Recently, the Italian aircraft carrier ITS Cavour joined France, Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom in Exercise Pitch Black 24 in Australia. This high-intensity training aims to boost interoperability with international allies. Following the exercise, the Italian carrier strike group will head to Guam, Japan, and then, for the first time, it will transit through the South China Sea headed to the Philippines.

This comes as the Italian Parliament greenlights over forty military operations for 2024, including new missions in Italy’s “Enlarged Mediterranean,” an EU-led naval mission in the Red Sea (Aspides), and a humanitarian mission in Palestine (Levante). Personnel-wise, Italy stands out as the top contributor to UN military operations and the second-largest to both NATO and EU missions.

These moves reflect a dual-track foreign policy expansion initiated under the Draghi government (2021–22) and accelerated by the Meloni administration. Italian foreign policy has broadened beyond its traditional Atlantic, European, and Mediterranean perimeters.

First, Italy is stretching the concept of the “Enlarged Mediterranean,” extending its reach from the Sahel region of Africa to the Black Sea, including the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Sea. Here, Italy is concerned with and aims to strengthen fragile states, which are susceptible not only to crime and terrorism but also to influence from China and Russia. These powers used economic aid and military support not just for resource extraction but to exert control over Europe through strategic points, resources, and migration routes. To counter this, among other goals, Italy launched the Mattei Plan. It secured several African states’ endorsements at the Italy-Africa Summit (January 28–29) as well as G7’s blessing at the Borgo Egnazia Summit (June 13–15). The plan targets nine critical countries—Algeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ivory Coast, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Morocco, Mozambique, and Tunisia—with pilot projects.

Second, Italy’s participation in Pitch Black 24 highlights its growing engagement in the Indo-Pacific in the wake of other European middle powers. Italy joined the Global Combat Air Program (GCAP) with Japan and the UK. Still, it didn’t renew its Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with China, signed a strategic partnership with Japan, and strengthened ties with India. Italy is also ramping up its military presence in the Indo-Pacific, underlining its commitment to Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) despite not joining US-led initiatives of the sort.

The six-month deployment of the Italian Navy’s Thaon di Revel-class ship Francesco Morosini in 2023, followed in 2024 by a five-month deployment of the Cavour aircraft carrier group and a similar cruise by the off-shore patrol ship Montecuccoli, showcases this shift. These missions are about naval diplomacy, promoting Italian industry, and engaging with NATO allies and local forces to promote interoperability—particularly with Japan. Italy also participated in the Rim of the Pacific exercise (RIMPAC), the world’s largest maritime warfare exercise, for the first time with a vessel.

Despite this growing effort, Italy has yet to formalize a national security strategy defining its interests, objectives, resources, threats, and defense capabilities. As the only G7 country without such a document, Italy may be pressured to develop one soon if recent signals from high-level institutions are any indication.

Adopting a national security strategy would require Rome to clearly define its actions and manage constraints. This is crucial as Italy’s middle power status brings two major implications.

From a positional standpoint, a middle power is defined by its ability. Given this, Italy should focus its foreign policy primarily on the “Enlarged Mediterranean.” This approach helps avoid both the risk of overextending commitments with limited resources and the challenge of justifying increased exposure in a region like the Indo-Pacific to a domestic public that is often resistant to higher defense spending.

As middle powers can defend their interests mostly in their regions, Italy is pressured to focus on the “Enlarged Mediterranean” and avoid overextension of commitments. This is also crucial as the Italian audience is highly skeptical of foreign military deployments.

However, middle powers are dangerously exposed to great power competition’s externalities. When confrontation among the most powerful actors ramps up, middle powers are pushed to alignment with their stronger ally as freedom of maneuver shrinks. As a result, Rome is now paying more attention to Washington’s calls for a more robust European engagement with the Indo-Pacific. This move is supposed to benefit relations with Washington, as Rome can leverage the growing commitment in Asia to keep the Americans committed to Euro-Mediterranean security, at least to a reasonable extent.

Italy faces this middle-power dilemma. On one hand, the Mediterranean is a powder keg, urging Rome to focus resources on its stabilization. On the other, the United States will increasingly pivot toward the Indo-Pacific and pull some allies with it. In this context, formalizing a national security strategy could enhance Italian standing, especially if it contains a global outlook, as well as promote greater executive coordination. 

However, it might also constrain foreign policy flexibility as the document puts commitments down on paper. Alternatively, not adopting one could be a strategic choice for retaining greater freedom of maneuver and adaptability. Alas, it might also limit Italy’s future role on the global stage for two reasons. First, Washington and some allies could feel that Rome was not keeping up with the shifting balance of power. Second, national executive coordination could fall short, especially in the face of growing great power competition.

Gabriele Natalizia is a visiting fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. He is also an associate professor at the Department of Political Science at Sapienza University of Rome, where he teaches security and international politics and political science.

Lorenzo Termine is a visiting fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. He is also a postdoctoral researcher at Sapienza University of Rome and an adjunct professor at both the University of International Studies in Rome and the American University of Rome.

Image: Massimo Todaro / Shutterstock.com.