for both sides of the Atlantic.

Lena Klink is a Summer Editorial Intern at The National Interest and a senior at Hamilton College.

Image: Jukka Salo / Shutterstock.com.