Abdulhamid al-Dbeibah is the Prime Minister of the Government of National Unity (GNU) based in Tripoli and the political face of one of the wealthiest business families to have survived Libya’s transition from authoritarian rule under Muammar Gaddafi to the patchwork landscape of militias and councils today. In the last three weeks, he has succeeded in alienating both the militias that form his most vital constituency and the international community that he so desperately relies upon for his legitimacy. 

Perhaps he genuinely believes that he can somehow unite the rival factions and increase his government’s share of national resources, thereby centralizing power and signaling that he is truly irreplaceable. However, his recent moves are more likely a cynical effort to forestall his inevitable ouster, buying him a little more time in which he can create the appearance of a man in control of his destiny as he hopes that circumstances change and his fortune improves.

Elites and Elections

The GNU was launched in February 2021 in an effort to reform and revitalize the government in Tripoli, following two attempts by Khalifa Haftar’s National Army to seize the capital. It was in line with the spirit of the Political Agreement of 2015, which produced the Presidency Council as a centralized executive branch in Tripoli and the Higher Council of State as an advisory body coordinating decisions between the two governments in eastern and western Libya. These were always interim arrangements in the minds of the UN Security Council member states, who envisioned moving quickly toward elections in which the Libyan people could express their will about the future of the state. 

Morocco hosted talks of a “6+6 Committee” that failed to deliver a roadmap for elections in June 2023 but was able to issue recommendations for a set of procedures and regulations that should appeal to both sides. The government in the West has made vague promises to hold elections before Revolution Day on February 17, and the government in the East has repeatedly asserted that it will support elections after a broader unity government is formed. 

However, elections have never been in the interests of any of these power brokers and, therefore, will likely remain postponed indefinitely. Elite families on both sides now hold their respective institutions captive, using them as a platform for extending lines of patronage while holding the UN and international oil consumers hostage to their local agendas. In that sense, the relative calm of the period since 2021 has provided breathing room for key political and military actors to entrench themselves and explore common interests. The United Arab Emirates has helped broker an understanding between Haftar and Dbeibah on sharing oil revenues. At the same time, Turkey and Russia have reached a détente that allows them to expand their own military basing arrangements in the western and eastern regions, respectively. 

Leap of Faith

Over the last month, Dbeibah has upset the balance and provoked such a strong reaction that the equilibrium probably cannot be restored. He has effectively seized the Central Bank, probably in an effort to gain a greater share of the budget and secure access to the foreign reserves. He has also attempted to unify the command structure and exert authority over the militias in Tripoli, probably in an effort to reassure his political allies and the public that he is still in control. 

Military Restructuring 

Dbeibah’s close ally at the head of the Presidential Council, Mohammed al-Menfi, gave a speech on August 18 (Armed Forces Day) calling for unifying the militias and, in his capacity as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, convened the first-ever meeting of commanders and intelligence chiefs. 

On August 23, Dbeibah launched a Supreme Committee for Security Arrangements, headed by Minister of Interior Emad al-Trabelsi, who immediately issued an order for all militias to evacuate government buildings within twenty-four hours. 

The new Supreme Committee is nominally tasked with supervising the withdrawal of all units to their headquarters, relinquishing control of all public buildings to the control of the Ministry of Interior, turning over all private properties to their proper owners, removing their checkpoints and leaving them in the control of the MOI, subjecting their prisons to government inspection, and submitting control of all ports of entry to government authorities. 

Central Bank Closure

On August 16, the Presidential Council voted unanimously to remove Central Bank Governor Sadiq al-Kabir on the grounds that his term had long since ended and appoint a new Board of Directors. They also announced a committee to investigate mismanagement by the Central Bank and the need for a “fair distribution of state revenues.”

Armed men arrived to seize the Central Bank headquarters in Tripoli only to find the premises locked and the staff dismissed on an extended “bank holiday,” according to a video posted on social media. 

Mohammed al-Shukri, who had been nominated for the post in 2018 but never assumed the duties, declined the offer this time around. Deputy Governor Abdul Fattah Ghaffar is now in charge, though only in an acting capacity, while various representatives from the two governments are exploring the idea of reaching a compromise that will reassure international markets. 

Dbeibah and his allies have forced through these measures in the hopes that they will convey strength and purpose, signaling that they are indispensable for stability in the West and irreplaceable in office. Neither is true. The loyalty of the militias in Tripoli only extends as far as they receive their paychecks. If Dbeibah is gambling that the militias hate each other more than they hate him, and his promise of a greater share of the national budget will rally their confidence in him, then he is likely to be disappointed. 

Dbeibah is a serious politician, however, and his latest moves were probably motivated less by an overestimated sense of his own self-worth and more by a fear that his removal from power was imminent. He cannot compete with eastern Libya in terms of natural resources or Foreign Direct Investment, and it shows when the newspapers and social media proliferate with images of long lines at fuel stations in the West and Emirati property developers signing deals for major projects in Benghazi. An MOU that he signed in March granting Turkey wide latitude for basing troops in Libya came under sharp criticism as a form of neo-colonialism when the details became public on August 12. 

Most importantly, Dbeibah’s ally as head of the Higher Council of State, Mohammed al-Takala, lost to his rival Khaled al-Mishri in second-round voting on August 6 and has overstayed his tenure in office. Takala has appealed to the courts, and now he and Mishri are each trying to convene the body as competing presidents. If fully empowered, Mishri could strike a deal with Aquila Saleh, Speaker of the House of Representatives (HoR) in eastern Libya, and work to convince the UN of the need for a new unity government in advance of elections. 

Watching and Waiting

Khalifa Haftar, Aquila Saleh, Osama Hammad, and others in the East are biding their time with the expectation that Dbeibah will falter. The HoR has issued endless proclamations—declaring the removal of al-Kabir illegal, the Presidential Council illegitimate, the oil fields under force majeur, the transfer of the title “Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces,” etc. Throughout all of this drama, Haftar’s son Saddam has been leading his land forces on desert patrols on raids of drug dealers and human traffickers in the South in order to show the public that while politicians bicker, his family is achieving tangible gains in promoting border security and public safety. As long as the HoR remains united, Osama Hammad presents himself as a credible alternative, and Khalifa Haftar remains in good health and ready to mediate among the factions, the government in the East can watch and wait. 

They would be right to keep their distance. Dbeibah can create new security structures, lock down the Central Bank’s headquarters, and jettison the principles of broad consensus that underpinned the Political Agreement of 2015 and every attempt at national dialogue ever since. He may even try to hold a referendum on a constitution accompanied by-elections sometime this winter, though they would probably only be held in the West, and their legitimacy would come under attack. With all of these moves, Dbeibah is probably only buying six months more time in office. If anything, the last three weeks have shown that the situation is fluid and unstable. Dbeibah and his allies have overextended their authority, and the international community does not want to write him a blank check. 

Joshua Yaphe, Ph.D., is a Visiting Fellow at the Center for the National Interest. For fifteen years, he was the lead analyst for the Arabian Peninsula at the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research. The opinions and characterizations in this piece are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. Government.

Image: Hussein Eddeb / Shutterstock.com.