However, this does not change the fact that the United States must update its playbook to move beyond the strategies of the Cold War or the immediate post-Cold War era. It must adapt to these new realities in order to participate in the great power competition for the Global South, which is largely non-military. This involves engaging more proactively with the Global South in areas including trade, infrastructure, digital connectivity, education, and economic development.

Telecommunications, in particular, is a key sector. China has become a leading subsea cable provider and owner as part of its “Digital Silk Road.” Chinese state-owned and subsidized firm HMN Technologies (Huawei) is now the fourth-largest cable provider globally and has seen the fastest growth over the past decade, completing over 108 projects. Areas of investment also include emerging critical technology fields such as internet services, where Huawei has provided internet access for hundreds of millions. Today, Huawei subsidiaries own up to 70 percent of all 4G networks in Sub-Saharan Africa. 

China’s dominance in telecommunications poses a strategic threat to the United States. Allowing Beijing to control significant digital infrastructure flows increases its influence and potential for surveillance—a reality that has already begun to manifest as China assists despots in the developing world to oppress citizens and dissidents through China’s model of digital authoritarianism. The United States must counter this by increasing investment in digital infrastructure in the Global South, promoting American telecom companies, and offering secure and competitive alternatives to Huawei’s technology.

China has also developed a global network of strategically vital ports under its “Maritime Silk Road”—the oceanic counterpart of the “Digital Silk Road.” Beijing now owns or operates ports and terminals at nearly 100 locations in over fifty countries, spanning every ocean and every continent. The Chinese have ownership in about twenty-three ports in Africa alone. This effectively leaves China in control of ports at the heart of global supply chains, which could be leveraged for geopolitical gain. The United States must respond by investing in port infrastructure projects, offering favorable financing terms, and creating public-private partnerships to support port development in the Global South.

China has dwarfed the United States as Africa’s largest trade partner since 2009. Today, one-fifth of the region’s total goods exports go to China, mainly consisting of raw metals, mineral products, and fuel. The current volume of U.S. trade with African states is only one-fifth the size of trade between Africa and China. To date, fifty-two out of fifty-four African countries have also signed an agreement or understanding with the BRI. China has invested at least two-and-a-half times as much in African infrastructure projects as the entire Western world combined. China’s economic influence through trade and investment creates dependency, potentially leading to political alignment with Beijing. To address this, the United States must boost its economic engagement by increasing trade with African nations and supporting American businesses to enter these markets. Expanding the scope and scale of the Development Finance Corporation’s (DFC) operations and fostering sustainable development partnerships is the first step out of several that would help counterbalance China’s economic clout.

A significant aspect of China’s influence in the Global South also revolves around trade and debt. The DFC committed $9 billion across about 130 transactions last year, while China’s BRI undertook $90 billion across about 210 deals. As a result, many developing countries have become ensnared in Chinese debt traps. This economic dependency translates into political leverage for Beijing. In this new era of great power competition, the United States must reconfigure its foreign aid model to adjust to these realities. This involves rethinking the balance between development loans and grants and preserving open and market-based economies at home and abroad while resisting unfair economic practices. Development aid is not merely a charitable act; it is a strategic investment in future allies. Countries that build their capacities with American support are less likely to fall into Chinese debt traps and more likely to engage in fair and transparent governance.

Another key element of changing global dynamics is where the elites of the Global South choose to study. Higher education remains one of the most effective tools of soft power, fostering good governance, functional and accountable institutions, and an empowered civil society. China’s increasing number of foreign students highlights its recognition of the impact of educational exchanges on shaping future leaders’ perspectives and loyalties. In 2003, there were fewer than 1,300 African students enrolled in Chinese universities. In 2017, there were more than 80,000. According to the 2020 data from UNESCO’s Global Education Monitoring Report, China is the largest provider of scholarships worldwide. For public funding, the United States doesn’t even make the top ten. In 2020, China granted 12,000 academic scholarships to African students, while the United Kingdom offered 1,000. The United States’ Fulbright program offered just over 200. 

U.S. programs have been hampered by resource limitations, regulators’ unrealistic expectations, and visa restrictions. However, the United States’ competitive advantage remains its high quality of education, fair and transparent recruitment processes, and exposure to civic-minded curriculum. Indeed, in 2023, there were 290,000 Chinese nationals studying at U.S. colleges and universities, overwhelmingly without scholarships, by far the largest share of foreign students in the United States. The United States must leverage these values to ensure that more students from developing countries are exposed to its liberal educational system over China’s controlled and regimented environment.

Furthermore, a key element of changing global dynamics is where countries in the Global South source their military equipment. India and Russia, for instance, have maintained a close defense relationship for decades. The Indian Army is equipped with Russian-made tanks and rifles, while its air force uses Sukhoi fighter jets and Mi-17 helicopters. Despite deepening ties with the United States, India remains the largest buyer of Russian arms. This relationship has contributed to India’s reluctance to condemn Russia following its invasion of Ukraine. Although New Delhi indirectly called on Moscow to respect international law, it stopped short of criticizing Russia. This demonstrates countries purchasing military equipment from China or Russia often find themselves geopolitically aligned with these powers for times to come. The United States must provide better alternatives to ensure these nations support American geopolitical interests instead.

China’s vaccine diplomacy during the COVID-19 pandemic also significantly enhanced its influence; it claimed to have distributed 2.2 billion vaccine doses worldwide by September 2021. Unlike OECD countries, where vaccine distribution prioritized domestic needs over international diplomacy, China and Russia leveraged their autocratic systems to withhold vaccines in their own societies in order to gain geopolitical advantages abroad. By offering vaccines to countries like the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Brazil, China sought to secure diplomatic concessions, such as the non-recognition of Taiwan and the inclusion of Huawei in their telecom systems. There are rumors that Paraguay considered switching recognition from Taiwan to the PRC over this issue. This approach highlights a shift in global power dynamics, where countries like China, once incapable of producing vaccines, now use low-quality vaccines as strategic tools for diplomatic gains, disregarding the traditional norms of global health diplomacy embraced by OECD nations.

Ignoring the Global South is dangerous for American national security. The growing influence of China in these parts of the world is not merely an economic challenge—it is a strategic threat that can significantly reshape global power dynamics. Most countries would prefer to collaborate with the United States, but without a more attractive offer than what China provides, they will inevitably turn to Beijing.

The field of play in the global power competition has shifted, but the importance of the developing world is greater than ever. The United States must once again leverage its moral convictions and strategic insight to address this new era of challenges as effectively as it did during the Cold War. America’s long-term interests are best served by supporting the rise of partner countries that will, when push comes to shove, uphold a rules-based liberal world order. Renewing its commitment to engagement in the Global South is crucial for U.S. foreign policy to counter China’s “alternative vision for global governance.” By doing so, it can build resilient partnerships, promote good governance, and secure its interests in a rapidly changing global landscape. The stakes are high, and the time for action is now.

Daniel F. Runde is a senior vice president at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He is also the author of the book The American Imperative: Reclaiming Global Leadership Through Soft Power (Bombardier Books, 2023).

Image: Shutterstock.com.