On Wednesday, November 27, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), led by Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa (commonly known as Abu Mohamad al-Jolani), and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) launched a lightning offensive against the Assad regime. By December 1, they had seized Aleppo, Syria’s largest city. One week later, Bashar al-Assad’s regime is on the verge of collapse.  

While the volatile geopolitical environment influenced the timing and scale of the offensive, the resurgence of the Syrian conflict was inevitable. The country remained fragmented and mired in a political deadlock, with no prospects for reconstruction and 90 percent of the population living below the poverty line. Even in territories under regime control, the government had failed to restore order, allowing instead militias and criminal gangs to operate freely. Assad had consistently refused to make even the slightest concessions, both domestically and with its neighbors, perceiving compromise as a sign of weakness. Instead of addressing the dire living conditions or engaging in a political process to end the war, he doubled down on his repressive tactics and turned Syria into the world’s largest narco-state.

Meanwhile, Jolani had spent the past few years consolidating and reforming HTS. By introducing specialized training programs and shifting to conventional warfare, the group has instilled greater discipline among its forces and considerably improved its operational capabilities, as demonstrated by this latest campaign. Its security apparatus, the General Security Service, has also gained experience from counter-terrorism operations against the Islamic State and Al Qaeda while expanding its capacities to conduct sabotage activities and intelligence gathering. HTS has also adapted its political messaging to focus on overthrowing the regime and rejecting sectarianism. Since launching the offensive, it has repeatedly emphasized that all minorities are integral to Syria’s social fabric and must be respected. To be clear, HTS remains a jihadist movement, but its pragmatism and professionalism stand in stark contrast to the regime’s corrupt, hollowed-out forces and the SNA’s mercenary approach.   

In the past, religious minorities reluctantly supported Assad out of fear of persecution should a fundamentalist Islamist movement seize power. However, growing discontent with the regime—combined with the relatively limited bloodshed of the offensive and Jolani’s outreach to minorities—ignited uprisings across Syria. In As-Suwayda, a predominantly Druze province in southern Syria and neighboring Daraa, local factions began mobilizing and launching attacks on regime forces, opening a southern front. Days later, they were in the suburbs of Damascus, burning Bashar’s portraits and toppling statues of his father, Hafez al-Assad.

Although Turkey has tacitly supported the offensive, it likely did not anticipate the regime’s defensive lines to collapse so easily. Despite its deep animosity towards Assad, Turkey’s objectives in Syria are to contain Kurdish forces, secure its border, and facilitate the return of refugees to alleviate domestic pressure. Ankara may have intended to use the offensive as leverage to push the regime into negotiating normalization on more favorable terms rather than seeking its overthrow. The success of the offensive could enable Turkey to play a pivotal role in shaping Syria’s political future. On the other hand, given the rapidly evolving dynamics on the ground, the conflict could spiral out of control or provide the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) an opportunity to capitalize on Assad’s weakness. Unlike the SNA, Jolani has refrained from attacking the SDF and has, overall, demonstrated a greater degree of autonomy from Ankara. 

With Russia focused on its war in Ukraine, Hezbollah forces weakened, and Iran distracted by its confrontation with Israel, Assad could no longer rely on the same level of military support as before. The past fourteen months have dealt a severe blow to Iran’s Axis of Resistance, and Assad’s absence from their conflict with Israel is viewed as a betrayal. Furthermore, after witnessing military forces flee or defect, Iran is unwilling to commit additional resources to prop up a collapsing regime. However, Tehran will likely mobilize its militias and try to exploit the chaos on the ground to secure its landbridge to Hezbollah in Lebanon.

As for Moscow, it has grown increasingly exasperated by the ineptitude of regime forces and Assad’s obstinacy in normalization negotiations with Turkey, which it helped mediate. When Russia intervened in Syria in 2015, it hoped to secure a strategic foothold in the Middle East and cement its status as a great power. Instead, it ended up with a devastated country and a rogue regime that proved incapable of defending itself. Now, the Kremlin’s priority is to maintain control over its key military assets, namely the Khmeimin Airbase and the naval base in Tartus. 

Behind the scenes, it will attempt to strike a deal with Turkey, Qatar, and various Syrian factions on the ground. In fact, given Qatar’s humanitarian aid to northwest Syria, which is under Jolani’s control, its status as the only Arab country to refuse normalization with Assad, and its strong relations with Russia, Turkey, and Iran, Doha is uniquely positioned to play a key role in negotiating Syria’s post-Assad future.

The map of the Middle East is being redrawn for many converging reasons, and what happens next in Syria will have profound ramifications for the entire region.

Kelly Kassis is a geopolitical analyst and director of international relations at the Center of Political and Foreign Affairs (CPFA),

Image: Hanohiki / Shutterstock.com.