British financiers and traders continued to develop Latin America’s economy for the next century and British envoys exercised enormous political influence throughout the region. That Britain dominated Latin America was not in question; both Latin American and British historians agree that by mid-century Britain had incorporated the region into its informal empire. It would take the Great Depression and World War II before Britain ceded its leadership role to the United States.

Myth No. 4: Americans Were Unified in Their Support of Manifest Destiny in Opposition to Britain

In 1845 John L. O’Sullivan, editor of a leading political journal complained of British and French interference in U.S. efforts to annex Texas, warning that their goal was to block American expansion and “the fulfillment of our manifest destiny.” The phrase soon became a rallying cry for American expansion, first in claiming the Oregon territory from Britain, then in justifying the territorial conquests of the Mexican American War which stretched the nation’s borders to the Pacific Ocean. However, rather than a unifying cry, Manifest Destiny deeply divided the nation. Northerners led by Henry Clay and John Quincy Adams were staunchly opposed to the war fearing it would risk conflict with Britain and France and lead to the expansion of slavery in the new territories seized from Mexico. The ensuing United States victory escalated tensions with the South beginning the countdown to the Civil War.

Myth No. 5: America Forced Britain’s Retreat during the 1895 Venezuelan Crisis, Confirming Its Dominance in the Western Hemisphere

For nearly fifty years the border separating British Guyana from Venezuela had been under dispute. In the mid-1890s the Venezuelan government escalated matters by invoking the Monroe Doctrine to secure the support of the United States in its negotiations with Britain. U.S. Secretary of State Richard Olney led the American intervention warning British Prime Minister Lord Salisbury that “the United States is practically sovereign on this continent” and insisted that the dispute be subject to international arbitration, to which Britain agreed, having already offered Venezuela arbitration a few years before.

Scholars have interpreted Britain’s concession as deference to the rise of American power and its growing influence in South America. This is only partly true. The Royal Navy, with its approximately 200 battleships and cruisers, outgunned the U.S. Navy by a 10-1 margin while Britain remained economically dominant on the continent until the 1930s. Instead, Britain acquiesced because of the rise of Germany which reshaped the global balance of power and itself aimed to establish an empire in Latin America, alarming both Washington and London. Rather than a transition of power, the 1895 Venezuelan crisis reflected a new rapprochement between the two powers founded on an informal burden-sharing agreement: while Britain shifted its attention to the main thrust of German power in Europe, the United States assumed greater responsibility to defend both nation’s interests in Latin America. The British decision to accept arbitration seemed obvious, especially as its case was so strong and upheld by a unanimous decision of the court. However, it had little impact on Britain’s continued relations with Latin America; the United States would not become the new hegemon of the Western Hemisphere until World War II.

What are the real takeaways for Beijing’s leadership from America’s experience with Great Britain? First, do not underestimate the staying power of the reigning champion. Initially, the United States had believed Spanish America part of its domain and would not realize the extent of Britain’s influence until the early 1830s when shocked U.S. diplomats reported back to Washington, leading to a century’s-long phobia about the influence of “perfidious Albion” in the Americas. Second, rising powers must avoid unnecessary antagonisms with the dominant power if they truly wish to emerge peacefully. There were many opportunities for the United States and Britain to clash. Indeed, the Venezuelan crisis eventually prompted the two nations to plan for conflict. However, both sides did what was necessary to avoid what would have been a terrible war, especially for the United States. Finally, as the U.S. did after World War II, China should follow Britain’s lead in offering an inclusive, not exclusive, sphere of influence. Britain never sought to close its informal empire to any nation, indeed, later in the nineteenth century, it encouraged the South Americans to overcome their anti-American sentiments trade with the United States to service its enormous debts to City of London bankers. This is very likely why Britain’s dominance in the region has been ignored.

Unfortunately, it’s hard to imagine the Chinese absorbing these lessons as they are convinced of America’s decline and increasingly demand obeisance from other states within East Asia, including U.S. allies, which in turn will only harden the Sino-American rivalry in the twenty-first century.

Gregory Mitrovich is an award-winning historian whose forthcoming book is entitled The Contest: The United States, Great Britain, Germany, and the Rivalries that Forged the American Century.