Second, public opinion in China supports the idea of unification. According to a study conducted by Adam Y. Liu and Xiaojun Li, although public opinions toward the unification with Taiwan are mixed, 55 percent of the respondents supported “launching a unification war to take back Taiwan entirely,” while 33 percent opposed it and 12 percent were unsure. According to another online survey in China published in ThinkChina and Taiwan Inside, 53.1 percent supported armed unification with Taiwan, while 39.19 percent opposed it among Chinese elites. This shows that the CCP’s principle of unification with Taiwan has a broad popular base.

Apparently, unification with Taiwan has been an established goal for the CCP and the Chinese people. If Xi gave up this objective, he would be seen as abandoning his core mission and betraying his own promise. In addition, he would likely face serious political consequences within the CCP and among the Chinese people, lose credibility and legitimacy as a leader who can defend China’s national interests and dignity against external pressures and challenges, and face criticism, opposition, or even a coup from within the party or the military. More seriously, he would also risk provoking social unrest or nationalist backlash from the public, who have been indoctrinated with patriotic education and propaganda for decades. Xi’s legitimacy has been largely based on the unification with Taiwan since the 20th National Congress of the CCP. Therefore, he cannot afford to give up his historical unification task voluntarily.

While U.S. deterrence strategy may cause the CCP to reconsider its actions and carefully evaluate its approach to unification, it won’t halt China’s progression in that direction.

The CCP may postpone the implementation of the unification mission under certain circumstances: Significant shifts in the regional or global landscape might prompt a reassessment of priorities. Substantial domestic opposition to the unification task or mounting international pressure could compel a leader to reconsider their top priority. The potential Chinese domestic political fallout may lead to backlash from factions or interest groups within China. A change in the CCP’s political ideology can also influence a leader’s position on the unification task. A significant shift in public attitudes toward the unification task has the potential to influence a leader’s decisionmaking process and could also create opportunities for alternative arrangements and potentially reduce the urgency of pursuing reunification through military force. Nevertheless, all these hypothetical conditions are highly unlikely to occur under any CCP administration.

Therefore, the CCP’s mission to take over Taiwan is inevitable sooner or later. While Xi has not ruled out the use of force, he has also expressed his preference for peaceful reunification based on the One-China principle and the 1992 Consensus. Is it possible for the PRC to reach the goal of peaceful unification with Taiwan based on the 1992 Consensus? Reality shows that since Taiwan transitioned to democracy in the 1980s, Taiwanese people’s minds are getting farther and farther away from the PRC.

In a poll conducted by Pew Research Center in 2020, the majority of Taiwanese hold a negative view of China, and about 66 percent of Taiwanese people identify solely as Taiwanese. The numbers of Taiwanese who hold a negative view of China continue to grow and about 90 percent of Taiwanese identify themselves as “Taiwanese” according to a survey in 2021. Although more than 90 percent of Taiwanese originally came from mainland China, they are now embracing an identity that is distinct from the PRC. The Taiwanese people’s desire for unification with China fell further to a near-record low in 2022, and only 1.3 percent of respondents wanted unification with China as soon as possible.

Taiwanese public opinions will drive the Taiwanese government to make tougher policies toward the PRC, but it could also drive nationalism in the mainland to run higher and create more difficulties for the PRC to fulfill a peaceful reunification. This suggests that the window of peaceful reunification is closing. Twenty years ago, in my book Remaking China’s Public Philosophy for the Twenty-first Century, I posited that reshaping China’s political institutions through the transformation of its public philosophy would be the most effective means to address the potential conflict in the Taiwan Straits. However, it has now become a distant possibility.

Thus, a critical question remains: is it more advantageous for China to achieve early reunification with Taiwan? Or is it more advantageous for China to achieve reunification with Taiwan later? With the intensification of competition between China and the United States and the gradual deterioration of China’s international situation, it is increasingly preferable for China to unify Taiwan earlier rather than later.

Under Xi’s regime, China has been promoting the process of military modernization at unprecedented speed and preparing for an armed occupation of Taiwan on a massive scale. China has upgraded its missile bases and deployed a new hypersonic missile along the mainland’s eastern coast, which could target Taiwan and U.S. bases in the region. China has been conducting large military exercises near Taiwan, simulating amphibious landings, air assaults, and missile attacks, as well as crossing the median line of the Taiwan Strait, which had been a tacit boundary for decades. The United States has recognized that China’s military has reached or is approaching the ability to take over Taiwan.

