As in the case of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic’s UN membership since 1945, there is a historical curiosity regarding the non-proliferation regime. After gaining independence in 1991, Ukraine briefly had the third-largest arsenal of nuclear weapons after Russia and the United States. At the time, Ukraine possessed more atomic warheads than the remaining three official nuclear weapon states—the United Kingdom, France, and China—put together.

In the mid-1990s, however, Kyiv agreed to destroy its unusable intercontinental missiles in exchange for the now-infamous Budapest Memorandum of 1994. Ukraine was also persuaded to liquidate or hand over to Russia all militarily usable atomic stockpiles, radioactive materials, nuclear technologies, and relevant delivery systems.

The Gravedigger of the Post-Cold War Order

Russia’s war against Ukraine since 2014 and its escalation in 2022 have shaken not only the liberal world order but also the European Security Order and the general international legal system. Russia’s attack is directed not just against Ukraine’s democracy but against the statehood, borders, sovereignty, identity, and integrity of a UN member state. The subversive effects of this behavior by a permanent member of the UN Security Council and official nuclear-weapon state under the NPT are amplified by the meek and ineffectual behavior of the remaining members of the Security Council, other nuclear weapon states, and other powerful Western countries—first and foremost Germany.

It is true that the massive sanctions imposed on Moscow by the West since 2022 have hampered Russian warfare and weakened the economy. However, they have not been able to constrain Russia, let alone end the war. Western arms deliveries to Ukraine are not insignificant but continue to be reluctant, circumscribed, and slow. They remain limited in scope and size. The deliveries still exclude various crucial types of weaponry.

Russia’s war also often indirectly and sometimes directly affects the security interests of Europe and other states. For example, Russian missiles operate in the vicinity of Ukrainian nuclear power plants, target the embassy district of Kyiv, or destroy Ukrainian grain silos. Even so, militarily powerful European states whose interests are visibly threatened or diminished by Russian warfare have not reacted materially. Instead, the European nations leave the protection of objects in Ukrainian territory critical to them for Ukraine’s armed forces.

Last but not least, international involvement in non-military aid for Ukraine remains muted. Today, there are intense debates in the West over transferring Moscow’s frozen funds to Kyiv, on how to punish Russia for its mass human rights violations in the occupied Ukrainian territories, and on the repatriation of thousands of unaccompanied deported Ukrainian children from Russia to their homeland. However, there have thus far been few relevant practical steps taken to implement these and similar intentions.

Conclusions

The continuing gap between the West’s public rhetoric and political practice gives the impression that the liberal international order is a mirage. To be sure, Russia is heading towards a dead end for its would-be empire and will emerge from the war as a net loser, even if victorious on the battlefield. At the same time, the Kremlin has managed to partly destroy the UN-based world system that emerged after 1945 and the European Security Order that emerged from the Helsinki Declaration of 1975.

To alleviate this situation, the words and deeds of Western and non-Western governments and international organizations must align. This concerns European actors above all but is also an issue beyond Europe. Western European and North American support for Ukraine is heavily driven by normative and emotional concerns, often based on feelings of community, solidarity, and empathy. While laudable, such motivations must be supplemented with more explicit and rational consideration of the national and transnational costs of Russia’s continuing devaluation of world order, international law, and global security.

Outside the Western realm, values, emotions, and norms have played a lesser role in evaluating Ukraine’s plight since February 24, 2022. Many politicians and commentators in the Global South see the Russo-Ukrainian war as either a quarrel between different groups of white people or as a conflict between Russia and the West. Most commentators perceive it as an event largely unrelated to the interests of non-European nations. A number of politicians, diplomats, and experts even regard it as a confrontation that should be exploited by Asian, African, and Latin American countries for their own benefit. Some go as far as to mistake Russia’s imperial war, illegal annexations, and genocidal behavior as acts of anti-imperialist resistance against an allegedly expansive West—a curious misinterpretation also popular in Western far left- and right-wing circles.

The spread of such misunderstandings across the non-Western world is paradoxical. Russia’s rhetorical devaluation and practical subversion of international law, order, and organization not only concerns the European continent. It may be more dangerous for militarily weak non-Western countries than for well-protected NATO member states or close non-NATO allies of the United States, such as Japan or South Korea.

It is sometimes forgotten that Ukraine is—in broadly comparative terms—a country intensely involved in regional and global treaties and organizations. To illustrate the international embeddedness of Ukraine as of May 2024, it has been the beneficiary of an extraordinary Budapest Memorandum attached to the NPT since 1994, a participant of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe since its creation in 1995, party to an especially detailed Association Agreement with the EU since 2014, as well as co-convenor of a special NATO-Ukraine Council founded in 2022. Many states around the world are less entrenched in international structures or have less powerful partners and allies. The sovereignty and integrity of these non-European countries rely—even more than Ukraine’s—on the functioning of the multilateral rules, organizations, and agreements that Russia is currently attacking.

Western and non-Western countries should, out of their own interests, support Ukraine as much as possible as it works to restore its territorial integrity and sovereignty. They should support Ukraine in its attempts to limit and reverse the genocidal aspects of Russia’s attack on Ukraine since 2014 to hold Russia accountable and consider ways to reform the UN and broader world system in order to prevent future misuse of international agreements and organizations to implement expansionist or genocidal policies. They should consider strengthening older or establishing new discussion forums (diplomatic, political, or academic), transnational networks (governmental, non-governmental, or mixed), and international organizations (regional, transregional, or global) designed to confront and contain revanchist, colonial, imperialistic and genocidal policies.

Western and non-Western governments, think tanks, media outlets, and NGOs should cooperate in the exchange and spread of accurate information and political clarification to the wider public about Russia’s war and its various international consequences. Making national and multinational action in support of Ukraine more resolute will demand better explanatory work from Western and non-Western press offices, research institutes, PR companies, educational institutions, and other public bodies. They must clarify for their audiences the full range of risks and implications for international stability that emanate from Russia’s subversive foreign behavior.

Dr. Andreas Umland is an analyst at the Stockholm Centre for East European Studies (SCEEUS) at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI). The article is based on a February 2024 SCEEUS report. See sceeus.se/en/publications/.

Image: Dmytro Larin / Shutterstock.com.