Last month’s initial public hearing of the Afghanistan War Commission featured several discussions that touched on the role of contractors for both military and development projects during the war. We agree that the commission must take a clear-eyed view of the use and performance of contractors along with the policies and strategies associated with their work. In conjunction with this, however, we believe it is important to address some common perceptions and misperceptions about contractors.

The Afghanistan War Commission was established by Congress in 2021 to conduct a comprehensive review of key decisions related to U.S. military, intelligence, foreign assistance, and diplomatic involvement in Afghanistan from June 2001 to August 2021. As Co-Chair Shamila Chaudhary noted in her introduction, the commission intends to bring an unflinching and rigorous approach to assessing the twenty-year war, identifying lessons learned, and making recommendations with the directive to reflect, learn, and heal.

Notably, the Afghanistan War used the most contractors in the history of U.S. military engagements. This resulted from the military drawdowns following the first Gulf War. The fact that we were fighting two simultaneous wars, in Afghanistan and Iraq, also increased the need. After the first Gulf War, the U.S. made a strategic decision to maintain an all-volunteer force and outsource much of its defense service support capability. Today, the U.S. cannot fight a war without their support. As an integral part of the defense industrial base, contractors provide significant capabilities both from a services and defense manufacturer perspective. These capabilities not only supported the warfighter during the conflict but also represented a deterrence to war and defense of freedom. 

There is a common misperception that many contractors are greedy and are just in it for the money; in fact, Dr. Noah Coburn’s witness testimony reinforced that misperception. As he put it, “It does not seem coincidental to me that the U.S.’s longest war to date is also the war that relied most on contracting.” During the hearing, Commissioner Daniel Fata pushed back on that statement, saying it was a dangerous inference. “It almost sounds like [Dr. Coburn suggested] the war was dragged on for war profiteering.” Fata then highlighted the tremendous sacrifices made by contractors: “People lost their lives trying to do the right thing.”

It is sometimes implied that contractors will not be as motivated or efficient as those in uniform or carrying a U.S. Government badge. On the contrary, many former military and foreign service officers, aid and development professionals, teachers, and others were motivated to continue their work in support of U.S. interests. Sadly, as Commissioner Fata stated, many contractors paid the ultimate price trying to do the right thing alongside their U.S. government, Afghan, and other Allied partners. 

The International Stability Operations Association (ISOA), which represents over 200 companies that contract with the U.S. Government, NATO, and other organizations, is grateful for the mission and work of the commission to learn from the use of contractors during the Afghanistan War. Some contracting improvements have already been made, including better financial controls and oversights, U.S. and international standards in place for training, recruiting, and conduct, and more competition for contracts, among other things.

In the coming months, ISOA stands ready to support the Department of Defense and the Industrial Base as the commission assesses the Afghanistan War. Given how the Department of Defense budget is currently structured, the United States cannot fight a war without a strong, experienced, and ethical base of contractors. Let us learn from what happened in Afghanistan and better utilize this necessary and valuable resource.

Howard R. Lind is the President of the International Stability Operations Association.

Image: Ryanzo W. Perez / Shutterstock.com.