Most recently, the People’s Liberation Army has expanded testing and evaluation of its weapons systems to simulate a total war waged on a global scale, especially with the United States. This is another example indicating that China is speedily preparing for the worst-case scenario—reunification with Taiwan by military force. On July 6, 2023, the same day that the U.S. secretary of treasury, Janet Yellen, arrived in Beijing, Xi inspected Eastern Theatre Command, the branch central to keeping up cross-strait pressure on Taiwan, saying that the PLA must deepen its planning on war and combat and improve its ability to win any war. This sent a signal to the United States that the reunification of Taiwan is China’s core interest. The PRC is approaching the verge of reunifying Taiwan by military force to fulfill the CCP’s historical mission of the reunification of Taiwan and Xi’s global ambitions.

For now, it is hard to precisely assess if China could win a war with Taiwan; yet, it is certain that U.S. deterrence strategy is based on the idea that the United States can prevent China from using military force against Taiwan by making the costs of such action outweigh the benefits, and by signaling the U.S. commitment and capability to defend its interests and allies in the region. It is also clear that U.S. deterrence strategy is built upon assumptions that underestimate China’s resolve and ambition to achieve its national goal of unification with Taiwan.

Even assuming that the United States did not overestimate its ability and willingness to intervene in a cross-strait conflict, the Taiwan Relations Act does not explicitly guarantee U.S. military intervention in the event of a Chinese takeover of Taiwan by force. Even if the United States ends up getting involved in a possible war across the Taiwan Strait, the initial defense will rely on Taiwan’s own military capabilities and the Taiwanese people’s determination to counter Chinese military actions. However, the Taiwanese government and its people are far from fully prepared to defend the island. According to a survey conducted by the Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation in 2022, about 51.5 percent of Taiwanese lack confidence in the country’s defense capacity and their government’s ability to deter possible Chinese military action. Taiwan’s politics are divided along pro-independence and pro-unification lines, making it difficult for the government to mobilize public support and allocate resources for island defense. Most Taiwanese prefer to maintain the current status quo to avoid provoking China or engaging in a military conflict over sovereignty. Instead of making a commitment to defend their territory, most Taiwanese people have a huge hope to rely on external support, particularly from the United States in the event of a war in the Taiwan Strait.

As a result, Taiwan’s military lags behind China’s military buildup and faces shortages in personnel and equipment, along with low availability rates and obsolescence of certain platforms, which adversely affect training and readiness. Under the current conscription system, all qualified male citizens of military age are only required to perform either 1 year of active-duty military service or receive 4 months of military training. Clearly, this system does not meet the needs of the Taiwanese defense. Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen announced a plan to extend the compulsory conscription program but received backlash from younger Taiwanese. U.S. deterrence strategy without sufficient Taiwanese military capability and determination of Taiwanese people would lose its solid foundation.

Conclusion

After tracing the historical context and evolution of the CCP’s stance on Taiwan, exploring the consistent ideology and principles of the CCP, delving into Xi’s personal ambition and plan, and discussing the differences of people’s attitudes in Taiwan and the PRC toward the “unification,” it is apparent that peaceful reunification is increasingly unlikely. Considering Xi’s efforts to maintain his legitimacy for a possible life-long tenure, the reasons stated above, and the current domestic problems and international pressures facing China, it is likely that Beijing will act early against Taiwan. The secret meetings held between former senior U.S. national security officials and prominent Russians, allegedly aiming to lay “the groundwork for negotiations to end the war in Ukraine,” could even further encourage China to speed up the unification of Taiwan. The PRC will use force to ultimately solve the Taiwan issue if it does not have any other feasible options. It is wishful thinking if the United States believes it can only rely on a deterrence strategy to stop the process of the PRC’s unification with Taiwan. In fact, U.S. deterrence strategy lacks solid ground based on the reality of Taiwan’s preparation regardless of the actual preparation of the U.S. side. While developing a comprehensive strategy toward China, it is imperative to understand the CCP’s intentions and objectives in the Chinese way in the Chinese context.