A jihadist rebel group wants to build and govern a stable country that is at peace with its neighbors and recognized by the international community. As much as that may seem an impossible contradiction destined to end in failure and violence, there are reasons to believe that a positive outcome might be achievable. 

It has been two weeks since the hasty fall of the Assad regime, and the situation in Syria is surprisingly stable. This is despite the takeover of the capital by jihadist rebels, who are led by a commander once associated with both Al Qaeda and ISIS. In the south, Israeli forces occupy a buffer zone and conduct hundreds of targeted airstrikes on former government military assets. In the north and northeast, the prospect of a Turkish invasion looms over the Kurds. 

Outside observers have sought to explain the calm in Damascus by noting how Syrians are exhausted after almost fourteen years of civil war, pointing to lessons learned from other civil conflicts in other Arab countries. More importantly, however, the situation is relatively contained because of the desire of one man, Ahmed al-Sharaa (a.k.a. Abu Mohammad al-Jolani), to show the world that he and his followers are capable of governing in peace and deserving of international recognition. 

Journalists, academics, and other pundits have been trying to predict the future by looking back on how al-Sharaa and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) handled governance in Idlib province during the civil war. Analysts search for signs that would indicate how they will tackle their new assignment at the national level. The results are a set of contradictions and mixed messages.

On the one hand, last year, HTS tried to pass a Public Morality Law that would have banned alcohol and deployed a morality police force on daily patrols. On the other hand, HTS walked back the proposals when they caused friction among religious scholars, other armed factions, the public, and international aid groups. This led al-Sharaa to say that the government should not impose Islam but rather encourage people to seek religion out of their own volition.

Al-Sharaa has been praised for helping to attract foreign investment and maintaining functioning electricity and medical services while at the same time being criticized for ruling like an autocrat in the face of popular protests. Consequently, experts remain confounded as to what version of HTS is the one currently ruling the fifth-largest Arab country by population, with more than 20 million citizens precariously positioned between Israel, Lebanon, Turkiye, and Iraq.

These attempts to read something into the past few years entirely miss the opportunity of the present moment. Current circumstances shape Ahmed al-Sharaa’s objectives. He is focused on gaining the recognition of the Syrian people and the international community for his movement, and in doing so, he is putting himself in a tight position that will make it difficult for him to walk back. He has renounced ambitions for transnational jihad, encouraged engagement with the West and an eventual diplomatic solution with Israel, and declared the need for the protection of all religious minorities. He has also promised to demobilize all militias and abolish conscription in favor of a volunteer army so that all arms are in the hands of the state, and even suggested that he may disband HTS in favor of reconstituting state institutions that reflect the diversity of the country. He continues saying all of the right things for both local and Western audiences despite sporadic off-message comments coming from some members of his group on key issues, such as roles for women and Shari‘a law. 

This is remarkable for a man who has effectively become the most successful jihadist in the post-9/11 era. HTS is on the verge of achieving something that no other jihadist group could have dreamed of—the control of a sovereign state that is capable of attaining international recognition. Neither the Taliban nor even ISIS could claim such a thing. Even many people in Syria who value liberal rights and freedoms might support a government comprised of moderate Islamists from HTS. We cannot underestimate the way that half a century of economic struggles, international isolation, and regime brutality have impacted the public’s hopes and expectations. The average Syrian only knows a binary world of state and mosque, not civil society, due to the severe restrictions imposed by emergency law, which has been in effect since the early 1970s. 

Ahmed al-Sharaa’s move toward the center puts him in a delicate balance with Syrians on all sides, and his transitional government will inevitably face criticism and protests from one constituency or another. Average Syrians want their interests represented. Damascus witnessed its first major protest last Thursday over comments by an HTS spokesperson about women’s roles in society. Al-Sharaa’s ability to maintain a balance, for now, may only be possible because the fighters who drove the Assad family away after decades of brutal repression believe they are witnessing a historical moment that will define the country for generations. 

Those fighters may have many different motivations. One motivation among them is the narrative in which their efforts in Idlib to create a functional government and a stable society within a broadly Islamic framework have served as a model for Syrians everywhere looking for an alternative to Assad. They may be willing to share power with other local and expatriate factions, but they will also expect their own abilities and contributions to be honored and respected. 

The international community, especially the United States and Israel, are understandably much more cautious about the claim that al-Sharaa and HTS have abandoned jihadism. For the United States, Al-Sharaa is personally responsible for American and coalition casualties in Iraq and known for his collaboration with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. For Israel, HTS resembles Hamas, an undeniable example of the perils of trusting enemies when they make bold and ultimately baseless statements about fundamental change. Examples of just such a tectonic shift in Islamist ideology are incredibly rare in the region, with Iraq’s Muqtada al-Sadr more an imperfect exception than the rule. 

Al-Sharaa needs significant economic and technical support from the international community to rebuild the country’s infrastructure, economy, and institutions. The level of that support will depend on the Trump administration’s willingness to engage with the new government in Damascus, which means that al-Sharaa must reassure Washington about his intentions, especially those toward Israel. Netanyahu has been clear that he seeks to reduce the long-term threat from a resurgent Syrian military directed against Israel, with no intention of escalating into a broader conflict with the transitional government. He has even said that he supports exploring relations with the new Syrian Government. If al-Sharaa wants to put relations with Israel on a new footing, he will have to find a way to communicate with the Israelis without alienating the Syrian public during this limited window of goodwill that the transitional government currently enjoys. In this effort, he will benefit from a surprising amount of interest among many Syrian youth for a more positive relationship with Israel. 

The challenge for the next Trump administration is learning to decipher Ahmed al-Sharaa’s intentions and motivations. He may be offering a palatable alternative to more hardcore jihadist leaders in the region, but that does not mean that his followers will not seek other ways to subtly Islamicize society and export their Islamist ideology in the region. Obama and Biden engaged in a lot of virtue-signaling on Syria about the respect for international law and establishing a transitional process. Yet, they never set clear expectations and held the Assad regime to those commitments. President Trump must take a more realistic approach and hold the new government accountable to its pledges in exchange for any potential support or recognition while recognizing that the Syrian people are ultimately the best fail-safe against radicalization.

Hazem Alghabra, born in Damascus, Syria, is the founder and president of Frontiers Consultants, a Washington, DC-based consultancy firm that provides public relations and crisis management solutions with a focus on the Middle East and the United States. Alghabra previously held multiple positions with the U.S. Department of State, including Senior Advisor for Public Affairs in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. Alghabra is a frequent commentator on a wide range of television stations, including i24, ILTV, Alarabyia, Sky News, and BBC.

Joshua Yaphe is a Visiting Fellow at the Center for the National Interest. He previously served as Senior Analyst for the Arabian Peninsula at the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), Visiting Faculty at the National Intelligence University (NIU), and scholar-in-residence at the National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations. He has a Ph.D. from American University and is the author of Saudi Arabia and Iraq as Friends and Enemies: Borders, Tribes and a History Shared (University of Liverpool Press, 2022). 

The opinions and characterizations in this piece are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. Government.

Image: Abidin Yagmur / Shutterstock.com.