Hours before polls closed in the United States on November 5, Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu informed Israeli Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant that he was fired from the cabinet. Gallant had become a well-known face throughout the war on Hamas. Gaunt and black-clad in the wake of the Hamas 10/7 massacre, he often visited soldiers in the field and kept his hand firmly on the helm of military operations.

Netanyahu said that he dismissed Gallant because trust had eroded between them. They had different priorities for the war effort and different visions for Israeli strategy. Gallant preferred a hostage deal and pushed for a day-after plan for Gaza. He also wanted to draft ultra-Orthodox Jews, who historically have an exemption from the army in Israel. This put him at odds with other members of Netanyahu’s coalition government. “...During the past several months, this trust between myself and the Defense Minister has begun to crack,” Netanyahu said.

With Gallant gone, there will be a shakeup in Israel’s political landscape. This is because Gallant brought with him many decades of experience as a soldier and officer to the position. He will likely be replaced by a politician rather than a former general, putting the war effort more firmly in Netanyahu’s hands. During the first months of the war in Gaza, Israel had a war cabinet that included two former generals (Benny Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot). They left the war cabinet in June.

Netanyahu’s decision comes as former U.S. President Donald Trump celebrates his election victory. That means that the period from November to January will be a window of opportunity for Israel in its operations. Similarly, there may be a spotlight from the Biden administration as it moves into its lame-duck era.

There are many balls in the air in the Middle East. Iran is threatening more direct attacks on Israel. Hezbollah has a new leader named Naim Qassem, who has spoken out about the U.S. elections, claiming it won’t change Hezbollah’s war on Israel. Israel began a ground operation against Hezbollah in October. Hezbollah launched missiles at central Israel on November 6, as if to show that the U.S. election would not deter its attacks.

Nevertheless, the region will be watching Trump’s statements closely, and they will likely affect the next phase of the war. This is clear because leaders in the region have been quick to call the president-elect. Netanyahu has spoken with Trump, as has the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia. Riyadh expects that the incoming administration will strengthen ties. The Saudis have been critical of Israel’s war in Gaza and publicly expressed their wish for a solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. However, they also likely know that Iran supported the October 7 Hamas attack in order to harm the Abraham Accords, the normalization deal Trump helped cement between the UAE and Israel. 

Iran wanted to weaken regional integration and stability through a proxy war with Israel. Iran pushed its proxies, such as Hezbollah and the Houthis, to attack Israel in order to create a regional war. Saudi Arabia has been affected because the Houthis in Yemen have previously fought Riyadh. Qatar hosts Hamas. During the first Trump administration, Saudi Arabia led Bahrain, the UAE, and Egypt to break relations with Qatar soon after a major meeting with Trump at the Riyadh Summit in May 2017. Saudi Arabia is thus keenly aware of the changes in the region that a new U.S. administration could help invigorate.

Meanwhile, in Israel, the war effort on two fronts will be in the initial spotlight. The IDF recently helped facilitate a polio vaccination campaign in Gaza. In addition, the IDF is winding down a month-long operation in Jabalia in northern Gaza. Jabalia is a large neighborhood north and northeast of Gaza City where Hamas maintains a presence. The IDF had fought Hamas in this area twice during a year of conflict but never cleared it of terrorists. In October, the IDF struck again. After a month of fighting, it has defeated Hamas. Yet, the slow operation illustrated how difficult it is to uproot the terrorists. Israeli soldiers use drones and unmanned M113 vehicles in operations to try to flush out the enemy and eliminate threats. However, it takes time, and the neighborhood is a jumble of ruined multi-story buildings.

The slow tactical war is grinding on in Gaza and Lebanon. In Lebanon, the IDF has four divisions deployed, and they have spent more than a month fighting Hezbollah in a series of border villages less than a mile or two from the Israeli border. This is a slow process because Hezbollah festooned the area with munitions and hide-outs. The IDF’s 8th brigade, for instance, has killed “dozens” of terrorists in recent operations in Lebanon. “Additionally, the troops located and confiscated numerous weapons, including Kornet missiles, grenades, and explosive devices hidden inside civilian homes and underground infrastructure,” the IDF said on November 6. Hezbollah is also not relenting in its attacks. It fired more than 120 rockets on November 6 at Israel.

Israel will need to decide how to conduct a multi-front war over the next months as a new U.S. administration prepares to enter office. This means looking at the next phase of operations in Gaza and Lebanon. Can Hamas or Hezbollah be decisively defeated now that they have been ground down through ground operations? Both terror groups lost their leaders, but they kept fighting. In addition, the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen and Iranian-backed militias in Iraq continue to threaten Israel. Iran also threatens more direct attacks but may be deterred by Trump’s return to the White House. The Iraqi militias remember that Trump ordered the airstrike that killed IRGC Quds Force leader Qasem Soleimani and Iraqi militia leader Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis in 2020.

On the other hand, the Iranians could judge that they have a short window now to strike harder at Israel before Trump takes the oath of office. They will likely suspect that Israel intends to take the gloves off after the U.S. election. The question will be whether they do. A year of war has left Israeli reservists exhausted and left many questions about the long-term strategy in Gaza and Lebanon.

About the Author: 

Seth Frantzman is the author of The October 7 War: Israel’s Battle for Security in Gaza (2024) and an adjunct fellow at The Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

Image: Creative Commons.