The Special Relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom is built on a common history of defending freedom, extensive economic ties, and close security collaboration—and it is flourishing. Still, it is in the interest of both countries to further expand it. 

As trade wars, decoupling, and military aggression foment international instability, the world is once again splitting into opposing camps. The United States, European countries, and other free nations are facing an increasingly sharp challenge from powers coalescing around the new revisionist axis of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Countering the multifaceted threats of this axis requires not only American power and diplomacy but also stronger and more effective alliances.

Military deterrence and the prevention of a great power war must be the focused common goal of the free world. However, there is no security without outperforming adversaries in the economic field (including technology). Donald Trump’s America First policy does not mean America alone, as former National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien noted in a seminal recent article. The United States can and must galvanize the will and resources of free nations to oppose bad actors and encourage peace.

The U.S.-UK partnership enabled victory in the Second World War and shaped the postwar order. It was central to winning the Cold War and prosecuting the Global War on Terror. Moreover, it continues to spearhead Ukraine’s fight against Russian aggression and remains a cornerstone of global stability. Speaking strictly in our personal capacity, we argue that it can continue to be a force for good.

Britain has been America’s primary military partner since the struggle against the original Axis. It makes outsized contributions in critical fields, including intelligence (for example, through the Five Eyes), naval cooperation (including AUKUS), nuclear technology, and special forces. The level of trust, complexity, and depth of this relationship cannot be overstated. Officers from both militaries are often embedded at the highest level within the other’s military structures. For instance, a Royal Air Force air marshal recently joined the command staff of the U.S. Space Force as assistant chief of space operations.

Most importantly, the UK is one of the few countries willing to take the lead together with America in a crisis—as seen in the fight against the Islamic State and the defense of Ukraine. This willingness reflects not just the natural, familial bond between two “English-speaking peoples,” as Churchill put it, but also a shared commitment to sacrifice for freedom. Crucially, this willingness is backed by the ability to act—with the UK in a position to draw on not only its extensive influence and diplomatic network but also its valuable military bases at strategic points around the globe.

Still, Britain is criticized in the United States for its shrinking military capabilities, particularly regarding the number of its troops and quantity of military equipment. This, in turn, fuels the perception that the UK is losing its status and influence in Washington and around the world. This criticism is not entirely justified: it ignores the fact that the UK operates highly expensive, cutting-edge U.S. military equipment, which contributes to unparalleled interoperability with the United States even if it limits how much Britain can afford. 

London is prepared to increase defense spending to 2.5 percent of GDP in a few years. But, in the current geostrategic context, it should aim to increase that contribution to 3 percent. 

Another key security consideration is Britain’s global posture. Here, the debate is between pigeonholing the UK in Europe and accepting (indeed, welcoming) a UK that assumes a more expansive global role. In the Indo-Pacific, the UK, as a smaller power but one with deep ties in the area, can help buttress alliances and talk to regional actors in ways that the United States cannot. 

The point of a stronger UK involvement “east of Suez” is not whether British forces can make a military difference if war breaks out with China. Rather, it is about adding weight to U.S. political-military efforts to align Indo-Pacific countries with a vision of security and freedom intended to prevent conflict.

The economic aspect of the Special Relationship rests on a solid foundation: the two countries are already major trade partners. America is the largest foreign investor in the UK, and Britain is among the top seven trading partners for the United States. However, there is still room for even greater economic collaboration, especially in light of the growing competition with China.

Brexit, which President Trump supported, held up the prospect of a more global UK policy. A Free Trade Agreement (FTA) was the centerpiece of this vision. President Trump was favorable to a U.S.-UK FTA—despite his reputation for trade wars, he engaged in twelve separate FTA negotiations. However, for a variety of political reasons, the UK trade deal could not be concluded while he was in office, and President Biden had little interest in FTAs in general.

Prime Minister Keir Starmer has staked his premiership on delivering economic growth. A U.S.-UK FTA would be a big win for his government, despite the Labour Party’s anti-Brexit and pro-Europe stance. His aides are said to have already tested the waters with U.S. political leaders about concluding an FTA.

At the level of geoeconomic competition, a U.S.-UK FTA would put pressure not only on China and other nations of the revisionist axis but also on the EU. It would present countries around the world with a choice between two types of trade arrangements: That of the United States, which relates to other regimes on the basis of mutual recognition, and that of the EU, which insists that other regimes harmonize their regulations with Brussels. Interestingly, China’s approach is also a type of harmonization since it conditions access to the Chinese market by replicating Chinese regulations. 

Two problems stand in the way. The first is the “Europe question” in British politics. Prime Minister Starmer seeks a rapprochement with the EU, the price of which will likely be higher regulatory re-alignment with Brussels. This, in turn, could limit Britain’s ability to strike ambitious FTAs with non-EU economies. Such regulatory changes would have to be at the very heart of a U.S.-UK trade deal. This is what can move the needle, as UK tariffs are already low. 

The second problem is the difficulty of negotiating the FTA itself and overcoming a number of market-access stumbling blocks—especially in agriculture (e.g., “chlorinated” chicken and GMO crops) or healthcare. But the effort is worthwhile. For example, since the two countries are the greatest financial powerhouses in the free world, they would both benefit from aligning their financial services regulations.

As things stand, the most likely framework for a U.S.-UK Free Trade Agreement could be the USMCA (the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement), seen as the gold standard by President Trump’s team. The UK would not need to join the USMCA but would sign on to its terms. This would also make Congressional approval more likely since Congress has already approved the USMCA terms. 

In addition, the United States and the United Kingdom could agree on a number of Mutual Recognition Agreements in which the parties share the same regulatory objectives but accept different ways of pursuing them. This would allow progress in various sectors of industry, including pharmaceuticals, accounting, and engineering. 

A U.S.-UK Free Trade Agreement will have to navigate difficult obstacles. However, there is political will on both sides, and its strategic and symbolic benefits make it worth the effort. The United States should pursue this deal because it benefits the American people and strengthens a key ally. It would also help tilt the world trade system towards free and fair trade between sovereign nations and away from excessive domestic and international regulation. 

Further advancement in bilateral military and economic ties is in the interest of the American and British peoples. Our relationship is and should remain “the highest level of special.”

Duke Buchan III, a Florida-based investor, is a former U.S. Ambassador to Spain and currently the National Finance Chair of the Republican National Committee.

Dan Negrea served in the U.S. Department of State as a Senior Advisor in the Secretary’s Policy Planning Office and as the Special Representative for Commercial and Business Affairs. He is a Distinguished Fellow of the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center.

Gabriel Elefteriu is Deputy Director at the Council on Geostrategy in London and a Fellow at the Yorktown Institute.

The authors write only in their personal capacity and not on behalf of any person or organization.

Image: Mistervlad / Shutterstock.com.